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Learning in Clinical Practice: Findings from CT, MRI and PACS 
 
SUMMARY 
This thesis explores learning in clinical practice in the cases of CT, MRI and PACS in 
UK hospitals. It asks the questions of how and why certain evolutionary features of 
technology condition learning and change in medical contexts.  
 
Using an evolutionary perspective of cognitive and social aspects of technological 
change, this thesis explores the relationships between technology and organisational 
learning processes of intuition, interpretation, integration and institutionalisation. 
Technological regimes are manifested in routines, skills and artefacts, and dynamically 
evolve with knowledge accumulation processes at the individual, group and 
organisational levels. Technological change increases the uncertainty and complexity of 
organisational learning, making organisational outcomes partially unpredictable. 
Systemic and emergent properties of medical devices such as CT and MRI make 
learning context-specific and experimental. Negotiation processes between different 
social groups shape the role and function of an artefact in an organisational context. 
Technological systems connect artefacts to other parts of society, mediating values, 
velocity and directionality of change. Practice communities affect how organisations 
deal with this complexity and learn. These views are used to explore the accumulation 
of knowledge in clinical practices in CT, MRI and PACS.  
 
This thesis develops contextualised theory using a case-study approach to gather novel 
empirical data from over 40 interviews with clinical, technical, managerial and 
administrative staff in five NHS hospitals. It uses clinical practice (such as processes, 
procedures, tasks, rules, interpretations and routines) as a unit of analysis and CT, MRI 
and PACS technology areas as cases. Results are generalised to evolutionary aspects of 
technological learning and change provided by the framework, using processes for 
qualitative analysis such as ordering and coding.  
 
When analysed using an evolutionary perspective of technology, the findings in this 
thesis suggest that learning in clinical practice is diverse, cumulative and incremental, 
and shaped by complex processes of mediation, by issues such as disease complexity, 
values, external rules and choice restrictions from different regimes, and by inter-
disciplinary problem-solving in operational routines.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Medical innovation is central to the advancement of human health, wellbeing, and increase 
in life expectancy (Ackerknecht 1982; Jennett 1986; Pickstone 1992; OECD 2008). While 
advancements in diagnostics, therapeutics and devices have moved quite quickly, 
innovation in healthcare delivery systems have taken place much more slowly (NRC, 
2002:12). 
 
A large variety of products and treatments are associated with medical innovation, such as 
immunisations, antibiotics, vaccines, aspirin (Vane et al. 1990), intraocular lenses (Apple 
and Sims 1996), hip replacement technology (Anderson et al. 2007) and diagnostic devices 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). Many of these innovations have direct benefits to 
individuals such as the eradication of certain diseases, early diagnosis, the reduction of the 
duration of illness and increase in longevity (Pickstone 1992). Medical innovation also 
benefits social and economic development more generally by supporting a healthy and 
productive workforce (Jennett 1986).   
 
While positive relationships between medical innovation and health outcomes are often 
undisputed, the translation of medical innovations via hospitals into effective and efficient 
services for patients is found to be wrought with complexities and difficulties (Kaluzny 
1974; Kaluzny et al. 1974; Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Webster 2006). Hospitals are sometimes 
described as intractable and inefficient contexts for innovation and change (Plsek 2003). 
Healthcare sectors have a high degree of organisational and professional heterogeneity and 
regulation (Kaluzny et al. 1974; Scott et al. 2000). Healthcare sectors differ in their 
regulatory conditions from private industry1. The high degree of regulation of processes, 
                                                 
1Regulatory conditions are sometimes considered as a central characteristic differentiating the public 
healthcare sector from private industry (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).  
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products, inputs, investments, and outcomes at the organisational, regional and national 
levels makes hospital decision-making relatively unpredictable and structures difficult to 
change (Scott et al. 2000).  
 
Hospital organisations are different from each other and they are different from firms, 
making planning and prediction of innovation outcomes difficult (Djellal and Gallouj 
2005). Hospitals are organised in complex ways, with many connection points and 
differences in local, regional and institutional links and interdependencies between them 
(Mohr 1992; Fitzgerald et al. 2002).   
 
Hospitals are highly specialised with a large and growing diversity of medical professionals 
and medical specialties. For example, NRC (2002) notes that in the US between the 1950s 
and 2001 the number of different medical specialists increased from approximately 10-12 
to 20, and the number of different medical specialties from 6-8 to over 100. These and other 
characteristics of the production process (such as interrelationships between specialists that 
may differ from service to service) mean it is very difficult to ‘scale-up’ service provision 
in this sector, for example to achieve an increase in the production and quality of services 
by investing in inputs (NRC 2002). 
  
Hospitals face a highly differentiated customer base compared to other organisations. 
Patient needs and their health outcomes are challenging to measure and understand 
(Kaluzny 1974). Patients and biological diseases are diverse and change continuously over 
time, making it difficult to ‘customise’ services and make predictions about future 
requirements (NRC 2002).  
 
Healthcare sectors such as the UK National Healthcare Service (NHS) are closely 
monitored and scrutinised by the public and the media, sometimes more so than any other 
industry (Roberts 1987). Close public attention makes it difficult to pre-empt directions, 
opportunities, drivers and consequences of change (Roberts 1987; Epstein 2000; Robertson 
and Jochelson 2006). For example, patients are supported in voicing their clinical demands, 
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and have the ability to exert pressure on healthcare services and shape the degree of clinical 
autonomy (Sitzia and Wood 1997).  
 
Healthcare has in recent years attracted a lot of policy attention, especially in the area of 
innovation and change. For example, since the 1990s the UK NHS has invested over £350 
million2 in the formulation and implementation of programmes to make hospital services 
more ‘high-tech’3 (NHS 2000; NHS 2003). 
 
Despite the considerable amounts of investments and efforts that have been focused on 
innovation in the NHS, policies for change have been criticised for the centralisation of 
decision-making and underestimation of contextual complexity (NAO 2005; Clegg and 
Shepherd 2007; Eason 2007). For example, innovation policies in the UK NHS can be 
based on an understanding of successive steps between advancements in science and 
industry, followed by evidence of efficacy through clinical research and trials, followed by 
formulation of medical guidelines and their implementation, which are expected to lead to 
changes in clinical practice (Granados et al. 1997; Grimshaw et al. 2004). This suggests a 
linear relationship where medical innovation is viewed as a natural outcome of 
implementation of guidelines with predictable results in their translation in clinical contexts 
(Granados et al. 1997).  
 
Centralisation of decision-making and its separation from application contexts (for example 
in large-scale implementation programmes) result in problems of implementation ‘on the 
ground’ (Collins 2003; 2007). Hospitals differ in important aspects such as the availability 
of staff, types of patients, and decision-making structures, meaning that innovation via the 
implementation of medical protocols may be possible in one hospital and impossible in 
another (Granados et al. 1997). 
 
Researchers have long argued that hospital and healthcare contexts are too complex and too 
diverse for policies informed by a narrow and linear view of innovation (Pickstone 1992; 
                                                 
 
3 This is large by international comparison for the time period and also compared to previous investments in 
the NHS (OECD Health 2005).   
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Metcalfe et al. 2005; Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006). Previous 
research has explained innovation in hospitals through concepts associated with diffusion 
(Rogers 1962; Coleman et al. 1966), communication (Rogers and Kincaid 1981), and as 
organisations innovating via evidence-based medicine (Ferlie et al. 2001; Van de Ven and 
Schomaker 2002). Diffusion approaches have tended to conceptualise hospitals as adopting 
organisations, and to give importance to aspects such as how the adoption decision is made, 
and the roles that specific individuals have in mediating information on ideas and products 
to decision-makers in hospitals (Rogers 1962). These perspectives have added greatly to 
our understanding of the process of diffusion of products and ideas into clinical 
environments.  
 
Further important perspectives have been provided by research on change processes more 
strictly within organisational contexts. Using perspectives of organisational behaviour and 
management, studies of innovation processes in hospitals have found specific 
organisational features of innovation outcomes such as routinisation of products and 
solutions to organisational problems (Kanter 1988; Van de Ven et al. 1989). 
 
While research on innovation in hospitals is both rich and vast, less has been said about the 
role of technological accumulation in underpinning and sustaining hospital innovation 
processes, such as suggested by neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary perspectives on the role of 
technology in organisational and economic change (for example, Rosenberg 1976; Freeman 
1982; Dosi et al. 1988). Neo-Schumpeterians argue that underlying innovation processes 
are incrementally accumulated ‘bundles’ of technology components such as knowledge (for 
example, individuals, artefacts, systems) and regimes (for example, structures within which 
knowledge components are organised, learning conditions shaped, and learning 
constrained) (Dosi 1988; Bell and Pavitt 1995).  
 
Sociological notions of innovation in organisations suggest that technological evolution is a 
social process of negotiation between social groups who over time ‘construct’ the meaning 
of, for example, a technological artefact in an organisational context (Pinch and Bijker 
1984; Blume 1992). In sociological perspectives the innovation process is shaped by the 
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meaning of the technology arrived at through the negotiation process, formed by social 
norms and structures, which may take a very long time (Bijker 1995; Williams and Edge 
1996).   
 
This thesis aims to add to existing literatures on medical innovation by exploring novel 
empirical areas of innovation in the UK NHS with existing evolutionary theories of 
technological learning and change. In supplier-dominated service sectors such as 
healthcare, innovation is characterised by processes of organisational change (Pavitt 1984) 
and that is why this thesis focuses on organisational change occurring in hospital practices.  
 
An important area of rapid technological advance that has attracted much investment in 
modern healthcare sectors since the 1990s and 2000s is that of diagnostic imaging 
technologies (Lazaro and Fitch 1995; NHS 2000; DoH 2007). Since their emergence in the 
1890s, medical imaging devices4 have revolutionised medical practice (Kevles 1997; 
Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). Diagnostic imaging devices have dramatically transformed 
diagnosis and treatment of diseases, both since the discovery of X-rays by Wilhelm 
Roentgen in 1895, and more recently through advancements in data processing and 
computing technologies in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and the creation of Computed 
Tomography (CT) scanners, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machines and Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET). Devices such as CT and MRI, in addition to providing 
images of anatomy, provide data on organ functionality and chemical and physical cell 
properties to a virtually unlimited degree (Kevles 1997).  
 
Medical imaging devices can be life-saving. In its first widespread applications in the 
1980s, CT was reported to have saved many lives because it provided 3-D images and 
much more information about what was going on in the patient’s body, unlike any other 
previous device or diagnostic technique (Sochurek 1987). Their high capacity and 
                                                 
4 Medical imaging devices are a group of diagnostic devices. Gelijns and Rosenberg (1999:313) suggest a 
grouping of diagnostic devices in five categories: (1) non-invasive imaging devices such as  X-ray, CT 
scanners, MRI machines, and ultrasound, (2) invasive imaging devices such as angiography and cardiac 
catheterization, (3) invasive direct visualisation technologies such as endoscopes, (4) electrical devices, such 
as electrocardiograms, and (5) “enhancing” technologies such as Picture Archiving and Communications 
Systems (PACS) which are software based.  
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sensitivity to detect tiny abnormalities makes modern digital imaging technologies very 
important in the early detection of severe and common diseases such as cancer5, which may 
be difficult or impossible to treat if they are not detected early enough (DoH 2001)6.  
 
Medical imaging devices can be cost-saving7, especially in the medium to long term 
(Mitchell 1988; Trajtenberg 1990). The costs of maintaining and using medical devices 
tend to fall over time and over the course of treatment, in contrast to therapeutics costs 
which tend to rise8 (NRC 2002). CT is considered to be welfare-enhancing (Trajtenberg 
1989). The early detection of diseases often makes them easier to treat, and medical devices 
such as CT and MRI, in addition to providing information on the type and condition of the 
disease provide information on its size and spread, which helps in the accurate planning of 
treatment (DoH 2001).  
 
Medical imaging devices are preferred by patients to other diagnostic techniques. CT and 
MRI, which are both non-invasive imaging devices, are often favoured by patients to 
invasive diagnostic techniques, which require insertion into the body9 or removal of tissue 
(Jennett 1986). With time, people have become less and less tolerant of invasive treatments 
and more apprehensive about their efficacy making non-invasive technologies more 
popular (Jennett 1986). 
 
In addition to hardware advancements in CT and MRI there has been a tremendous increase 
in computing software technologies in medicine. PACS10 produces digital images which 
can be enhanced, reconstructed, processed, displayed, archived, and analysed improving 
                                                 
5 It is predicted that 1 in 4 UK residents will contract cancer in their lifetime (NHS 1999).  
6 The diversity of diseases that can be detected with medical imaging is increasing quickly. For example, 
recently, MRI is making advancements in the detection of brain conditions such as dyslexia (MNT 2012). 
7 More generally, advancements in medical innovation over the period 1970 to 1990 have contributed to 
increased life expectancy as much as improvements to material wealth (NRC 2002). On the other hand, 
increasing technology costs are a key factor in rising health expenditures (Porter et al. 2006). Yet others state 
that they affect each other, and are differentiated by treatment and technology. For examples, vaccines have 
been very cost-effective, but progress in organ transplants has been costly but with little overall welfare gain 
(Djellal and Gallouj 2007). 
8 Furthermore, the economic value of disease reduction increases over time (as the wealth of the population 
increases the value of disease reduction rises) and the value of progress on one disease rises as progress is 
made on other diseases (NRC 2002). 
9 For example angiography, cardiac catheterization, and endoscopy are all invasive diagnostic devices.  
10 PACS, like other computer-based information management systems, is highly software dependent.  
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image quality and lowering transaction costs by enabling instant transmission of images to 
computer screens, between radiology departments, the operating suite, the bedside, portable 
communication devices, or anywhere else (Kevles 1998; Wolbarst 1999). For example, 
once an image is digitised, it can be enlarged or reduced, rotated or inverted, stretched or 
transformed to help the recognition of clinically relevant patterns and features that can 
dramatically improve accuracy in diagnosis (Huang et al. 1988; Strickland 1996; Bryan et 
al. 1999). Moreover, PACS can combine images from very different medical imaging 
devices, such as CT, MRI or PET, and make them comparable on one screen (Huang et al. 
1988; Bryan et al. 1999). It can also produce real-time images on a screen during surgery so 
that the surgical team can actually see their instruments inside the body as they perform 
operations (Kevles 1998). These are all differences from X-ray technology where images 
were printed on film providing a static image that could not be manipulated, enhanced or 
digitally transmitted.  
 
A large variety of factors affect the development of medical imaging devices (Gelijns and 
Rosenberg 1999). The following sections briefly review industrial advancements in medical 
devices and conditions affecting their supply in healthcare systems. The history of these 
technologies is described in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
The medical imaging devices industry is rapidly advancing into different technology areas, 
and it is dominated by a handful of very large firms11. Since the emergence of computer 
processing technologies and their application to X-ray and the development of the CT 
scanner, the diversity, quantity and power of medical imaging devices have increased 
tremendously. At the time of its innovation in the early 1980s, the prototype CT scanner 
went through several generations within three years of its development (Kevles 1998). In 
the 1990s and 2000s for devices such as MRI and PET this was even shorter. 
 
                                                 
11 Unlike other medical devices industries which are composed of many small firms, the medical imaging 
devices industry is dominated by the large firms Siemens, Philips, Toshiba, and General Electric (GE) 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). These firms also dominated the X-ray industry in the 20th Century and 
continue to do so today.  
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CT, MRI and PACS are part of a group of technologies that have evolved with the clinical 
specialty of radiology. These technologies originated largely outside of medicine, with 
complex operating principles based on the integration of knowledge of physics, 
mathematics, chemistry, engineering, electronics, computation and software. Very briefly, 
CT was developed in the early 1970s by EMI12, a firm specialised in recording, 
broadcasting and entertainment equipment which branched out into electronics after WWII. 
Their employee and engineer, G. Hounsfield, who specialised in pattern recognition and 
computing techniques is credited with having manufactured and patented the CT scanner13. 
The CT scanner quickly spread into the US, European and Japanese markets in the 1980s 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). 
 
Unlike CT which uses ionizing radiation combined with computing technology, MRI is 
based on principles of radio waves and magnetic fields and computing. MRI development 
is even more strongly connected to computing because, unlike X-rays which can produce 
an image without computers, magnetic resonance data requires much higher signal 
processing power to be processed into images. MRI development is attributed to close 
cooperation between UK-US universities and industry (Kereiakes 1987); the most notable 
academics credited for its development are P. Mansfield, R. Damadian, P. Lauterbur and J. 
Mallard. Industry research intensified in the mid-1970s with firms such as EMI and Philips. 
Development was difficult at first because, briefly, the computer algorithms were more 
problematic, the strong magnets created problems in hospitals, and up until the 1990s 
examination time for full-body scans was up to an hour (Young et al. 1982; Kaufman 
1987). The market for MRIs grew rapidly and between 1985 and 1993 the number of 
machines in the US grew tenfold (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). 
 
PACS is an information management system for diagnostic images in digital format which 
replaced traditional X-ray film, and was developed in the early 1980s. PACS is traced back 
to US efforts in the field of medical informatics, mathematics and physics, and the 
development of computer interface standards DICOM (Duerinckx and Pisa 1982; Wiley 
                                                 
12 Electrical and Musical Industries Ltd. 
13 Godfrey Hounsfield and Allen M. Cormack won the Nobel Prize in 1979 for the CT scanner.  
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2005). The first PACS system is said to have been built in the University of Kansas in 
1982/83 with support from a private company. Simultaneously, at UCLA, the pioneer B. 
Huang was employing his graduate students to digitise X-rays in paediatric radiology. In 
the early 1990s DICOM was completed and the harmonisation of standards made it easier 
for PACS systems to be created and connected in hospital settings (Huang 2003). 
 
Most hospitals in developed countries today have CT, MRI and PACS14 devices and 
systems. Their importance in the early detection of diseases and their cost-effectiveness in 
the long run make them very attractive investments. Table 1 shows the change in 
distribution of CT scanners for selected countries over time.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of CT scanners by country, 1979, 1990, 2000 and 2005 
Country Scanners per 
million 
population 
1979 
Scanners per 
million 
population 1990 
Scanners per 
million 
population 2000 
Scanners per 
million 
population 2005 
United States 5.7 24.5 28.7 34.4 
Germany (W) 2.7 11.9 11.9 14.4 
Austria n.a. 12.3 26.2 29.8 
United Kingdom  1.0 1.89 5.5 8.3 
France 0.6 7.2 10.0 10.4 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on OECD Health Data (2001; 2007; 2008).  
 
Table 1 shows that in the period 1990 to 2005 the amount of CT scanners in the UK 
increased from 1.89 to 8.3 CT scanners per million inhabitants. A large proportion of this 
increase is attributable to extensive government programmes for the diffusion of CT 
scanners in UK hospitals during this period (NHS 2000; NHS 2003; NPfIT 2004) and the 
increase in guidance for CT scanning (for example,  NICE 2003). The table also shows that 
countries differ in the distribution of CT scanners in their population. For example, in 2005 
Germany had 73% more CT scanners per million population than the UK. 
 
                                                 
14 Imaging devices are also used in other sectors, such as archeology. However healthcare forms the largest 
part of the market for these devices (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).   
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Explanations for the variations over time and between countries are attributable to technical 
advance and government policy15 for the procurement of medical devices (Lazaro and Fitch 
1995; OECD 2008). In publicly financed healthcare systems such as the UK, the 
government plays a central role in the planning and regulation of resources such as hospital 
facilities, technologies, and staffing (Hutton and Hartley 1985). Other important factors are 
the degree of clinician specialisation, types and size of hospitals, patients, clinician 
accountability to patients and the public, as well as cultural predispositions towards 
invasive medical treatments (Yoshikawa et al. 1993; Herzlinger 2006). 
 
Technical change in diagnostic imaging is partially reflected in changes in usage of ‘high-
end’ CT and MRI scans compared to ‘low-end’ traditional X-ray scans. Table 2 shows 
growth rates in the UK NHS in the period 1995 to 2005. Both CT and MRI have high 
growth rates compared to X-ray which is relatively stable and slightly declining. CT and 
MRI are very different medical devices compared to X-rays, and the fast-paced changes in 
supply, demand, and technical changes are creating innovation challenges in the UK NHS 
(NPfIT 2004; Hendy et al. 2005; Clegg and Shepherd 2007).  
 
Table 2: Average annual growth rate of CT, MRI and X-ray scans NHS England 
1995-2005 
X-ray -0.2%
CT 9.2%
MRI 11.6%
Source: Author’s calculations based on UK Department of Health Hospital Activity 
Statistics (1995 to 2005).  
 
                                                 
15 In public healthcare systems the procurement and implementation of medical devices is largely centrally 
funded, although many hospitals acquire their scanners themselves through, for example, local charity and 
“Scanner Appeals”. In private healthcare systems such as the US hospitals buy their own scanners. In such 
cases, the high profitability of scanning make them lucrative investments, and many more hospitals have them 
(Blume 1992:8).  
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1.2 Aims and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to understand learning in clinical practices in the diagnostic 
imaging technology areas CT, MRI and PACS through a theoretical perspective informed 
by evolutionary theories of technological change. Some authors consider scientific 
research, advancements in private industries and evidence-based medicine as important 
developmental motors of change in the medical sector (Granados et al. 1997; Grimshaw et 
al. 2004). This thesis suggests that additional conceptual relationships are revealed when 
medical innovation is analysed through an evolutionary perspective of knowledge 
accumulation and social change (Morlacchi and Nelson 2011; Nelson et al. 2011)16.  
 
To fulfil these aims, this thesis addresses the following research questions and sub-
questions: 
 
 
RQ1: How do technical change processes in diagnostic imaging technologies (CT, 
MRI and PACS) affect learning in clinical practice? 
• What is the role of technical accumulation processes internal and external 
to the hospital with respect to learning in clinical practice? 
• In what ways do cognitive features at the individual, group, organisational 
and sectoral levels support or constrain learning? 
 
                                                 
16 NRC (2002:2) state: “[…] innovation in diagnostics, therapeutics and devices are important but are not the 
whole story. Corresponding innovations in the health care delivery system have not taken place and are badly 
needed if the full benefits of innovations in diagnostics, therapeutics and devices are to be achieved”. Nelson 
et al. (2011) suggest three different pathways to medical progress: (1) biomedical research, (2) the 
development of new modalities through the advancement of technological capabilities, and (3) learning in 
clinical practice.   
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RQ2: How do social processes of technical change in diagnostic imaging 
technologies affect learning in clinical practice? 
• What is the role of social features of technological systems and 
communities internal and external to the hospital with respect to 
learning in clinical practice? 
• In what ways do social features at the individual, group, organisational 
and sectoral levels support or constrain learning in these technology 
areas? 
 
 
RQ3: Why do some technologies in clinical practice develop more easily than 
other technologies? 
• For what reasons are CT, MRI and PACS more easily routinised in some 
clinical practice settings than in others? 
 
 
To answer these questions, this thesis uses a case-study approach and over 40 interviews 
with clinical, technical, managerial and administrative staff in five hospitals in the South 
East region of the UK. The cases examined in this thesis trace changes in hospital learning 
conditions and processes in CT, MRI and PACS technology areas in the period 2003 to 
2005.  
 
The findings in this thesis suggest that medical innovation is underpinned by processes of 
knowledge accumulation that are complex, incremental, iterative, and unpredictable, and 
which co-evolve with artefact characteristics, social norms, practice communities, 
experience and learning relationships constrained and supported by interactions with 
processes of social agency. 
 
The research in this thesis uncovers important questions in the area of medical technology 
policy. The incremental, complex, partly tacit and uncertain nature of processes 
underpinning innovation suggest that policies guided by scientific evidence which mask the 
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emergent and systemic nature of technological learning in healthcare may need to be 
changed. The complex issues of creating learning conditions to lower technological 
uncertainty in the healthcare sector may need to be addressed in medical innovation policy, 
their complexity perhaps being a reason why they may have been neglected in the past.  
 
 
1.3 Thesis content and structure 
This thesis has seven more chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of some of the 
main approaches to hospital innovation with the objective of identifying contemporary 
themes and frameworks addressing the topic. The chapter then reviews the main 
approaches to organisational learning, with the objective of finding a suitable framework 
for learning in clinical practice. The literature on evolutionary approaches to technical 
change is then reviewed, with the aim of identifying the rationale for the thesis. The 
theoretical framework and research questions are developed, explaining and justifying the 
exploration of hospital innovation through a neo-Schumpeterian viewpoint.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the research design and methods used. It discusses and justifies the 
choices for generating contextualised theory using novel qualitative empirical data. It 
presents the reasons for choosing clinical practice as the unit of analysis, and CT, MRI and 
PACS technology areas as cases. The chapter also describes the use of interviews for data 
collection, the selection of hospitals, and the use of qualitative analysis techniques for 
interpreting the data. The shortcomings of the research design and methods are discussed, 
as are the steps I took with the aim of lessening their negative impact on the study.  
 
In Chapter 4 the background history, technology, and policy of CT, MRI and PACS are 
presented. The beginnings of diagnostic imaging in medicine and the historical evolution of 
X-ray technology are described. The chapter then provides developmental histories of CT, 
MRI and PACS, to inform the reader of the factors that have shaped the organisational 
technological contexts of the cases examined. The chapter concludes with a description of 
the policy context of these technologies in the UK NHS where the empirical study was 
carried out, and aims to inform.  
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Chapter 5 analyses changes in learning conditions and operational routines in two hospital 
cases of CT innovation. The first case highlights changes in conditions for knowledge 
coordination and exchange in cancer diagnosis in a large urban teaching hospital. Changes 
in medical guidance, diagnostic information, and disease complexity influenced the 
processes by which clinicians solved complex cancer cases. The creation of departmental 
CT capabilities was supported by the formation of a community of practice characterised 
by inter-disciplinarity in problem-solving. The second case explores the development of 
departmental capabilities in CT scanning in a medium-sized town hospital. Social norms 
for change in departmental roles, mentoring and participation underpinned the creation of 
CT capabilities in a small radiology department. Painstakingly acquired departmental 
know-how formed the basis for medical guidance in CT scanning for other hospitals in the 
region.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses innovation and change in MRI clinical practices in two hospital cases. It 
describes how the learning environment for hospital institutionalisation of a novel MRI 
procedure for dementia imaging was enabled by individual imagination, experience and 
commitment, hospital strategic shifts changing resource availability, and changes in patient 
population. The second case examines the process of formulation of a regional MRI 
protocol for breast imaging. Differences in MRI devices, incremental processes of user 
configuration, and changes in patient preferences transformed the conditions within which 
clinicians solved medical problems and learned.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses changes in learning conditions for PACS integration in a city and in a 
town hospital. The first case traces the transition from a paper-based X-ray regime to a 
digital diagnostic regime shaped by the development of hospital-wide PACS capabilities. It 
shows how incremental, step-wise behavioural restrictions of technical choices, the 
inclusion of specialists with diversified skills, and organisational goals informed by the 
healthcare regulatory authority helped hospital staff change operational routines and 
unlearn. In the second case emergent and unplanned learning processes are found and 
examined, which support the incremental creation of hospital PACS capabilities. It shows 
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how the external imposition of rules can be in conflict with internal changes in learning, 
how the making of decisions on aspects of emergent and systemic technologies such as 
PACS far away from the organisational locus of learning increases technological 
uncertainty, and the activities individuals and groups engage in to help reduce it.  
 
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of the research study and presents the central 
aspects of medical innovation based on the individual case studies. It highlights the main 
theoretical implications of the research, and discusses how the results have supported and 
how they have contradicted existing theory on medical innovation and technological 
change. It also presents the limitations of the study and suggests some options for future 
research. Policy inferences derived from the research evidence are discussed as are 
suggestions for changes in health technology policy.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Innovation in hospital organisations: Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
This chapter first provides a literature review of some of the main approaches from the 
social sciences that have addressed hospitals as innovation contexts. It does this with the 
objective of identifying the state of the art of the literature on innovation in hospitals, along 
with the main research gaps, and finds the subject of learning processes in hospitals to be 
an important but relatively understudied area warranting further enquiry.  
 
Section 2.2 reviews the main approaches to organisational learning, with a specific focus on 
learning processes, and the factors underpinning them with the objective of developing a 
suitable framework for exploring learning processes, and the factors influencing them, in 
hospitals. This section establishes that Crossan et al.’s (1999) learning process model 
provides a workable framework to apply to the exploration of hospital learning processes, 
learning levels, and learning outcomes. In terms of the factors affecting learning, this 
section argues that a focus on technology offers a fruitful direction for the exploratory 
study.  
 
Section 2.3 presents how technological change has been explained in the literature, with the 
objective of arriving at an identification of the role of technology in organisational 
innovation, to be used as a set of factors in the exploration of hospital learning and 
innovation processes. It is used to supplement the organisational learning model introduced 
and defined in the previous section, and to provide the rationale for the thesis framework 
and research questions.  
 
Section 2.4 develops the theoretical framework and research questions guiding the study. In 
doing so, it introduces, explains and justifies the exploration of the interrelationships 
between learning in hospitals and evolutionary aspects of technology. It proposes a model 
of hospital innovation that is defined by interactions between ‘4I’ organisational learning 
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processes (intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalising) and certain knowledge 
and social features of technology.  
 
 
2.1 Hospital innovation: a review of existing approaches to the topic 
Hospital innovation has been approached from a large and diverse range of perspectives. 
Hospitals have been conceptualized, for example, as demand-side organisations innovating 
via diffusion (Rogers 1962; Coleman et al. 1966), or communication (Rogers and Kincaid 
1981), as organisations innovating via evidence-based medicine (Granados et al. 1997; 
Ferlie et al. 2001; Grimshaw et al. 2004), and as those innovating through product and 
process improvement and integration (von Hippel 1988; Van de Ven 1991; Lettl 2005). The 
following sections briefly review these approaches to hospital innovation, focusing on their 
conceptualisation of the hospital innovation process, factors influencing it, and some points 
of critique.  
 
 
2.1.1 Rogers’ diffusion approach to the analysis of hospital innovation  
In Rogers’ (1962/1995) diffusion approach, hospital innovation processes were defined as 
the adoption of new ideas and products from outside the hospital organisation. Rogers 
conceptualized innovation in hospitals as stages in the spread and adoption of new products 
or ideas by medical practitioners (Rogers 1962/1995). He considered a rich array of factors 
such as the social connectedness between doctors (see next paragraph), individual 
characteristics and agency, the ‘fit’ of the novel product to the adopting context, and 
contextual characteristics, as antecedents to innovation diffusion (ibid.). Different factors 
assumed differing degrees of importance in various stages (invention, development and 
adoption by users) of the innovation diffusion process (ibid.). The outcome of a successful 
diffusion process was adoption by users in hospitals.  
 
Social connectedness referred to the personal relationships between doctors (Rogers 1962; 
Coleman et al. 1966; Burt 1973; Rogers and Kincaid 1981). Personal relationships 
supported communication and information exchange, and increased the propensity for 
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imitation (Burt 1973). Well-connected individuals were more likely to become aware of 
new products through communication with other doctors, and therefore were more apt to 
purchase and adopt them.  
 
In addition to social connectedness, heterophily (differences in individual knowledge bases 
and culture) was important in the first stages of the process, for a novel product to enter the 
adopting context (Rogers 1962/1995). In later stages, homophily (similarity in knowledge 
bases and culture) was important to simplify communication between individuals in the 
adopting unit and thereby facilitate product or idea integration into existing operational 
processes (Fennell and Warnecke 1988; West et al. 1999; Fitzgerald et al. 2002; Becker et 
al. 2005). 
 
Individual agency increased the propensity to adopt an innovation. In the early stages, the 
existence of individuals who engaged in and influenced opinion formation within the 
adopting unit was important (Rogers 1995:5-6; Locock et al. 2001; Fitzgerald et al. 2002). 
Opinion leaders informed, communicated and pushed forward the adoption process by 
assuming a mediating role between the buyer and the seller. At a later stage and after the 
decision to adopt had been made, individuals who engaged in changing context-specific 
processes (‘change agents’) facilitated further steps in product adoption.    
 
Structure influenced process. Rogers defined structure as the “patterned arrangements of 
the units in the system” (Rogers 1995:24). Structure had three main aspects. First, it 
determined the decision-making roles at different stages in the adoption process. For 
example, the level at which the decision to adopt an innovation was made (optional at the 
individual level, collective at the group or organisation level, a decision made at the 
authority level of the organisation or above, or a decision that was contingent upon other 
innovation decisions) was important in influencing innovation spread and integration. The 
closer the innovation-decision was to the individual adopter, the greater chance it had for 
integration into working processes (Rogers 1995). Second, structure was important for 
communication patterns between individuals. As communication influenced the spread of 
ideas, the structure of communication networks co-shaped their spread (Coleman et al. 
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1966; Granovetter and Soong 1983; Scott 1991). Third, structure was closely related to 
social norms defined as the established behaviour patterns of individuals in the organisation 
(Rogers 1995), such as the degree of individual opinion leadership or change agency.  
 
Despite its widespread appeal and importance in identifying factors affecting innovation 
adoption, Rogers’ approach did not take into account contextual differences and differences 
that exist across innovations. Moreover, Rogers did not address innovation processes and 
outcomes that occur post-adoption. The diffusion process was seen to end with product 
adoption and to be the same as imitation. This was later criticized in other literatures for 
reasons such as the inseparability of the diffusion and innovation process (Bell and Pavitt 
1995), and the fact that the adoption of products does not necessarily mean that it has 
diffused within the organisation or transformed its processes (Van de Ven et al. 1989), and 
that innovation diffusion is more complex than imitation (Greenhalgh et al. 2004).  
 
A further criticism is that the product or idea that was being adopted was viewed as static 
and unchanging (Greenhalgh et al. 2004) and as atomistic. Products change over the course 
of time in their composition, application, and connectedness to other parts of the hospital 
organisation and the wider system (Barley 1986). The idea that products are dynamic and 
interconnected with other parts of the organisation and system was later examined in detail, 
for example, by Hobday (1998) in his study of ‘complex products’. This topic has also been 
analysed from a sociological perspective in connection with the role of IT in healthcare 
systems and its changing relationship to healthcare workers, patients, their perceptions and 
their interrelationships (Henwood et al. 2003; Jones et al. 2003; Hart et al. 2004). Dynamic 
aspects of products will be described in later sections of this chapter and form an important 
part of the chosen conceptual framework.  
 
Adopting contexts such as hospitals are not passive adopters but more active, complex and 
dynamic than Rogers implied (Kaluzny et al. 1974; Van de Ven 1991; Djellal and Gallouj 
2005). For instance, their internal structures are found to differ in terms of a greater number 
of aspects than those described in the diffusion approach (Djellal and Gallouj 2005). For 
example, hospitals have a diverse range of activities; doctors have a diverse range of 
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specializations and their role in hospital structures and the wider healthcare system changes 
over time (Djellal and Gallouj 2005), which may affect adoption processes in more 
differentiated ways than suggested by Rogers.  
 
The view of the innovation process as occurring in stages (invention, development and 
adoption by users) was found to be deterministic and in some ways flawed (Rothwell et al. 
1974). For example, it did not take into account interactions of processes and factors within 
and between the stages, the iterative, multi-organisational, multi-institutional and 
interdependent nature of the innovation/diffusion process, and the change in importance of 
different factors over time and context (Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997). Several historical 
studies have pointed out the importance of multi-organisational interdependencies in 
innovation, and their partial unpredictability (Pickstone 1985; Pickstone 1992; Metcalfe et 
al. 2005; Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006).  
 
The diffusion approach nevertheless was a very important analytical approach to 
understanding adoption as socially mediated processes, and influenced other innovation 
approaches such as quantitative studies to hospital innovation adoption17, and information 
and communication studies approaches to hospital innovation, reviewed in the following 
section.  
 
 
2.1.2 Communication studies approaches to the analysis of hospital innovation 
Communication studies approaches developed from the sociological perspective of 
diffusion, building on the notion of innovation as ideas that spread through the social 
process of communication (Rogers and Kincaid 1981; Kincaid 1987). Innovation as 
                                                 
17 The emergence of quantitative techniques beginning in the 1970s and 1980s influenced many quantitative 
studies on the determinants of hospital innovation (for example, Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Tornatsky and 
Klein 1982; Damanpour 1991; 1992; 1996; Nystrom et al. 2002). These studies do not focus on innovation 
processes and are therefore not reviewed here. They form a large volume of the literature on hospital 
innovation and to a large extent the studies ask very similar questions and come up with similar answers. In 
many cases the variables whose relationships are modelled (for example, size and innovation adoption as in 
Damanpour 1992) have a positive relationship to each other. These studies have been criticized for not being 
able to explain differences across hospital organisations, for treating the variables as atomistic, and for the 
unrealistic assumptions that their effect can be isolated from other effects and that these effects are 
quantifiable (Greenhalgh et al. 2004).  
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communication implied “a process by which individuals share information with one 
another to create a shared understanding” (Rogers and Kincaid 1981:63). An individual or 
organisation was more likely to adopt an innovation if other organisations and individuals 
they communicate with had already done so (Burns and Wholey 1993; Westphal et al. 
1997).  
 
Communication of innovations was found to have network features that shape the direction 
of information flows between people (Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1995). Social 
networks were vehicles for the flow of information via social ties, detectable through the 
frequency and intensity of the information exchanged through them (Granovetter and 
Soong 1983; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Information flow frequency and intensity 
between members determined the structure of the network and its operation (Granovetter 
1973).   
 
Social network structure was characterised, for example, by individuals assuming different 
positions in the network because of the volume, content and reach of the information that 
flowed through them (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Individuals with a relatively large 
number of social ties to other network members had central positions in the network and 
were experts or ‘stars’ (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Stars had power over the network 
because they could, to a greater degree than the other network members, determine the 
type, content and receivers of information (Granovetter 1973). 
 
Information content was also determined by the connectedness of members to other 
networks. Individuals who had ties to other networks had access to different types of 
information, and acted as ‘boundary spanners’ in the network (Tushman 1977). Boundary 
spanners were important because through them new information could spread within the 
network.  
 
The strength of social ties between network members and members outside the network 
was important for information novelty and innovation. Weak social ties were more useful in 
bringing in new information to the network than strong ties, because strong ties implied 
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repeated information exchange with the same network members, increasing the propensity 
that the same kind of information was circulated within the network (Granovetter 1973). 
Over time this approach was further developed by differentiating between network models 
for innovation diffusion (Valente 1995) and the relationship between network features and 
network dynamism (Watts 1999; Kossinets and Watts 2006).  
 
These theoretical principles were built upon with other, more nuanced concepts asking the 
question of why information or knowledge flowed more easily between some members 
than between others. The characteristics of the message transferred, the quality of the 
source, the recipient18, the channel of communication, and the characteristics of the context 
within which messages are flowing were all found to be important (Teece 1977; von Hippel 
1994; Szulanski 1996). 
 
On the other hand, many empirical studies that drew on these approaches simply created 
new terminology out of what Rogers and Granovetter already had said. For example, the 
empirical study by Goes and Park (1997) on hospital innovation found that inter-
organisational links affected hospital innovation positively, emphasising the importance of 
structure and links without adding new information about these concepts or their effects on 
innovation. 
 
 
2.1.3 Evidence-based medicine approaches to the analysis of hospital innovation 
Evidence-based medicine evolved from the discipline of clinical epidemiology and focused 
on medical innovation as the spread of medical research that had the best evidence of 
treating diseases effectively19 (Granados et al. 1997). Clinicians were to innovate in their 
clinical practices by staying informed and changing their behaviour in accordance with new 
information about which drug, device or technique was most efficient and effective for 
patients20 (Grimshaw et al. 2004). 
                                                 
18 Such as their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
19 Health technologies are heavily evaluated and assessed before they are allowed to enter the market 
(Granados et al. 1997).  
20 Evidence-based medicine has been important in shaping health technology policy in the UK (NICE 2001).  
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Medical innovation was seen as a linear technical process at the level of the individual 
(Green 1998; Green 2001). Recently many scholars using this approach realised that the 
implementation of guidelines was not as straightforward as individuals changing their own 
practice, but required more complicated hospital-level and systemic changes (Dopson et al. 
2002; Grimshaw et al. 2004). Clinicians were embedded in specific structures, their 
behaviour was connected to other parts of the hospital and healthcare system, and changes 
to their own practices required other changes that were difficult to anticipate (Dopson et al. 
2002). The evidence base for certain practices was often ambiguous and contested and 
needed to be continuously interpreted and reformulated to fit the practice context (Ferlie et 
al. 2001).  
 
Changing clinicians’ behaviour through research evidence has been critiqued (Dopson et al. 
2002; Gurses et al. 2010) for neglecting factors such as clinicians’ autonomy and the fact 
that its implementation in clinical settings often involves power struggles (Ferlie et al. 
2001). Moreover, Dopson et al.’s (2002) study on how research evidence is created and 
evaluated in healthcare settings suggests that before research evidence can be assimilated, 
the requisite knowledge must already exist within the organisation. 
 
The diffusion, communication and evidence-based approaches tended to focus on hospitals 
and clinical contexts as part of the ‘demand-side’ – individuals and organisations were seen 
as passive receivers of products or information, and whose main innovation process is that 
of adoption. The models assumed that their main premises were applicable to other clinical 
contexts (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). These critiques have, to a certain degree, been 
subsequently built upon by Van de Ven and colleagues (Van de Ven et al. 1989; Van de 
Ven and Grazman 1999), who explored hospitals as diverse innovation contexts engaged in 
organisational innovation processes that carried on, or began, once the innovation was 
adopted.  
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2.1.4 Organisation and management approaches to the analysis of hospital innovation  
A broad variety of factors, their interactions with each other and with contextual 
characteristics are found to constitute different hospital innovation processes in this 
literature (Van de Ven 1991). Hospital innovation processes are conceptualised as 
organisational-level processes defined as the integration and routinisation of products 
within the hospital organisation (Kanter 1988; Van de Ven et al. 1999), the improvement of 
products and processes through user innovation (von Hippel 1988; Lettl 2005), the solution 
of organisational problems (Grilli and Lomas 1994), or the creation and change of hospital 
organisational practices (Van de Ven et al. 1989). 
 
The diversity of these approaches and the factors that they attach to hospital innovation 
make it difficult to derive generalisations. However, broadly speaking, hospital innovation 
is considered to be a complex process that cannot be traced back to single entrepreneurially 
minded individuals, single inputs, or single innovations but instead arises from 
combinations of various factors, sometimes specific to the case, context, and time-period 
under observation, that interact to push the innovation process forward (Van de Ven 1999).  
 
These processes are represented by trial-and-error and experimentation (Van de Ven 1991). 
Organisational factors such as effective leadership, flexible bureaucratic style, management 
of relationships between people, and an organisational culture that is open to risk were 
found in hospital case studies to positively affect the opportunity for hospital members to 
‘try things out’ and find solutions to their problems (Grilli and Lomas 1994; Yetton et al. 
1999; Plsek 2003). The degree of contextual complexity was also found to be important 
(Kanter 1988; Nystrom  et al. 2002). Kanter (1988) showed that organisational complexity 
in structure, such as different and complicated departmental and organisational boundaries, 
has the potential to increase the generation of ideas in the hospital context. On the other 
hand, too big an organisational size increases complexity and bureaucratic procedures, 
slowing innovation processes down (ibid.).  
  
Process studies from these literatures also found that hospital innovation is supported by 
staff involvement in decision-making. A dichotomous relationship between decision-
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making and implementation existed in many hospitals, hindering innovation (Van de Ven 
1991). If staff were involved in the decision to adopt innovations, they could translate these 
decisions into clinical practices more effectively (ibid.). Good communication between 
different groups of people in the hospital facilitated innovation, especially because medical 
practitioners are often disparate and disconnected (ibid.). The inclusion of top management 
had innovation-enabling effects, as well as encouraging harmonious work groups, and low 
turnover of staff (ibid.).  
 
Innovation processes in hospitals depended upon the use and improvement of existing 
products. Von Hippel (1988), addressing the role of medical practitioners in product and 
process improvement of medical devices through their medical usage of them, found that in 
his sample of devices over 80% were conceived, developed or improved by doctors and 
technicians working in hospitals (ibid.).  Lettl (2005) and Lettl and Gemuenden (2005) 
suggested that the high level of education and professional use of medical devices by 
doctors, the high pressure to solve proximate problems, and user openness to new 
technologies were all important supporting factors in hospital innovation.  
 
Hospital innovation outcomes in these studies are varied and mixed. They can range from 
the creation of new products or their radical improvement (von Hippel 1988; Lettl 2005), to 
incremental and piecemeal changes to existing hospital processes and practices that emerge 
from hospital adaptation to new technologies (Van de Ven, 1999). Overall, these studies 
highlight the importance of hospital innovation processes, but tend to envision the hospital 
as a closed organisation, and do not refer to external factors (apart from products) affecting 
innovation. Moreover, organisation and management approaches have tended to treat 
hospitals much like firms (especially the US literature on healthcare innovation) and do not 
take into account the differences between hospitals and firms in innovation (such as 
regulatory aspects specific to the healthcare sector).  
 
The table below summarizes the main conceptualizations of hospital innovation reviewed 
here, along with the associated processes, factors, and some areas of critique. 
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Table 3: Summary of approaches to hospital innovation: Process, factors, and critique  
 Diffusion approaches Communication studies 
approaches 
Evidence-based medicine 
approaches 
Organisation and management 
approaches 
Innovation process Adoption of ideas or products (from 
outside) by medical practitioners 
(Rogers 1962).  
Ideas that spread through the social 
process of communication (Rogers 
and Kincaid 1981).  
The adoption of medical research 
that had the ‘best’ evidence of 
treating diseases by clinicians 
(Granados et al. 1997). 
Changes in hospital organisational 
practices (Van de Ven 1998; 1999), 
changes in medical products (von 
Hippel 1988; Lettl 2005), solving 
organisational problems (Grilli and 
Lomas 1994), and many others.  
Factors affecting the innovation 
process 
Social connectedness (personal 
relationships between doctors), 
heterophily, ‘innovation-system ‘fit’, 
individual agency and roles such as 
change agency and opinion 
leadership, structure (of units in the 
adopting system) (Rogers 
1962/2003; Coleman et al. 1966; 
Burt 1973). Factors assume different 
degrees of importance at different 
stages of diffusion.  
The structure and operation of social 
networks (Granovetter 1973; Rogers 
and Kincaid, 1981), the strength and 
degree of social ties measured, for 
example, by the degree and intensity 
of information flow (Granovetter 
1973; 1976), ‘boundary spanners’ 
(Tushman 1977). More recent 
studies focused on more nuanced 
characteristics of the message 
transferred, the source, the recipient, 
and the context (Szulanski 1996).   
Evidence of clinical efficiency and 
effectiveness of products, devices or 
techniques (Grimshaw et al. 2004).  
A broad and diverse array of factors 
which are context-specific, and 
cannot be traced back to single 
individuals or processes but instead 
arise from a combination of factors, 
their interactions,  characterised by 
trial-and-error experimentation  
(Van de Ven 1991). Few empirical 
studies using this approach explicitly 
focus on hospitals. Factors such as: 
the relationship between decision-
making and implementation, 
opportunity for hospital members to 
experiment (e.g. Yetton et al. 1999), 
hospital complexity, good 
communication and inclusion of 
hospital management in the 
innovation process (Van de Ven et 
al. 1999).  
Critique (shortcomings as analytical 
approaches for the study of 
innovation in hospitals) 
Does not take into account 
contextual differences (Kaluzny et 
al. 1974; Djellal and Gallouj 2005; 
2007), and differences across 
innovations, ‘the innovation’ is 
considered to be static and atomistic, 
the process is deterministic (e.g. 
Rothwell et al. 1971; Metcalfe et al. 
2005); and the approach does not 
provide a framework for 
understanding what happens post-
adoption.   
 
 
The main focus is the individual, 
difficult to bound the network, that 
the characteristics of the innovation 
or the individual do not change over 
time, and that the frameworks are 
applicable to other contexts 
(Greenhalgh et al. 2004). 
Medical innovation is seen as a 
linear technical process of changing 
behavioural practices by clinicians 
without the need for other changes 
in the practice context or wider 
healthcare system (Green 1998); 
evidence of certain practices is often 
ambiguous and contested  and  needs 
to be adjusted to fit the context 
(Ferlie et al. 2001); neglects that for 
a practice to change the requisite 
knowledge needs to be available in 
the adopting context (Dopson et al. 
2002). 
No coherent framework, unclear 
what underpins organisational 
transformation and change, hospital 
viewed as a closed organisation.   
Source: Author’s own summary. The selection of approaches partially draws on the extensive and detailed review by Greenhalgh et al. 
(2004).  
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To sum up, hospital innovation is a topic studied from a variety of perspectives providing a 
rich and detailed conceptual background to the diversity, complexity and importance of 
hospital innovation. However, the main approaches reviewed have several shortcomings in 
their direct application as frameworks for studying innovation processes in hospital 
organisations.  
 
First, the diffusion approach is not suitable because it does not offer a comprehensive 
framework for studying organisational processes following adoption; it does not take into 
account contextual differences, adoption by units other than individuals, and changes in 
‘the innovation’ over time (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). Second, the communication studies 
approach is not directly applicable to hospital innovation because it, too, limits innovation 
to adoption and passive spread, and it is difficult to bound the network, especially in 
exploratory studies as in this thesis. Third, the evidence-based medicine approach sees 
medical innovation as a linear technical process of changing behavioural practices at the 
individual level following the acquisition of information (a narrow view of innovation), and 
neglects the changing and ambiguous nature of what counts as evidence, and the fact that 
the contextual changes required to modify clinical practices are much more complex and 
involve many more actors, both aspects being largely unpredictable and different from 
context to context. Finally, the organisation and management approaches, although the unit 
of analysis moves away from the individual to the organisational level allowing for the 
inclusion of more variables, processes and actors, the studies are too few to provide a 
comprehensive framework. Overall, it is difficult to frame which processes trigger and 
underpin organisational changes, and as a result it remains unclear how and why hospitals 
learn (Van de Ven et al. 1999; Djellal and Gallouj 2005).  
 
The following section provides a review of the organisational learning literature with the 
aim of finding a suitable and comprehensive framework for studying learning processes 
that underpin hospital innovation.  
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2.2 Organisational learning: literature review and hospital learning framework 
 
2.2.1 Seminal works: Herbert Simon and James March and their followers 
Since Simon’s (1957) seminal contribution, many conceptual advances have been made in 
understanding organisational behaviour and change. Simon (1957) argued that 
organisational behaviour is dependent upon decision-making processes. Organisational 
decision-making processes were seen as a combination of individual cognitive capacities 
and how individuals in the organisation made choices about what to do (ibid.). Decision-
making was determined by individual cognitive capacities and the individual’s role in the 
organisation (which influenced where to look for information, which roles to pursue and 
how to do what they needed to do) (ibid). Simon described individual cognition as 
boundedly rational, emphasizing the limits to what people learn, and what they know, and 
the uncertain outcomes of their learning (ibid.). 
 
March and Simon (1958) further developed Simon’s work and created what was to be a 
ground-breaking analysis of organisational behaviour, decision-making and choice. March 
and Simon (1958) stated that organisational processes are influenced by rules that guide 
and control individual behaviour. Organisational rules served to transform the different 
knowledge bases, perceptions, attitudes, and interests into actions that were predictable and 
stable, and ensured that, despite the internal differences between individuals, organisations 
still met their goals21. Changes in rules were processes by which organisations changed.  
 
Organisational rules changed only gradually because they were made up of a broad and 
complex range of components (such as storylines, traditions, common beliefs, goals, 
loyalties, standard practices, and interpretations), with the result that control over them was 
problematic (March and Simon 1958; Lindblom 1959). March and Simon (1958) 
challenged the notion that organisational hierarchies determine what organisations do, by 
                                                 
21 Organisational behaviour was not entirely rational, but guided by what was known to work in the past to 
meet desired organisational outcomes (March and Simon 1958).  
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highlighting that organisational processes were often not hierarchical, but were made up of 
flows of information and actions that went in many different directions.  
 
Following this intellectual trajectory, Levitt and March (1988:320) stated that organisations 
achieve their goals through the establishment of routines, a richer concept, defined as: 
“forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, technologies, around which organisations 
are constructed and through which they operate. [Also including] the structure of beliefs, 
frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and 
contradict the formal routines.” Organisational behaviour was conditioned by routines 
which were stable and predictable processes that allowed organisations to achieve their 
goals. They were also independent of the individual actors who carried them out, and 
continued to exist even when individuals left the organisation (Cyert and March 
1963/1992).  
 
Routines were dependent upon what happened in the past (Simon 1955; Siegel 1957). 
Based on systems of socialisation and controlled behaviour, and on inferences and 
knowledge about what worked previously, routines emerged as stable patterns of conduct 
(Cyert and March 1963/1992). Retention processes were part of how an organisation 
created its own memory (Simon 1955). Organisational memory contained the cognitive and 
behavioural processes and targets of the organisation, and remained when individuals left it, 
or when the organisation merged with others.  
 
Organisations behaved the way they did because this is what they had learned to do (Simon 
1957; Cangelosi and Dill 1965). Organisational learning was an experiential process by 
which individuals, alone and in interaction with others, created knowledge, and applied this 
knowledge to their actions. Learning processes preceded the creation of routines, through 
testing and experimentation, and integration with other processes and structures, to become 
routinised actions. Learning was found to be incremental (Lindblom 1959). It was gradually 
improved upon as new information was obtained (Quinn 1980) or through re-examination 
about what worked and did not work (Argyris 1982). The incremental nature of learning 
made change difficult, slow, and uncertain, less rational and more a process of ‘muddling 
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through’ (Lindblom 1959). Individuals were said to have different cognitive capacities and 
abilities for interpretation, influencing learning and routines in organisations (Loasby 
1976).  
 
To behave differently, organisations first had to unlearn (Hedberg 1981; Nystrom and 
Starbuck 1984). Hedberg (1981) defined unlearning as “a process through which learners 
discard knowledge” that was no longer accurate or suitable. Unlearning made room for new 
knowledge and behaviour. Unlearning was difficult because routines were a form of 
specialisation of the organisation. It was the areas within which the organisations were 
competent, and enjoyed increasing returns to scale (Arthur 1994). As conditions or 
organisational targets changed, existing routines were often no longer optimal modes of 
behaviour, and organisations became locked-in to sub-optimal processes (David 1985). 
 
Zaltman et al.  (1973) and Argyris and Schoen (1978) stated that the extent and degree of 
learning was important. The degree of learning determined whether an organisation is 
really learning or merely adapting (Fiol and Lyles 1985). Lower-level learning (single-
loop) occurred through routine operations and was reflected in changes in behaviour within 
the prevailing norms and structure. Higher-level learning (double-loop) changed the 
organisational structure, defining new problems, heuristics and strategy (Argyris and 
Schoen 1978).  
 
During the same period of time, advances in the relationships between knowledge and 
economic change were being made by Solow (1957) and others, who put knowledge at the 
centre (of economic change). Arrow (1962) stated that different process of learning such as 
‘learning by doing’ was how economies accumulated knowledge, and augmented their 
productive capacities. Learning-by-doing and learning-by-using (Rosenberg 1982) 
differentiated between the forms of knowledge acquisition in practice.  
 
A landmark contribution was Nelson and Winter’s (1982) suggestion of routines as a locus 
of learning in organisations, and their explanation for why some organisations performed 
better than others. Nelson and Winter (1982) defined routines as repeatable patterns of 
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organisational processes that may “range from well-specified technical routines for 
producing things through procedures for hiring and firing”. Organisational routines defined 
the organisation’s areas of competence and its learning outcomes (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Routine change was an observable change in behaviour preceded by learning 
processes. Learning processes occurred at multiple levels. Sometimes learning processes 
were implicit and did not lead to routine change (Argyris and Schon 1978; Huber 1991).  
 
Many studies on organisational learning that followed continued to add more and more 
concepts, sometimes in a more and sometimes in a less integrated way (Dodgson 1993). 
Many approaches were developed without empirical testing (March and Simon 1958; 
Huber 1991; Dodgson 1993) making it difficult to understand how they may be more 
systematically organized in an empirically testable framework without losing their richness 
and complexity, and how they may be expressed and recognizable in organisational 
practices. To make the exploration of analytical approaches to learning more manageable, 
following Crossan et al. (1999), I have used an organizing principle of concepts that 
addressed respectively organisational learning levels, learning processes, and learning 
outcomes. The following section presents the analytical approaches reviewed and the 
organisational learning process framework I decided upon.   
 
 
2.2.2 Approaches to the analysis of organisational learning processes  
The literature on organisational learning reviewed so far has focused on the seminal 
concepts and definitions. This thesis explores learning processes in hospitals, drawing on 
the organisational learning literature and the literature on technology evolution. This 
section draws on more recent organisational learning literature to explore organisational 
learning processes, levels and outcomes in hospitals.  
 
 
Individual level 
Learning processes such as comprehension, gaining insights and new ideas, and other 
cognitive processes, occur at the individual level (Argyris and Schon 1978; Huber 1991; 
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Simon 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Conscious and subconscious processes in 
individuals enable them to perceive, understand and recognise patterns, and to draw 
conclusions (Underwood 1982). Their capacities are dependent upon what they learned in 
the past (Simon 1991). Through learning in practice and processes such as learning-by-
doing and –using (Rosenberg 1982), individuals gain competencies and expertise in 
specific areas that enable them to recognise patterns, and to apply what they have learned to 
similar situations. Over time, knowledge that is acquired through experience becomes tacit 
knowledge, applied intuitively without conscious effort and planning, but as an 
unconscious spontaneous process (Polanyi 1966).  
 
Tacit knowledge is difficult to transfer, but individuals may be able to express what they 
know tacitly using imagery and metaphors (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Metaphors link 
individual intuition with mutual interpretation (Crossan et al. 1999). In order to be able to 
express tacit knowledge, individuals must also possess a language capacity. Shared 
language enables individuals to express what they may only ‘feel’ as an insight or a new 
idea if the language is not yet known or does not yet exist (Tsoukas 1991). Metaphors may 
also be useful when what is tacitly known becomes harder and harder to express by the 
individual over time, as the codified elements are transformed into tacit elements (Nonaka 
1994). The metaphors and kinds of language used can become an important basis for the 
learning trajectory, and what happens as a result (Crossan et al. 1999).  
 
Individual-level learning also includes conscious processes, such as interpreting (Weick 
1979). The process of interpretation involves making explicit what is known, and making 
cognitive connections to an existing environment, as well as the creation of a ‘cognitive 
map’ of a knowledge space (Weick and Bougon 1986). The more connections the 
individual can make with a particular knowledge area, the better equipped they are to learn 
more, and to increase the complexity of what they do (Crossan et al. 1999).  
 
Similar to the expression of what is intuitively known, interpretation involves language 
capacities. Individual interpretive capacity differs according to the degree of precision with 
which they can express what they know (Weick and Bougon 1986). There is a relationship 
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between individual cognitive capacity and the existing language and knowledge domain.  
Individuals’ cognitive maps differ and they will interpret the same events and information 
differently. The degree of ambiguity that is attached to a piece of information or event will 
differ across individuals, sometimes independently of the quality of information.  
 
Individuals make interpretations on their own and as part of a social process. Through 
interaction and communication with others, individuals clarify their understandings, make 
new connections, and refine their language (Brown and Duguid 1991). The process of 
collective interpretation may foster a shared understanding and a shared language, 
becoming an integrative process occurring at the group or community level.   
 
Individual knowledge is created through interactions between codified and tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka 1994). Similar to what was explained before with reference to Polanyi, individuals 
internalise knowledge through practice, by transforming codified knowledge into tacit 
knowledge, which becomes ‘embodied’ in the individual. As well as through individual 
practice, tacit knowledge is increased through social processes of interaction (Nonaka 
1994). People learn to imitate others through interaction and face-to-face observation. A 
further learning process is externalisation, or the transformation of what is known tacitly to 
explicit knowledge (for example, through publications, or the issuing of standards and 
guidelines). Through the process of combination, individuals integrate codified knowledge 
with other codified knowledge (Nonaka 1994). Externalisation and combination also occur 
at the group and organisational levels.  
 
 
Group level 
Learning processes occurring at the group level involve integration. Integration processes 
are expressed in the coordination of collective actions amongst individuals. Groups or 
communities make individuals interact with one another and collectively get better at doing 
the activity (Lave and Wenger 1991). Integration is facilitated by shared language 
reinforced by continuous interaction and involvement in similar tasks. Belonging to the 
same group reinforces a similar identity and culture, reinforced by the application of 
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individual knowledge and actions to similar tasks (Brown and Duguid 1991; Lave and 
Wenger 1991). Through collective application of its knowledge to similar tasks and goals, 
the group evolves into a community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991).  
 
Communities of practice are loci of learning. Shared understanding creates a mutual 
understanding that crosses formal departmental and organisational boundaries. Shared 
language makes it easier for knowledge to flow (Brown and Duguid 1991). Learning can 
also occur between groups and communities (Cohendet and Llerena 2003) via, for example, 
individual ‘boundary spanners’ knowledgeable in the language of several communities at 
the same time (Huber 1991). Learning processes in communities are underpinned by a 
common language that retains what has been learned in the past (Brown and Duguid 1991).  
 
Learning processes in communities of practice have a strong degree of informality (Wenger 
2000). ‘Hybrid’ characteristics of communities, made up of a diversity of specialties, 
professionals, academics, that have (in the short or long term) converged in one area make 
it easier for problems to be solved because of the diversity of knowledge and experience 
that the group can draw on (Cohendet and Llerena 2003).  
 
Communities of practice are defined by agreement on certain principles of collective 
action, which if unreflective can evolve into ‘groupthink’ (Janis 1982). Repeated 
interaction and engagement in similar activities makes what was once a conscious process 
an unconscious and unquestioned one in which the heuristics of the activity are accepted 
and taken for granted. In such a condition, learning and change may be difficult and 
‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris and Schoen 1978) is required to enable the group to adapt 
to changing requirements.  
 
 
Organisational level 
Learning processes observable at the organisational level involve routinisation (or 
institutionalisation) (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Crossan et al. 1999; Feldman 
2000; Cohendet and Llerena 2003). The routinisation process differs from individual and 
35 
 
group learning processes, and it remains part of the organisation even when individuals and 
groups leave it, i.e. they are retained in the organisational memory (Nelson and Winter 
1992). Routines are composed of an organisation’s knowledge in the form of operational 
procedures, rules, behavioural codes and norms that are formalised and define the 
organisation’s structure and competencies. Routines are a locus of organisational learning 
(Dodgson 1993).   
 
Routinisation is characterized by a high degree of mutual consensus and by the stabilisation 
of organisational processes (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). Learning at this level is more linear 
and involves less trial-and-error experimentation, than learning at the individual and group 
levels. It takes a long time for learning outcomes from the individual and group levels to be 
institutionalised, and when they are, they may no longer fit the context (Crossan et al. 
1999).  
 
Institutionalising learning processes is a way of making informal knowledge explicit and 
usable to the organisation (Crossan et al. 1999). By forming structures around individual 
and group practices, an organisation can make use of its internal knowledge bases. Creating 
a context within which behavioural processes may occur more easily and repeatedly is a 
way of creating the right conditions for achieving desired organisational outcomes.  
 
Routinisation is a way of achieving desired goals more efficiently and effectively. Over 
time, the organisation increases the proportion of individual and group behaviour that is 
regulates, and learning becomes less experimental and more directed and target-oriented. 
Practices that become institutionalised have achieved a form of approval from members 
high in the organisational hierarchy and often last for a long time (Crossan et al. 1999). The 
organisation moves more towards modes of knowledge exploitation than knowledge 
exploration (March 1991).  
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2.2.3 Hospital learning framework 
Crossan et al. (1999) provided a broad and integrated organisational learning process 
framework that captured the depth and richness of organisational learning processes 
analysed in the early approaches, as well as later approaches based on communities of 
practice (Lave and Wenger 1990; Brown and Duguid 1991), and complexity (Lant and 
Mezias 1990). This thesis uses Crossan et al.’s framework for opening the ‘black box’ of 
organisational learning in an exploratory study of hospital learning. The following section 
defines the learning processes and organisational levels that this thesis uses as a framework 
based on Crossan et al.’s ‘4I’ learning processes.   
 
Intuiting 
Crossan et al. (1999:526) define intuiting as a subconscious process by which individuals 
learn and comprehend something new. It is considered as a process of “past pattern 
recognition” based on the knowledge that the individual accumulated throughout their 
lifetime. It is based on what the individual experienced and internalized through both 
explicit and tacit knowledge acquisition (Polanyi, 1966). Intuition is difficult to express 
because it is ‘felt’ subconsciously. Its expression may be helped with imagery and 
metaphors that enable the communication of intuition to others. The language people attach 
to their intuition has important consequences for how an idea is developed or a problem 
solved because it influences processes of intuiting within others (Crossan et al. 1999:527).  
 
Interpreting 
According to Crossan et al. (1999:528), interpreting is defined as a conscious process of 
developing cognitive maps and making connections within the area that they are 
knowledgeable in. It is expressed in an individual’s understanding as well as in their 
actions. Attaching a vocabulary to what is known allows individuals to make connections 
between what they intuit and the external environment. The language connections 
individuals can make affects their comprehension, and the actions that they will take. The 
outcome of interpretation depends upon the language that already exists ‘out there’ as well 
as the individual’s cognitive map. Interpreting is not exclusively a process that occurs at the 
individual level, but can also be a social process involving dialogue and discussion until an 
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understanding and agreement upon what action to take is reached (Daft and Weick 1984 as 
cited in Crossan et al. 1999:528).  
 
Integrating 
For Crossan et al. (1999:528), integrating is defined as “coherent and collective action”.  
The process of developing and mutually adjusting towards joint group behaviour requires a 
collective understanding of what is going on (Brown and Duguid 1991). Group learning is 
characterized by a shared language and common tasks, and defined by a collective 
identification with a common goal or set of beliefs or domain of knowledge and action. 
Developing a shared language co-evolves with the development of shared meaning (linking 
integration with interpretation). Engagement with similar practices and the desire to reach a 
common goal make people adjust their behaviour and learn.  
 
Institutionalising 
Lastly, Crossan et al. (1999:529) define institutionalising as the formalisation of what is 
learned at the individual and group levels into procedures, rules, and organisational 
routines. It is the process by which the organisation exploits what has been learned at the 
individual and group levels to achieve its desired goals. Routines provide the context for 
stable and repeated action and remain active in the organisation when individuals leave it. 
Routines are composed of elements such as formal practices, with rules and sequences that 
are embedded in the organisation and arise from the formalisation and stabilisation of 
organisational processes, emerging as predictable and certain rather than experimental and 
uncertain learning processes occurring at the individual and group levels.  
 
According to Crossan et al. (1999), organisational learning starts at the individual level and 
works its way up to the organisational level and the creation of organisational routines. The 
processes are not linear (from individual to group to organisational level) but interrelated 
with feedback loops between the different processes and levels. Not every process occurs 
distinctly at each level, apart from intuiting which occurs at the individual level and 
routinisation which occurs at the organisational level. Table 4 presents a summary of the 
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various processes and levels. For concepts of technology, I drew upon the literatures on 
technological evolution reviewed and defined in the following section.  
 
Table 4: Hospital learning processes as suggested by Crossan et al. (1999) 
Level Process Inputs/Outcomes 
Individual Intuiting, interpreting Practice, imagery, metaphors, 
cognitive maps, dialogue and 
communication 
Group Integrating Collective action, common 
language, shared meaning, 
understanding and identity, 
spontaneous adjustments to 
thinking and behaviour  
Organisation Institutionalising (routinising) Routines, rules, procedures 
Source: Crossan et al. (1999:525) 
 
 
2.3 Evolutionary approaches to the analysis of technological change in organisations 
Two central assumptions of this thesis are that the understanding of the organisational 
learning literature would be enriched by concepts of technology evolution22, and that a 
greater understanding of which organisational learning processes affect technology 
evolution in organisations would be useful for the technological change literature. These 
assumptions are a guide to develop the exploratory framework through which to address the 
questions of how and why hospitals innovate in different technology areas. To structure the 
contributions of this rich literature and make it usable for an exploration of learning in CT, 
MRI and PACS clinical practices, I focused on knowledge and sociological features of 
technology evolution inside and outside the organisation.  
 
 
2.3.1 Knowledge aspects of technology evolution inside the organisation 
Nelson and Winter (1982) view technology as dynamic, differentiated by sector, time 
period, and organisation, and embodied in ‘technological regimes’ which are specific and 
manifested in routines, skills, artefacts and organisational and sectoral structures. 
Organisational learning is not a homogeneous set of processes occurring to the same degree 
across organisations, but idiosyncratic and differentiated by regimes and technology areas 
                                                 
22 The concept of ‘knowledge accumulation’ links the organisational learning literature with the literature on 
technology evolution. 
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outside and inside the organisation. As such, technological regimes play a central role in 
organisational learning and change (Nelson and Winter 1982; Freeman and Perez 1988), 
making the accumulation of technical knowledge central in an organisation’s productive 
work (Rosenberg 1976).  
 
Technological change is not something that organisations “buy-in” from outside, but it is 
rooted in a specific set of change-generating resources (or routines and capabilities) which 
are located within the structures of the technology-using organisation (Bell and Albu 1999). 
These resources are composed of a variety of dynamically evolving and inseparable 
‘elements’ in organisations, such as “knowledge embodied in artefacts, people, procedures 
and organisational arrangements… [including, at least] product specifications and design; 
materials and component specifications and properties; machinery and its range of 
operating characteristics, together with the various kinds of know-how, operating procedure 
and organisational arrangement needed to integrate these elements in a production system” 
(Bell and Albu 1999:1717) (emphasis added). Elements of technology are highly 
interconnected so that changes in one area may be linked to many other elements of the 
technology bundle (Bell and Albu 1999).  
 
In organisations, technical knowledge is systematically ordered and stored in organisational 
routines. According to Nelson and Winter (1982), routines store technical knowledge that 
has been made operational. Operationalising technical knowledge occurs through learning, 
the embodiment of knowledge in individual skills, their application, and their expression in 
‘solutions to problems’ (Teece et al. 1994). Technical knowledge, like all knowledge that is 
partly tacit (Zollo and Winter 1999), needs to be accumulated via learning processes such 
as learning-by-doing and learning-by-using (Rosenberg 1982). As such, complex 
technologies that are integrated in organisations in the form of products, processes, 
knowledge and skills cannot simply be ‘transferred’ but need to be learned in order to be 
incorporated into existing structures and processes (Attewell 1992).  
 
Technological change increases the uncertainty and complexity of organisational learning 
(Rosenberg 1976). Knowledge accumulation underpinning routine creation and change is 
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characterised by experimental and trial-and-error processes of change. The types of 
problems and possible solutions that may occur in changing organisational contexts are 
unpredictable; if the tacit knowledge required to solve them is unavailable, then processes 
of experimentation and trial-and-error will prevail (Rosenberg 1976; 1982). Technical 
change processes in organisations are diverse, the importance of different technological 
processes is believed to vary over time, and at any given time multiple technologies, their 
mechanisms, and modes of organisation, may co-exist in any given context (Rosenberg 
1976). Technical knowledge is applicable in similar contexts, but because it interacts with 
many other resources and organisational characteristics it is difficult to say which contexts 
are similar, making the evolution of technology areas in organisations partially 
unforeseeable and different from context to context (Rosenberg 1976). 
 
Technical change in organisations is path-dependent (Dosi 1982). Organisational routines 
are reliant and dependent upon existing resource contexts. In particular, they are reliant 
upon the localised tacit knowledge, which also explains heterogeneity in technical change 
across sectors and organisations (Pavitt 1984; Bell and Pavitt 1993). These factors also give 
rise to diversity in organisational routines and the degree to which they are able to change 
(Pavitt 1998). Moreover, technical knowledge is cumulative. The degree to which an 
organisation adapts to technological change depends on skills and knowledge it has 
accumulated from the past (Nelson and Winter 1982).  
 
Organisational routines are underpinned by solutions that have been found for problems on 
the one hand, and new problems and problem-solving on the other. Rosenberg (1976:17-
18) states: “Dynamism refers not only to learning but to the successful application of that 
which is learned. This often happens where the highest level of problems and problem-
solving exist”. Knowledge, in order to lead to change and be learned, must therefore be 
applied to solve problems, which in turn generates new knowledge. If the same kinds of 
problem-solving skills are useful in one context as in another, then one technology will 
generally be applicable to both (Rosenberg 1976). Knowledge accumulation through 
problem-solving is also dependent upon an individual’s commitment to solve the problem 
(Rosenberg 1976).  
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Technical knowledge differs in importance and complexity for organisations over time 
(Dosi 1988). As technologies and their conditions evolve and change, certain kinds of 
knowledge become more important (Dosi 1988). Over time, the complexity of what was 
once radically new and difficult to comprehend and use, becomes less complex and more 
widely known. For example, at the beginning of the 20th Century knowledge of corrosion 
processes was poor and developed by few, while in the 21st Century it is very well known 
and exploited by many.  
 
Learning under conditions of technological change is incremental (Rosenberg 1982). The 
knowledge requirements of different technology areas and their interactions with existing 
contextual conditions are non-obvious and difficult to predict. A further factor making 
learning in different technological areas incremental and slow is the partial tacitness of 
knowledge. Nelson (1998) suggests that technical knowledge has two interacting modes. 
The first consists of ‘bodies of understanding’ which comprise knowledge in a particular 
technological area that is easy to codify and transfer. Bodies of understanding contain 
knowledge that has evolved into general knowledge. The second comprises ‘bodies of 
practice’ which have been incrementally acquired within a particular context and are 
specific to the problems, experience and skills that have been accumulated through tacit 
learning.  
 
Knowledge accumulation in an organisation’s ‘bodies of practice’ is what an organisation 
depends upon to carry out its productive processes. The limits to what an organisation can 
and cannot do are partly defined by what it knows and does not know (Pavitt 1998). If 
components of technological processes are relatively novel in organisations, there may not 
be enough individuals to ‘observe’ and the required tacit elements may be lacking, thereby 
constraining learning and routine change (Zollo 1997). 
 
Technological knowledge is not only created in universities and firms but in other 
organisations such as hospitals in the form of “Mode-2” knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994; 
Nowotny et al. 2001). Mode 2 processes indicate a shift from traditional, linear and 
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disciplinary forms of knowledge generation to knowledge that is created from interactions 
across specialisations and is directly applicable to current problems (Gibbons et al. 1994). 
Knowledge generated ‘in the context of application’ suggests a role for organisations and 
practice settings in which knowledge is generated where problems arise and where its 
application is direct and proximate. Hospitals are increasingly considered as such 
organisational contexts (Gibbons et al. 1994; Hopkins 2004). Instead of being organisations 
narrowly recognised for their medical services, hospitals are portrayed as contributing to 
the generation of knowledge that solves healthcare problems. In addition to internal 
problems and requirements for Mode-2 knowledge, Martin (2003) suggests external drivers 
of Mode-2 such as higher complexity in products, technologies and skills.  
 
Technology comes in different forms, one of which is its embodiment in products. Products 
can be highly complex and contain a diversity of knowledge and multiple technologies, 
making them difficult for organisations to absorb (Granstrand and Sjolander 1990). 
Technological diversity in products, or ‘capital goods’, may be underpinned by specific 
disciplines such as physics or engineering which the organisation may or may not be 
proficient in (Patel and Pavitt 1997; Pavitt 1998). Technologies embodied in products 
change over time and affect an organisation’s learning and production processes (Patel and 
Pavitt 1997). Technologies in products tend to increase (rather than decrease) specialization 
and complexity in the organisation (Pavitt 1998). 
 
Products differ according to the degree to which they are autonomous, systemic, emergent 
and complex (Hobday 1998). The degree of autonomy or systemness of a product has an 
important impact on organisational learning (Rosenberg 1994). Autonomous products are 
defined as ‘hardware’, equipment, or instruments that possess ‘stand-alone’ qualities in 
terms of their connectedness to other parts of the organisation (Barley 1986; Zuboff 1988). 
Autonomous products tend to be easier to integrate in organisational processes than 
systemic products. Systemic products, on the other hand, are connected to other parts of the 
organisation and the wider technological systems influencing organisational and socio-
economic structures (Hughes 1987; Davies 1996). Such connections to ‘large technical 
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systems’ (LTSs) involve important interactions with the internal structure of the 
organisation such as its learning and production processes (Davies 1996).  
 
The degree to which a product is emergent is also important for organisational learning. For 
example, mass-produced commodity goods that have ‘stabilised’ in their organisational 
functions and roles are easier for organisations to integrate than products that are in the 
process of finding their role (Hobday 2000). Moreover, the relationship between the 
properties of complex products and their stabilisation or routinisation in organisations is not 
straightforward or predictable. Aspects of technological complexity of products evolve in 
organisations at different rates; where one aspect or functional demand may be met in the 
organisation, other aspects may not (Wang and von Tunzelmann 2000).   
 
Hobday puts forward the notion of ‘complex product systems’ (COPS) to denote products 
that are technology-intensive, typically high cost and customised, including capital goods, 
control units, software packages, and services (Hobday 1998; 2000). COPS encompass a 
broad range of products that are characterised by systems and sub-systems, sub-
components, network attributes, and emergent properties that require complex processes of 
coordination, integration, and design (Hobday 1998). COPS fall into different categories 
(e.g. IT networks, train engines), change with processes of customisation in sectors and 
organisations, and entailed a high degree of user involvement in their evolution (Hobday 
1998).  
 
The extent to which a product may dynamically co-evolve with their environment is 
partially dependent upon the degree to which it is ‘locked-in’ to specific roles, functions, 
and relational configurations in the organisation and the wider system (David 1985; Cowan 
and Gunby 1996). Learning and change is more complex when technologies are embedded 
in the organisation and ‘compete’ with different technologies for similar functions (Arthur 
1989). 
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2.3.2 Knowledge aspects of technology evolution outside the organisation 
Important aspects of learning in organisations are shaped by external changes. Freeman and 
Perez (1988) explain that organisational structures both shape and are shaped by new 
technological paradigms. Technological paradigms define the bodies of knowledge external 
to an organisation (Dosi 1982). Dosi (1982) applied Kuhn’s (1962) interpretation of 
scientific paradigms to suggest that organisations are not led by a technological 
development path that they govern internally, but that they are part of a growing body of 
knowledge external to the organisation which influences its internal processes and 
direction. This growing body of knowledge is also considered to constrain it along a path 
dependent on what has occurred in the past (Dosi 1982). Nelson et al. (2011) put forward 
the notion of a ‘practice paradigm’ linking external knowledge with internal organisational 
practices, suggesting important influences of organisational conditions under which skills 
can be improved across practices, and technical knowledge can be acquired, retained and 
applied.  
 
Schumpeter (1939) first stated the importance of considering the flow of resources 
(information, knowledge, people) across organisational boundaries. Knowledge comes into 
the organisation from different sources, such as external organisations, firms, research 
institutions, government support conditions, regulatory conditions, and users (Rothwell 
1986). Organisational knowledge is created through processes of interaction, with other 
types of organisations, and via linkages between organisations, people, user/producer links 
and other systems integrator elements that enable knowledge flows within and outside the 
organisation (Lundvall 1992). It emerges from feedback, application, and change in 
different parts of the system (von Tunzelmann et al. 2008).  
 
Medical knowledge is advanced through hospital interactions with other parts of the 
‘medical innovation system’ (Metcalfe et al. 2005). Historical studies of medical products 
and techniques have shown that hospitals are part of the innovation and production process 
of medical technologies, with varying degrees of involvement over time and technology 
area. Medical practitioners, for example, played an important role in scientific 
advancements and product improvements in the areas of prosthetic hips and intra-ocular 
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lenses via their interactions with other parts of the innovation system (Pickstone 1985; 
Pickstone 1992; Metcalfe and Pickstone 2006). 
 
Pavitt (1999) states that flows and creation of knowledge between and within organisations 
are not random but have important structural dimensions. In more traditional manufacturing 
firms, it is important for R&D departments to be connected to production (Pavitt, 1999). In 
cases where knowledge is not produced in R&D departments but elsewhere, network 
connections between people and organisations are important, connections which can exist 
along supply, production and distribution channels as well (Bell and Pavitt 1993; Sutton 
1998). Organisational innovation emerges within a ‘system of innovation’ in which 
governments and institutions play an important role (Freeman 1988; Lundvall 1992; 
Edquist 1997).   
 
Organisational learning processes are affected by the differing rates at which external 
knowledge progresses (Rosenberg, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Knowledge progress 
is not easily recognisable or acquired in forms that can be conveniently applied (Pavitt, 
1999). Instead, it relies on tacit knowledge embodied in competencies, routines and 
capabilities to be assimilated and absorbed (Dosi 1988; Zollo and Winter 1999). The ability 
to deal with changing external knowledge is dependent upon a firm’s ‘absorptive capacity’ 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As knowledge outside the firm is continuously growing, the 
firm’s absorptive capacity, a relative concept, needs to be increasing at least a similar rate 
to keep up (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002). 
 
An organisation’s ability to assimilate and innovate with external technologies is not solely 
dependent on science-based knowledge, but also requires engineering forms of knowledge 
and other “lower” types of knowledge useful in problem-solving (Rosenberg, 1982). More 
important than ‘higher’ types of external knowledge are technologically useful knowledge 
and information, and conditions that encourage and enable their acquisition and 
assimilation. Internal learning is dependent upon a variety of external knowledge bases, but 
if very different from internal knowledge bases they are difficult to absorb and apply (Pavitt 
1999). An important constraint in the production, application and use of complex products 
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is the reliance upon an increasing diversity of knowledge principles and disciplines 
(Granstrand and Sjolander 1990; Pavitt 1999).  
 
Sometimes what is developed in research and development is not suited for practice. 
Medical treatments, for instance, need to be evaluated in humans in trials examining their 
clinical effectiveness. They are not, however, examined on criteria related to the context 
within which they will be applied, administered and transformed into healthcare services 
(Nelson et al. 2011; Morlacchi and Nelson 2011).  Organisational context includes the 
equipment, memories, and work environment, and the information that is processed by 
other members, whose interactions with the technology are impossible to predict (Nelson 
and Winter 1982:105). In a similar vein, Rosenberg (1982:143), drawing on Kuznets 
(1972), points out that “a product innovation in one context may be a process innovation in 
another”, suggesting that contextual specificities may be definitive in determining the role 
of an innovation in an organisation or sector, rather than it being given from outside.  
 
 
2.3.3 Sociological aspects of technology evolution inside the organisation 
Technological evolution in organisations is a social process of negotiation between social 
groups (Pinch and Bijker 1984; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985; Bijker et al. 1987; Blume 
1992; Williams and Edge 1996). Instead of being driven by the evolution of knowledge as 
defined previously, technology in the sociological perspective is part of the evolution of 
social processes, perceptions and decisions regarding technology (Pinch and Bijker 1984; 
Blume 1992). Over time, social processes ‘shape’ or ‘construct’ the role the technology 
plays in the social system, stabilizing its functions and rules for the organisation (Pinch and 
Bijker 1984; Bijker 1987; Wynne 1988). Social features of the organisational context such 
as social groups, negotiation processes, social norms and structure, play a dominant role in 
the evolution of technology in the organisation (Williams and Edge 1996). 
 
Social contexts are heterogeneous and have multiple social groups at the same time that 
may have radically different interpretations of, for example, the technological artefact, and 
thereby exert a different influence on the evolution of its ‘meaning’ (Pinch and Bijker 
47 
 
1984). Interpretations may change over time and interact with one another (ibid.). By 
possessing ‘interpretative flexibility’ in the use and functions of the artefact in their social 
context, social groups such as ‘users’ for example, in turn, are shaped themselves, and 
assume different roles in the organisation or social system (Kline and Pinch 1996). 
 
The different technical options and choices surrounding the artefact in the organisation are 
outcomes of social choices throughout the negotiation process (Clark et al. 1988). Social 
choices are affected by the social structure (for example, the distribution of power between 
social groups) in the organisation, the technological problem, and the solution (Pinch and 
Bijker 1984; Orlikowski 1992). Each social group may have a different position in the 
organisational hierarchy, may perceive a problem differently, and have a different solution. 
The acceptance of the solution may depend upon the position of the social group in the 
hierarchy (Pinch and Bijker 1984; Blume 1992). 
 
Social negotiation processes are not smooth and predictable but often problematic. One 
reason is that they may challenge existing power structures in the organisation. For 
example, Barley (1986), in his analysis of the negotiation process of the CT scanner in two 
hospital departments, found that technicians (lower in the organisational hierarchy) had 
different solutions to the problem to radiologists (higher in the organisational hierarchy), 
which challenged the structure between them.  
 
Organisations may have similar hierarchical structures but differ in their behavioural 
norms, which may affect the negotiation process (Barley 1986). For example, Barley 
(1986) found that the social norms or ‘scripts’ that predefine the ways in which different 
members of hospital departments interact have an important influence on the speed and 
direction of technology evolution in the organisation. The hospital department with norms 
that supported horizontal interaction across social groups allowed for faster problem-
solving than did the department that maintained a vertical and uni-directional form of 
exchange (ibid.).  
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Negotiation can take a long time and indeed it is often impossible to know how long it will 
take. The meaning of the artefact is intertwined with which social groups are involved in 
gradually giving meaning along its technological trajectory (Latour and Woolgar 1979; 
Williams and Edge 1996)23. Social processes are unpredictable, and relevant social groups, 
their perceptions and their roles in shaping meaning, may only be recognisable in hindsight 
(Pinch and Bijker 1984). 
 
Negotiation can come to an end when artefacts are ‘stabilised’ (Barley 1986; Blume 1992). 
Stabilisation is also sometimes described as routinisation or institutionalisation (Greenhalgh 
et al. 2004). This occurs when the main problems with the artefact have been solved and the 
solutions have been accepted (Blume 1992). Routinisation occurs incrementally throughout 
the negotiation process, and is characterised by the artefact assuming a role and function 
within the social system that is, relative to previous periods, unchanging (Blume 1992). 
Over time, a further negotiation process for the same artefact may occur when new uses are 
found (Pinch and Bijker 1984). Empirical studies on routinisation processes of 
technological artefacts within hospitals are, apart from Barley’s exemplary (1986) study, 
quite scarce (Greenhalgh et al. 2004).   
 
During the negotiation process, the relationships between social groups change (Barley 
1990; Nettleton and Hanlon 2006) and their relationship to the technology changes too 
(Green et al. 2005).  Healthcare environments in particular are considered as diverse and 
complex with complicated decision-making structures, and it is unclear which social group 
is driving the stabilisation process and which group is subject to its outcomes (Henwood et 
al. 2003; Berg 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
23 The social negotiation of the bicycle (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) is considered to be shaped by the differential 
social forces that varied and prevailed over 19 years before it was stabilised, shaped by the differential 
preferences and roles of different social groups (e.g. cyclists, anti-cyclists and female cyclists), their 
differential perceptions of problems, and their solutions.  
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2.3.4 Sociological aspects of technological evolution outside the organisation  
Organisations are part of wider socio-technological spaces, and sociologists and historians 
of technology have suggested several important organising themes within which processes 
and features can be questioned, subsumed and analysed. Of these, the main ones which I 
will discuss here are Hughes (1983; 1987) work on technological systems, Constant’s 
(1980; 1987) work on technological communities, and Bijker’s (1987) work on 
technological frames. I will also repeat some important aspects of Pinch and Bijker’s 
(1984) work on negotiation and closure because these processes occur in the social systems 
of which organisations are part and affect the evolution of technology and the role and 
processes of artefacts within the organisation.    
 
Technological systems connect artefacts to different parts of society, they develop through 
stages, and each context or locality has its own technological style (Hughes 1983). The 
connectedness of artefacts to different parts of society (for example, to inventors, engineers, 
entrepreneurs and consumers) means that defining features which are established in one 
part of the system (for example, the building of an artefact and their characteristics such as 
power systems by engineers and entrepreneurs) influence the role of the artefact in another 
part of society (for example, the role of electric power in households) (ibid.).  
 
The evolution of technological systems is characterised by stages defined by reverse 
salients (Hughes 1983). Reverse salients are disruptive situations or problems that focus 
problem-solving efforts on them and over time create specific groups of problem-solvers 
(Constant on Hughes 1989:229). Cultural aspects of technologies such as values (for 
example, what is considered most important about the technology the time, such as 
efficiency), institutions, and ideas change through these stages (Hughes 1983).  
 
Evolution of technological systems has momentum, which is derived from the components 
of systems, their interactions, and their goals and directionality, and velocity with which 
they spreads and are created (Hughes 1989:76). Velocity can create conditions of radical 
technological changes, which can be disruptive to the organisation via for example 
deskilling, and making previous investments wasteful (Hughes 1989:59). Systems evolve 
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and expand, and over time they become less flexible, but they do not simply disappear; 
instead, systems layer over one another (ibid).  
 
Localities and organisations have their own contextualised technological style which arises 
from interactions with the economy, geography and politics of which they are part (Hughes 
1989). Hughes (1989:70) provides the example of a copper shortage in Germany after 
WWI, causing power plant designers to install larger and fewer generators to save copper, 
which persisted after the copper shortage passed. Such learning experiences and localised 
design modifications can help explain the regional style of the Ruhr area (Hughes 1989:70). 
Diagnostic imaging technologies in Japan diffused rapidly because of the cultural value of 
non-invasive medical examinations in Japanese culture (Yoshikawa et al. 1993).  
 
Organisations are embedded within communities of technological practices (Constant 1980; 
1989). Defined by “the adherence to a tradition” (Constant 1989:224), practice 
communities are composed of individuals and organisations that incrementally develop 
their tradition through shared normative values, common problem themes, and testing 
procedures (Constant 1980). The community changes by changes in constraints to what can 
be usefully done while continuing the conventions (Constant 1989:225). 
 
Organisations and artefacts change within evolving technological frames which structure 
communication between social groups (Bijker 1989). The technological frame explains 
how a social environment structures the design of an artefact. A problem (e.g. scarcity) and 
several solutions, the solution which is chosen creates the frame within which other 
solutions are searched for and chosen as the technology evolves. The frame includes goals, 
problem-solving strategies, and practices of use (ibid.). Depending on the technological 
frame that is described, different factors will play different roles (ibid.).  
 
A member of a social group can have different degrees of inclusion in a technological 
frame, which will change over time and influence the negotiation process (Bijker 
1989:174). Users and their practices, for example, can influence the design of the artefacts 
(ibid.). The technological frame notion can help explain the role of social processes in 
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‘closing’ the definition process of an artefact by specifying the role of different social 
groups, their problems, and the solutions to the problems that are agreed upon in society 
(Pinch and Bijker 1984). 
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Table 5: Summary of evolutionary approaches to technological change in organisations  
 Knowledge approaches  Sociological approaches  
Conceptualisation of technology Knowledge embodied in artefacts, people, procedures, routines, 
capabilities and organisational arrangements, product 
specifications and design; materials and component 
specifications and properties; machinery and its range of 
operating characteristics, together with the various kinds of 
know-how, operating procedure and organisational arrangement 
needed to integrate these elements in a production system (Bell 
and Albu 1999:1717).  
 
 
 
Social process of negotiation between social groups (MacKenzie 
and Wajcman 1985; Bijker et al. 1987).  
Factors affecting technology evolution inside the organisation Changes in the technological regimes, and the technical 
knowledge stored in routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; Freeman 
and Perez 1988), changes in the complexity and diversity of 
technical knowledge in the different technology areas examined 
(Rosenberg 1976; Dosi 1988), path dependencies in 
technological trajectories (Dosi 1982), cumulativeness in 
technical knowledge bases (Nelson and Winter 1982), individual 
commitment to problem-solving (Rosenberg 1976), changes 
over time in technical knowledge embodied in products (Patel 
and Pavitt 1997), internal practice-based knowledge regime 
(Nelson et al. 2011), changes in the multitude of technologies 
embodied in the products (Granstrand et al. 1992), changes in 
the emergence and systemness of products (Hobday 1998), and 
the competition between technologies with existing technologies 
for similar organisational functions (Arthur 1989). 
 
 
 
Social features of the organisational context such as social 
groups, negotiation processes, social norms and structure (Pinch 
and Bijker 1984; Blume 1992).  
Factors affecting technology evolution outside the organisation Changes in the external practice paradigm (Nelson et al. 2011), 
feedback and interactions with other organisations (Lundvall 
1992), different rates of change in external technical knowledge 
(Dosi 1982), the suitability of external products and 
technologies for organisational practices, and the absorptive 
capacity of the organisation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra 
and George 2002). 
Technological systems, specifically connectedness, reverse 
salient, momentum, expansion, inflexibility, layering of systems, 
and contextualised technological style (Hughes 1983; 1989). 
Technological practice communities and adherence to tradition 
characterised by shared normative values, common problems, 
testing procedures, and constraints Constant (1980; 1989). 
Technological frames (Bijker 1989) and notions such as social 
environment, social group inclusion and exclusion, problems, 
and closure upon a solution shaping the role of the artefact in the 
organisation and in society (Pinch and Bijker 1989).  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own summary of literature reviewed. 
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2.4 Conceptual framework and research questions  
The literature reviewed in section 2.1 suggested that hospital innovation is a complex and 
heterogeneous process of product and information adoption (Rogers 1962), and 
communication within social networks (Rogers and Kincaid 1981), determined by research 
evidence (Ferlie et al. 2001) and an outcome of organisational and managerial adaptation 
processes (Van de Ven 1991). This review also highlighted that a conceptualisation of 
hospitals as ‘passive adopters’ is misleading and that hospitals are, like firms, active 
participants in the medical innovation process (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). Section 2.2 then 
reviewed the organisational learning literature, to establish a framework to help uncover 
elements and underpinnings of hospital innovation processes. The exploratory nature of the 
study and choice of empirical context led me to choose the open, flexible but systematically 
integrated organisational learning framework suggested by Crossan et al. (1999). This also 
provided the definition of ‘hospital innovation’ as introduced in section 2.4.1 below. 
Moreover, the literature review of organisational learning showed that these perspectives 
are rather vague as to what drives the process of change in organisations (Dodgson 1993), 
and provided a reasoning for focusing on technology, and thereby the grounds for the 
thesis. Section 2.3 reviewed several perspectives on technology evolution, focusing on 
aspects of neo-Schumpeterian approaches and sociological approaches, to arrive at a 
comprehensive and detailed list of factors for their application to a novel empirical area.  
 
Based on the theoretical contributions and their exposition, this section introduces the 
original research questions guiding the study. Section 2.4.1 defines hospital innovation 
based on the definition of routinisation provided by the organisational learning literature 
reviewed in section 2.2.3. Section 2.4.2 draws on the literature on knowledge approaches to 
technological evolution to suggest knowledge factors that may play a role in hospital 
innovation, and proposes the first research question of the study. Section 2.4.3 draws on the 
literature reviewed on sociological approaches to technological evolution to suggest social 
factors affecting hospital innovation, and introduces the second research question in the 
study. Section 2.4.4 draws on both the organisational learning and technology approaches 
reviewed to explore the issue of contextual and technological heterogeneity in hospital 
innovation, and develops the third and final research question of the thesis.  
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2.4.1 Learning in clinical practice 
Based on Crossan et al.’s (1999:529) definition of organisational learning, hospital 
innovation is defined as: “the formalisation (or institutionalisation) of what is learned (at 
the individual and group levels) into procedures, rules and routines”. Institutionalisation is 
the process by which an organisation exploits the knowledge that has been accumulated 
within it in order to achieve its goals. This process can take a long time (and, once it has 
occurred, may no longer suit the organisational context). Institutionalisation is seen as an 
outcome of interactions between learning processes at different levels in the organisation, 
defined below:   
 
Intuiting (individual level) 
Intuiting is defined as a subconscious process at the individual level determined by past 
pattern recognition (Crossan et al. 1999). It relies upon the knowledge that the individual 
has accumulated over their lifetime. It is tacitly learned and communicable to others 
through imagery and metaphors.  
 
Interpreting (individual and group level) 
Interpreting is defined as a conscious process of comprehension and connection with an 
individual’s cognitive map (Crossan et al. 1999). A cognitive map is composed of existing 
knowledge and language connections that partially exist in the outside environment. 
Interpretation, as it occurs via a common language, can take place in dialogue and through 
communication with others until an understanding is reached.  
 
Integrating (group level) 
Integration is defined as coherent and collective action (Crossan et al. 1999). Integration 
involves the mutual adjustment of collective behaviour and the creation and reinforcement 
of a collective understanding. It is characterised by a shared language, common tasks and a 
collective engagement in similar organisational processes and goals.  
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2.4.2 Knowledge aspects of technology evolution and learning in clinical practice 
Supported by Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi (1988), and Freeman and Perez (1988), 
organisational learning is affected by knowledge factors of technology evolution such as 
changes in technological regimes and interactions with aspects of the organisation-internal 
practice-based knowledge regime such as the technical knowledge stored in routines.  
 
Technical knowledge evolution is path dependent, and builds on elements of the technology 
‘bundle’ such as skills, structures, processes, artefacts, routines and capabilities that were 
accumulated in the past, shaped by ‘technological trajectories’ that are enabled and limited 
by what has been learned in the past, both inside and outside the organisation (Dosi 1988). 
Knowledge evolution is incremental, partially unpredictable, and accumulated through 
painstaking processes and individual commitments to problem-solving (Rosenberg 1976). 
Via processes such as learning-by-doing and –using, organisations accumulate and create 
knowledge (Rosenberg 1982) and expand their ‘bodies of practice’ (Nelson 1998).  
 
The process of technical knowledge evolution is characterised by changes in its complexity 
and diversity (Rosenberg 1976; Dosi 1988). For example, organisations are affected by 
changes over time in the technical knowledge in external products (Patel and Pavitt 1997). 
Changes such as the multitude of technologies embodied in products affect their knowledge 
requirements in the organisation and differ in their suitability for organisational practices 
(Granstrand and Sjolander 1990). Product properties such as the degree of their emergent 
nature, systems, sub-systems, sub-components, and network attributes affect organisational 
processes of customisation and routinisation (Hobday 1998). Technologies may compete in 
organisations for similar organisational functions (Arthur 1989).  
 
External to the organisation, technical change can bring about changes to the external 
practice paradigm (Nelson et al. 2011). Organisations are not closed but open, and 
knowledge (for example, in the form of information, technologies, and people) flows across 
their boundaries (Schumpeter 1939). Organisations are part of wider innovation systems 
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and knowledge is accumulated through feedback and interactions within and across these 
systems (Lundvall 1992).  
 
External technical knowledge changes at different rates (Dosi 1982). Thus, knowledge 
requirements of technologies change over time. Organisations differ in their absorptive 
capacity, which affects the extent and degree to which they can keep up with changing 
technological environments (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002). Where 
one aspect or functional demand may be met in the organisation, other aspects may not 
(Wang and von Tunzelmann 2000).   
 
Based on these theoretical considerations, I expect hospital innovation to be affected by 
knowledge aspects of technology, which leads to the first research questions and sub-
questions: 
 
 
RQ1: How do technical change processes in diagnostic imaging technologies (CT, 
MRI and PACS) affect learning in clinical practice? 
• What is the role of technical accumulation processes internal and external 
to the hospital with respect to learning in clinical practice? 
• In what ways do cognitive features at the individual, group, organisational 
and sectoral levels support or constrain learning? 
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2.4.3 Sociological aspects of technology evolution and hospital innovation 
According to Pinch and Bijker (1984), technology evolves via social processes of 
negotiation between different social groups whose perceptions of the technological artefact 
differ and change over time. In any social system, such as an organisation, the 
configuration of social groups shapes which perceptions dominate the negotiation process 
and which perceptions get rejected or accepted (Blume 1992). The structure of the social 
system both affects and is affected by the negotiation process, which may give rise to 
different social configurations over time (Bijker et al. 1987).  In addition to structure, social 
systems have social norms which shape the behaviour of social groups and their 
interactions, and which affect the process of technological evolution, and the stabilisation 
of the artefact and the finding of its role in the social system (Barley 1986).  
 
Based on this theoretical reasoning, I expect hospital innovation to be affected by social 
aspects of technology, which leads to the second research question: 
 
 
RQ2: How do social processes of technical change in diagnostic imaging 
technologies affect learning in clinical practice? 
• What is the role of social features of technological systems and 
communities internal and external to the hospital with respect to 
learning in clinical practice? 
• In what ways do social features at the individual, group, organisational 
and sectoral levels support or constrain learning in these technology 
areas? 
 
 
2.4.4 Differences between technology areas and clinical practice contexts 
The theoretical perspectives reviewed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that there are 
similarities and differences between organisational contexts, technology areas and social 
systems in their innovation processes and outcomes, which cannot be known a priori. 
Organisations differ in the extent and degree of individual intuiting, interpreting, 
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integrating, institutionalising and their interactions between these processes (Crossan et al. 
1999). Based on Rosenberg (1982:143), contextual specificities are assumed to determine 
technological change processes in an organisation or sector. Organisations differ in their 
technology ‘elements’ and ‘bundles’, such as skills, artefacts, tacit knowledge, routines, 
procedures and product specifications (Bell and Albu 1999). Social systems differ in their 
social groups, perceptions, and norms affecting the process of technology evolution in the 
organisation (Pinch and Bijker 1984; Barley 1986; Blume 1992).  
 
From this I infer that technology areas and clinical practice contexts will differ in the 
variety and extent of influence of knowledge and social factors underpinning organisational 
innovation processes, leading to the last research question guiding the study: 
 
 
RQ3: Why do some technologies in clinical practice develop more easily than 
other technologies? 
• For what reasons are CT, MRI and PACS more easily routinised in some 
clinical practice settings than in others? 
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Chapter 3 
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
This chapter first describes the exploratory case study design, and justifies the choice of 
producing contextualised theory with novel qualitative empirical data. Section 3.2 discusses 
the selection of clinical practice as the unit of analysis, and CT, MRI and PACS as cases. 
Section 3.3 describes the use of interviews for the collection of data, the choice of hospital 
sites, and the use of qualitative techniques for ordering, finding patterns, and for 
interpretation. It also describes the use of observations and archival searches for 
triangulation and improvement of validity. Section 3.4 summarises the methods used in the 
study.   
 
 
3.1 Research design  
Medical innovation is often seen as processes occurring in a ‘black box’24 (Greenhalgh et 
al. 2004; Djellal and Gallouj 2007; Yaqub 2008). While existing empirical studies of 
innovation in hospitals provide important insights, this thesis argues that a close and 
detailed examination of technological routinisation processes in CT, MRI and PACS will 
contribute further knowledge on the topic because some of these aspects may have been 
hidden in the past.  
 
Looking into the details of technology underpinning innovation, such as learning conditions 
and constraints, problem-solving procedures, changes in individual tasks, emergence of 
social groups, and patterns of interaction can reveal information about the accumulation of 
                                                 
24 The ‘black box’ metaphor has been used in many different research areas to explain the need for a focus on 
process rather than inputs and outputs, for example in investigations of technical change (Rosenberg 1982), in 
studies of hospital innovation (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Djellal and Gallouj 2007), and in the exploration of 
change in organisational routines (Feldman 2000; 2003).  
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technological knowledge (Morlacchi and Nelson 2011)25. It can also uncover differences 
between hospital organisations and practice contexts that may otherwise remain 
unexplained (Greenhalgh et al. 2004).  
 
A deep understanding of technology requires contextual analysis (Hughes 1983). This is 
because technological change processes are complex, idiosyncratic and impossible to 
separate from where they are taking place (Rosenberg 1982). The complexity and richness 
of process data tends to get lost upon aggregation, as in quantitative studies. The aim of this 
thesis is not to produce results that are generalisable to the population, but to generalise to 
analytic concepts in the field of innovation and technological learning, and to produce 
‘contextualised theory’ (Hughes 1983).  
 
In process studies of technology it is difficult to draw boundaries between the exploratory, 
descriptive and causal components and characteristics. This is in part because the focus is 
on obtaining a multi-dimensional view of understanding relationships and interactions 
between processes, how they affect one another, the conditions under which they occur 
(Bell and Albu 1999), and the varying degrees of determinism of interactions over time and 
across contexts. Processes are not separable from their contexts, and it is impossible to list a 
set of causal factors and separate the effects of everything else. A case study approach 
allows for flexibility in this sense, by giving opportunity to uncover phenomena that cannot 
be isolated from their context, such as social processes which do not have clear boundaries 
from other events (Yin 2009).  
 
This thesis contributes to existing theory via the analytical abstraction process of 
‘appreciative theorising’ (Nelson and Winter 1982). The analysis is guided by constructs 
and conceptual relationships of the theoretical framework, and aims to contribute to the 
theories that have guided the justification and formulation of the research questions. The 
use of existing theory meant that I did not use a research design based on the grounded 
theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 2010).  
                                                 
25 Greenhalgh et al. (2004:620) in their literature review identify process studies of routinisation as “the most 
serious gap” in the healthcare literature.  
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Understanding technology and change requires an uncovering of the processes by which 
problems are solved, learning takes place, and knowledge is applied, all of which differ 
across technology areas and contexts (Rosenberg 1982). Learning processes are very 
difficult to detect and examine (Hobday 1995). Case studies allow for discovering surprises 
and unplanned interactions, and for obtaining a lot of different information on previously 
unknown processes and implications for theory and policy (Yin 2009).  
 
Qualitative methods of data collection are better suited for exploratory studies in novel 
empirical areas for which quantitative indicators do not exist (Yin 2009). My use of 
qualitative data on processes, procedures, tasks, individual and group knowledge exchange 
and conditions for interaction and problem-solving builds on existing studies of learning 
and change in hospitals and firms (Van de Ven 1991; Crossan and Berdrow 2003).  
 
Guided by the theoretical framework for organisational learning and technological 
evolution, this study is inductive rather than deductive (Moser and Kalton 1971). Inductive 
studies of organisational learning (Pentland and Feldman 2005) and technological change 
(Rosenberg 1982; Bijker et al. 1989) proceed with a conceptual framework rather than a 
theory, and hope to contribute to theory in an iterative process. The focus is on finding 
relationships and processes of technological and social mechanisms, rather than their 
quantitative determinants, and thereby obtaining a “holistic” and integrated view of the 
research context, its logic, arrangements, explicit and implicit rules, guided by a theoretical 
framework and finding implications for theory26 (Miles and Huberman 1994:6). 
 
This thesis follows in the tradition of studies of technology that have approached the topic 
using “thick descriptions” of large amounts of detailed and deep information structured 
using a number of “middle-range” concepts (Bijker et al. 1989:3-5) which are open and 
flexible enough for the discovery of contextual complexity. Such studies place a “heavy 
interpretative load” (Bijker et al. 1989:3-5) on the researcher, and sometimes the load can 
                                                 
26 Inductive research finds implications for theory from the data, while deductive approaches do it by 
hypothesis testing (Glaser and Strauss 2010).  
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only be lessened by a lot of tacit experience in researching and writing about the subject 
(Glaser and Strauss 2010). I tried to remedy the effects of my own limited experience by 
not making any unsubstantiated claims and keeping my analysis as close to the empirical 
observations and theoretical framework as possible given my existing skills. Where this 
was not possible, I modified the framework (Yin 2009).  
 
To obtain detailed information that may be generalisable to theory without pre-conceived 
causal relationships between constructs, this study poses ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 
2010). ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions are answerable using rich contextualised data obtained 
from a variety of data collection techniques (such as semi-structured interviews, 
observations, and archival searches), which enable triangulation (Glaser and Strauss 2010). 
This is in contrast to surveys which aim to establish causality (Moser and Kalton 1971). 
 
The case study method accommodated the demands of ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions 
that have a wide variety of variables, with different kinds of outcomes and not just one 
result (Yin 2009:18). A further advantage of the case study method is flexibility and 
openness in data collection for exploratory studies. Although I aimed to use the same 
method for all cases, the different degrees of change in the cases selected, and differing 
contexts meant that I had to remain flexible in the type and amount of data that I was able 
to obtain, placing more emphasis on procedures and changes that I was able to get a lot of 
information on. The downside of openness and flexibility is that it can lead to a method of 
studying innovation that is “messy, stop-start, and difficult-to-research” (Greenhalgh et al. 
2004:614), as periodically encountered during the fieldwork. I tried to avoid this by 
revisiting plans, writing and analysing, and addressing problems as they arose (Glaser and 
Strauss 2010).  
 
This study is guided by historians, economists and sociologists who view technology as a 
dynamic process (Rosenberg 1976; Hughes 1983) and tries to take a longitudinal rather 
than cross-sectional perspective on technological change in hospitals. A problem with 
basing my investigation of past and present events on interview data was that people may 
not always remember what happened in the past or remember it accurately (Moser and 
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Kalton 1971). I tried to remedy this by collecting data from archival documents as well as 
interviews and observations. A further problem was that as I focused on the not-so-distant 
past (three to seven years) it was not possible to say whether events and features were 
indeed as important as they were claimed to be by others or interpreted to be so by myself, 
as longer historical periods might allow. This is a relatively common problem with 
studying present and recent events as we do not have the benefit of hindsight. I aimed to 
remain reflexive and critical about what I interpreted as relevant and less relevant 
information. 
 
 
3.2. Unit of analysis and selection of cases 
The unit of analysis chosen was the “clinical practice” because it was broad enough to 
accommodate processes, procedures, tasks, rules, interpretations and routines for the 
exploration of technological learning in hospital organisations (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; 
Nelson et al. 2011; Morlacchi and Nelson 2011). For example, knowledge in organisations 
evolves through the application of what has been learned in practice in one area, to similar 
practical problems in another area, changing learning conditions in both areas (Rosenberg 
1976).  
 
Practices reveal how organisational processes are carried out, and, for example, what the 
role of individual, group and contextual features is in their execution and evolution 
(Feldman and Pentland 2003). Organisational practices uncover performance aspects, 
problems that are solved, and practice components that are changed (Feldman and Rafaeli 
2002). At the organisational level, features of technology converge towards and evolve with 
organisational practices (Rosenberg 1976; Tidd et al. 2005).  
 
Clinical practices can be operationalised and identified by interviewees because people are 
usually able to express the role of individual tasks, procedures, routines, and problems and 
changes with them, and for what reasons they occurred (Feldman 2000). For example, 
routines are often associated with ‘practical’ examples in the literature (Nelson and Winter 
1982; Feldman 2000; 2003). Routines are also a useful concept with which to view both the 
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knowledge-based (Grant 1996a; 1996b), social aspects of organisational processes 
(Feldman 2000; 2003) and also to analyse organisational change (Adler et al. 2003).  
 
The variety of components and aspects that can be contained in organisational practices can 
help uncover differences between technology systems, and how they layer one over the 
other, between contexts, and over time (Hughes 1989). Practices are also useful for 
exploring the role of individuals and groups in the ‘construction’ of a technological regime 
in an organisation, their perceptions, and ‘closure’ of an artefact in a social context (Bijker 
1995). 
 
I selected the cases of CT, MRI and PACS because they fit the assumptions of my 
framework. In part, they all featured in the same technological paradigm (ICTs), their 
technological systems all overlapped with and deviated from the X-ray practice paradigm in 
hospitals, and they all relied upon technological capabilities and advancements largely 
outside the field of medicine (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). These aspects meant that they 
could be analysed using a neo-Schumpeterian view of organisational change. 
 
I also chose these technology areas as cases because of their differences (Yin 2009). The 
fundamental technical and scientific principles on which they all rely differed, and they 
emerged at different times in hospitals (CT and MRI in the 1980s, PACS in the 2000s). CT 
was heralded as a success from its beginnings in medical practice (Gelijns and Rosenberg 
1999).  MRI had been successful in the 1980s, and then its applications petered out, and 
were picking up again in the 2000s. PACS was a major focus of more recent large-scale 
government investments, and had mainly been described as a challenge to clinical practice 
(Hendy et al. 2005).  
 
Case selection was motivated by analytical rather than statistical reasons, because the 
objective was not statistical but analytic generalisation (Yin 2009). Multiple cases are more 
suitable for drawing analytic conclusions than single cases. I replicated the same method 
for all three cases to compare and contrast results, to come to more valid and reliable 
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conclusions, and to clarify the reasons why similar or conflicting results had been produced 
(Yin 2009). 
 
Coherence and overview in the cases was helped by adhering to a case-study protocol (Yin 
2009:82). The protocol was a ‘rolling’ one, as doing fieldwork in the NHS was very 
difficult and presented many surprises, so I needed to maintain an additional margin of 
flexibility. The protocol was kept to maintain a ‘mental line of enquiry’, which helped me 
not stray too far from the overall research focus.   
 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
I selected five NHS hospital sites in East Sussex mainly because they embodied the 
characteristics alluded to in the framework. For example, the hospital sites offered 
diagnostic imaging services in one or more of the technology areas chosen as cases. I also 
chose the hospitals because they were in the process of investing resources in these areas 
both autonomously and through government expansion programmes (NHS Plan and NPfIT) 
(for example, BSUH 2004), which indicated ‘technological momentum’ (Hughes 1983). I 
assumed studying these sites would produce findings with relevance for technology policy. 
 
The hospital sites were also chosen for reasons of geographical proximity and ease of 
access. East Sussex was my place of work and where I lived, and where my University was 
located. Some of the hospitals were part of the Brighton and Sussex Medical School, which 
I could access during my studies, carry out guided conversations with doctors and 
researchers, and obtain contacts for the definitive interview survey.  
 
NHS hospitals are publicly financed and researching them could provide complementary 
evidence to the existing literature on medical innovation which is largely US- and private 
hospital-focused. A primary aim of the case studies was to collect new data. Carrying out 
the study solely in the UK could result in a geographical bias. However, many important 
aspects of the cases had their roots in the UK. The advantages of focusing on a 
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geographical region with a rich history in these areas were thought to outweigh the negative 
influence of a bias that would skew them.  
 
Doing fieldwork in the NHS has a high administrative burden. I sought and obtained NHS 
Research Ethics Approval from the South East NHS Ethics Approval Office to gain 
admittance to local hospital sites. During the preparation of the documents, I held several 
meetings with hospital administrators, medical school research and administrative staff, 
doctors, and both face-to-face and telephone conversations with regional NHS offices in 
preparation of the human subject protection documents and the research plan. Collecting 
data in hospitals outside East Sussex would have required fulfilment of additional formal 
administrative procedures27.  
 
The hospital sites are varied and mixed. There are urban and rural hospitals, a specialised 
neurological hospital, a general hospital, and a large university teaching hospital. The 
diversity in practice contexts is largely a feature of how NHS hospital services are 
organised in a region. Clinical services are highly specialised and many of them are 
available locally so that patients do not need to travel large distances to take advantage of 
them. For example, one historical aspect of the NHS is to meet local health service needs 
(Webster 2006). 
 
I carried out a pilot study to gain familiarity with the cases in preparation for the interview 
survey. I conducted about seven pilot interviews in hospitals in London and Peterborough, 
and with radiology researchers at the Brighton and Sussex Medical School, placing 
emphasis on understanding the clinical practices, their contexts, features of the cases and 
perceptions of doctors and technicians. I wrote up and presented the results in a DRUID 
Doctoral Conference in the form of a conference paper (Sinozic 2006). The pilot study, 
conference presentation and feedback helped me improve the research design and interview 
schedule.   
 
                                                 
27 Seeking and obtaining NHS Research Ethics Approval took almost one year.  
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The definitive survey involved 42 in-depth semi-structured interviews with radiologists, 
radiographers, neurologists, neurosurgeons, breast radiologists, breast surgeons, medical 
physicists, nurses, radiology managers, and hospital managers. To improve internal 
validity, I interviewed people who were engaged in different hospital departments, 
performed different functions, had different roles and were engaged in different operational 
routines. I also interviewed people at different levels of seniority in the hospital, such as 
nurses, doctors, departmental managers, hospital managers and members of the Trust 
advisory board.  
 
Availability of hospital staff was often unpredictable so I remained flexible in scheduling 
and re-scheduling interviews, and moving between sites. I kept detailed transcripts, logs, 
and descriptions of each case to keep them separate and fresh in my mind as I arranged my 
enquiries in different practices. I recorded all interviews after obtaining written consent 
from my interviewees, and following the ‘24-hour rule’ (Yin 2009) I transcribed them all 
within one day of finishing them. 
 
I used a combination of the ‘snowball method’ (Moser and Kalton 1971) and searches of 
hospital databases to contact interviewees. The snowball method was particularly useful as 
individuals were familiar with others involved in their practices and would introduce me 
directly to them, which almost always resulted in the scheduling of a further interview. This 
allowed for an on-going inclusion of individuals and groups (Glaser and Strauss 2010) 
associated with the practice.  
 
During each interview I took extensive notes, which I added to once the interview was 
completed. Whenever possible, I took small breaks between interviews that occurred in the 
same day to make more notes and record my observations, both descriptive and analytical, 
while I could remember them well.  
 
In addition to interviews which formed the central component of the data collection, I 
collected data using a combination of other methods. I observed all activities in the 
practices to which I was permitted access. I attended a ‘multi-disciplinary team meeting’ 
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(MDTMs) and one technical conference, which allowed me to obtain more information on 
the cases. Combining different methods of data collection allowed me to check for internal 
validity and reliability of information, and to triangulate (for example, questioning 
respondents based on my observations) (Glaser and Strauss 2010). 
 
Archival searches were also an important component of data collection. For example, the 
NHS Hospital Activity Statistics, the CIPFA public records service, the Trust and hospital 
databases, hospital annual reports, white papers and reports on the evaluation of radiology 
services in UK hospitals, hospital websites, and articles in the local and national press. The 
hospitals provided valuable access to the NHS database and the NHS Brighton and Hove 
Trust library. 
 
During the data collection and some case redesign process, I remained open to new leads 
and possible revisions to interpretations in order to avoid bias. I did this by periodically 
talking to colleagues and fellow students about my results as I was collecting and analysing 
them. It was particularly useful to be surrounded by critical and helpful colleagues who 
offered alternative explanations and suggestions to improve the data collection and thus 
make the overall study more robust. It was advantageous to be doing my data collection 
locally, enabling me to go back to the office on a weekly basis to talk about how my 
fieldwork was progressing. 
 
The data was analysed in two main steps. I first ordered the data, and secondly then coded 
and interpreted it. Once I had collected all the interview data and transcripts, observations, 
field notes, and archival material, I started experimenting with ordering, using techniques 
for analysing qualitative data (Miles and Huberman 1994). I created matrices in which I 
displayed the data, organised it, and found categories and relationships. This involved a lot 
of trial-and-error experimentation, which kept the data in the forefront of my mind until I 
became more confident in interpreting it and in making analytic generalisations. 
 
The choice of research design and methods introduced potential researcher bias and 
subjective bias to the study. Researcher bias, for example in the form of enquiring and 
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interpreting to confirm my own assumptions, was reduced by reflecting upon my own 
intentions and analysis, and being open to novel analytical suggestions from the literature. 
Qualitative data is sometimes more prone to subjective bias than perhaps objectively 
quantifiable data. I tried to minimise this by using multiple sources of data and cross-
checking my observations and conclusions with my interviewees and colleagues.  
 
 
3.4 Summary  
A case study approach was chosen to explore learning processes in clinical practice, to 
make analytic generalisations guided by a theoretical framework. Clinical practice was 
chosen as a unit of analysis because the interesting and relevant procedures, rules, tasks, 
routines, social groups, interactions and problems were assumed to converge on them, and 
the concept was broad and operationalisable enough to uncover the detailed new empirical 
data I aimed to find. I selected CT, MRI and PACS technology areas as cases because of 
their importance and change in hospitals. I did a pilot study in hospitals in London and 
Peterborough to gain a practical understanding of the cases. Definitive interviews were held 
in five hospital sites in East Sussex. The hospitals possessed the characteristics underlined 
in the framework, as well as variety, and they were relatively easy to access. I triangulated 
the interview data with observations and archival searches. The data was analysed using 
qualitative techniques of ordering, coding, finding patterns and creating matrices to aid 
interpretation and the making of analytic generalisations. Researcher bias was reduced by 
remaining open to other analytic interpretations based on the literature and maintaining a 
broad framework. I tried to reduce bias by using multiple data sources, and cross-checking 
my results with different interviewees to improve validity.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Contextual Background: History, technology, and policy of CT, MRI and PACS 
 
 
This chapter presents a background context to the empirical chapters. Section 4.1 shows the 
beginnings of diagnostic imaging in medicine and the historical evolution of X-ray 
technology. In Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 aspects of the developmental histories, scientific 
discovery, and technical details of CT, MRI and PACS in the healthcare sector are 
described. The objective of these sections is to chronicle some of the important events and 
features that have shaped parts of organisational and technological contexts for learning in 
clinical practice. Section 4.5 describes the policy setting of diagnostic imaging in the UK 
healthcare sector. The purpose of this section is to help understand procurement, regulation 
and management of these technologies in the UK and to highlight policy aspects which the 
empirical chapters aim to inform.  
 
 
4.1 X-rays: Historical foundations of medical diagnostic imaging 
Ever since W. Roentgen’s discovery of X-rays in 1895 diagnostic imaging has been an 
important technological area in medicine. During that time, physicists were concerned with 
elementary relationships between electricity, magnetism and light (Bleich 1960; Schuster 
1962; Harder 1986; Mould 1995). Roentgen discovered X-rays by experimenting with the 
sending of electric currents through small glass tubes28, and examining the associations 
between different voltages, the anode (at one end of the tube), the cathode (at the other end) 
and the movement of particles between them. The anode and cathode were placed in a glass 
tube, which was then evacuated using a vacuum pump.  Applying voltage to the plates 
moved particles (which would later be identified as electrons) through the tube and made it 
glow. Roentgen came upon a type of ray that not only made the tube, but also the screen 
surface opposite, luminous (Bleich 1960). By holding his hand in front of the ‘invisible 
                                                 
28Roentgen used a tube developed by P. Lenard, a variation of the Crookes tube (developed by the English 
chemist W. Crookes in 1876) (Kevles 1998:17; Blume 1992:21).  
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light’ Roentgen found that some rays passed through and left black dots on the screen. 
Some rays were absorbed by the bone and could not pass through29.  
 
Roentgen discovered that the rays had three important properties that would later change 
medicine: (1) they could pass through opaque objects; (2) the extent to which they passed 
through objects differed according to different material densities; and (3) when they hit a 
photographic plate, they did not produce a photographic image of the object, but the image 
of its ‘shadow’ (Kevles 1998). The peculiar deflection and refraction properties of the rays 
were identified by Roentgen as new and unknown, and he named them “X” – rays30 
(Roentgen 1898). By discovering rays which could pass through matter, hit photographic 
film, and produce an image, Roentgen discovered the basis of radiography (Bleich 1960). 
The discovery of X-rays was revolutionary in science and society and the focus of much 
subsequent technological effort and change in medicine (Burrows 1986; Blume 1992). 
  
The evolution of X-ray technology in medicine can be described as having occurred in two 
main stages: (1) changes up to the inter-war period, and (2) changes post-WWI (Kevles 
1997). The potential of X-rays as a medical device were apparent soon after their initial 
detection, and spurred major improvements to it. Much like its discovery, important early 
changes were mainly technical and occurred outside the field of medicine (in engineering 
and in physics where the technicalities of the device were familiar) (Burrows 1986). These 
very early X-ray devices were quite complex and different from one another, characteristics 
which made them challenging to develop and use. Major technical problems were the 
electric current, and characteristics of its central components such as the instability of the 
gas tube and blurring of the image (Barclay 1949). Moreover, the devices at the time were 
not safe, occasionally caused burns and electrocution, and more serious after-effects of 
radiation which were felt many years after exposure but whose dangers were less well-
documented at the time (Kevles 1997).   
 
                                                 
29 Other rays were scattered and left random grey shadows on the film, known as ‘noise’. 
30 Over the next twenty years, physics research found that X-rays were electromagnetic waves with a very 
short wavelength in comparison to visible light. Like visible light, X-rays were understood as a stream of 
particles, called photons. X-rays photons were found to have more energy than visible light photons 
(Gardiner, 1964).  
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The Coolidge tube, credited to W. D. Coolidge, was a major improvement to the early 
device. At the time, the gas tubes that were used were highly unreliable (Gardiner 1964). 
Problems with measuring the voltage, its stability in the tube, and maintaining a vacuum to 
balance out the X-rays were technical aspects that needed to be solved to produce an 
accurate image (Gardiner 1964). This occurred with the invention of the Coolidge tube. 
Despite its superiority, the Coolidge tube did not replace gas tubes in widespread hospital 
use before 1920, almost two decades after it was developed (Kevles 1998). 
 
The further problem of early X-ray apparatus was blurring of the images. Blurring was 
caused by two main processes: first, when entering the body X-rays ionize molecules 
causing them to emit more rays. The lack of focus provided for these rays causes them to 
hit the film in a random manner, causing blurring. Second, X-rays scatter on their own, and 
this causes blurring as well. The invention that is acclaimed to have solved this problem is 
the Bucky-Potter grid, which helped focus and channel the rays, producing a better image. 
Although involving quite a simple step of positioning two metal grids between the patient 
and the tube, and the patient and the photographic plate, it was a tremendous improvement 
of the device (Burrows 1986).  
 
Commercial X-ray devices were introduced to the market one year after Roentgen’s 
discovery (Mitchell, 1988). The firms that entered the X-ray market were the same firms 
that dominate the diagnostic imaging device market even today31. The German firm 
Siemens, specialised in electromechanics, was one of the pioneers in commercialisation of 
X-ray devices. In the US, the firm General Electric, was another forerunner, and it started 
by designing a better tube, including a high-frequency coil to power it. Improvements in 
cathode tubes, as well as advancements in physics knowledge of voltage, wavelengths and 
their relationship to X-rays allowed for higher precision, depth and accuracy in the 
administration of X-rays and their usefulness in diagnosis (Kevles 1998:107). In each of the 
efforts of improvement, such as tubes, their stability, the speed of taking a picture, 
photographic plates, and so on, there was competition between patents (Kevles 1997:108). 
                                                 
31 For detailed accounts of the evolution of the diagnostic imaging industry, see Mitchell (1988) and Gelijns 
and Rosenberg (1999). 
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Improvements sometimes required more complicated production methods of the apparatus, 
most of which the manufacturers were unprepared for, and as a result, innovation was 
incremental and slow (ibid.).   
 
X-rays radically altered the medical profession, and public perceptions of medicine, as well 
as culture and art (Henderson 1988; Adler and Pointon 1993). Uses of X-rays in medicine 
for examining bones were immediately apparent32. However, in the earlier years the 
technology had a heterogeneous customer base: X-rays were not strictly medical devices 
nor were they strictly part of a medical specialty, but could be manufactured and tested on 
people in an unregulated way (largely because its dangers were either unknown or ignored) 
(Kevles 1997; Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). X-rays were particularly useful in WWI for 
the identification of bullets and broken bones. Dentists and coroners also found them very 
useful in their practices, as did criminologists (Kevles 1997:43-45). Although the most 
common application was, as it is still today, for the examination of bones and the chest, 
increasingly doctors were discovering its uses for imaging the gastrointestinal tract, neck 
and brain. 
 
X-ray technology transformed medicine in several important ways. The approach to 
medicine at the time was that it was more an art than a science33, and X-rays (with their 
scientific basis and relative accuracy in visualisation) played an important role in making 
medicine more scientific (Howell 1989). They introduced a new science-based role for 
diagnosis, making the hospital more like a laboratory with machines (ibid.). The medical 
approach at the time was that disease was unique to each patient, and X-rays provided an 
opportunity to generalise diseases across patients, with similarities across cases.  
 
                                                 
32 X-rays are useful in examining bones which absorb a lot of the rays. They are also useful in examining 
veins and other soft tissue when a contrast agent is used (Wolbarst 1999:12). Tumours and cancerous tissue is 
difficult to detect on X-rays because their density is similar to surrounding tissue and can be undetectable 
because of limited radiographic contrast (Wolbarst 1999:12). Even today, X-rays are amongst the most 
common and least costly method of imaging diagnosis (NHS 1999). 
33 In the 19th century, disease was considered unique to each patient and inseparable from them. X-rays 
contributed to an overall shift in thinking about disease as attributable to specific causes that were 
generalisable across patients (Kevles 1998:39).  
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The diffusion of X-rays in medicine led to major improvements, both directly and 
indirectly, in the equipment and the medical sector. Doctors, in particular the early users 
who experimented with the device on patients, played a major role in their innovation and 
institutionalisation in medicine (Pasveer 1989). For example, through the process of 
“retrospectography” doctors in the US circulated X-rays without a diagnosis. The person 
who took the picture would attend the operation or autopsy, where X-rays of the affected 
organs would be made. Then a ‘correct’ diagnosis would be made and compared to the 
original X-ray images, determining what the diagnosis should have been (Kevles 1997).  
 
Doctors’ involvement and experimentation led to improvements in understanding how to 
‘read’ images and make diagnosis of health conditions, the main skills in what would later 
become the medical specialty of radiology (Pasveer 1989). Through their interaction with 
sales representatives, doctors fed their complaints about the device back to manufacturers 
who improved the product (Burrows, 1986). Doctors increased their specialisation and 
demands on the equipment, leading to further product improvements via user-driven 
incremental innovation (Rothwell 1977; 1986).  
 
During WWI the professional use of X-rays was interrupted (Pasveer 1989). Increased 
demand for X-ray services, and no regulation of their provision, helped create conditions in 
which any person owning an apparatus could perform scans. Radiologists and other 
medical professionals asked for a continuation of the professionalisation of the service in 
the form of practical and theoretical education, to help counteract the decline in its status 
(Archives of Radiology and Electrotherapy, 1918:205 cited in Pasveer 1989:366).  
 
The two medical specialties that at the time profited most directly from their use of X-rays 
were surgery and dentistry (Kevles 1997). Surgeons improved their operations dramatically 
after seeing bullets and shrapnel on X-ray film. Improvements enabled by X-rays, and 
developments in antiseptics and anaesthetics, helped surgery become the most prestigious 
medical specialty (ibid.). Dentistry was the second medical specialty to integrate X-rays 
into clinical practices. The use of X-rays by dentists also improved the identification ability 
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of people working on forensic applications. Many advances in finding new roles for X-rays 
in medicine were made by surgeons (especially conditions of the brain) (Jennett 1986).   
 
Despite the widespread diffusion of X-ray devices and enthusiasm that surrounded their 
use, the medical sector was a difficult market. Important aspects of their institutionalisation 
in medicine took a long time (over thirty years), and the technology did not stabilise until 
the 1950s (Pasveer 1989). Purchasing the device and installing it in hospitals was not 
difficult and occurred quite swiftly34, but the multiple processes involved in 
institutionalising the product in hospitals was very slow (Howell 1995). X-rays required 
new skills – those of technicians – who were not doctors (Pasveer 1989). It gradually 
became apparent that these technicians, as they accumulated experience, became better at 
‘reading’ and interpreting the information on the images, and this experience made them 
important members of the medical profession (Blume 1992:27). Doctors, however, were 
unwilling to cede power to another group of professionals.  
 
The process of stabilisation of the technology in medical practice occurred through several 
power struggles. First, there was a power struggle in terms of which group – engineers, 
photographers, or doctors – would be allowed to publish in radiological journals (Howell 
1989). Over time, doctors assumed control over the technology. This period marked a 
transition from X-rays as a technology with a wide range of uses (for example, photography 
and entertainment) to its use as a piece of medical equipment (Chamberlain 1929). 
 
Second, there was the power struggle between doctors and technicians; doctors worked 
hard to keep technicians below them in the professional hierarchy, and they eventually won 
(Blume 1992; Kevles 1997:59). Radiologists were determined that technicians would have 
an inferior role in the department, despite being able to operate the equipment and interpret 
scans (Kevles 1997:84). Moreover, technicians had played a very important role in X-ray 
research. This changed as doctors assumed control of the practice, excluding technicians 
from scientific journals that some of them had previously founded (Kevles 1997:59).  
 
                                                 
34 By 1910 approximately 67% of US hospitals had the equipment (Kevles 1998:57).  
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Third, doctors competed in using X-rays for diagnosis or therapy, and eventually stabilised 
upon diagnosis as the principal, and therapy as the marginal, application (Kevles 1998:58). 
Using X-rays as a diagnostic tool had several benefits. It allowed doctors to compare 
organs before and after treatment. It also changed the doctor-patient relationship in 
important ways: for example, it allowed patients to see the diseased parts of their body for 
the first time, and to participate in the treatment process (Kevles 1997:58).  
 
 
4.1.1 Post-WWI and the inter-war period: Institutionalisation, standards and 
technical change 
In the period between the World Wars, over thirty years after the discovery of X-rays and 
the production of the first X-ray device, radiologists created their position as X-ray 
specialists in medicine, and established radiology officially as a core medical field35 
(Blume 1992; Kevles 1997:77). Important aspects were the establishment of formal training 
(such as the creation of the Cambridge Diploma in 1920) (Pasveer 1989). During this 
period the number of firms in the X-ray industry grew quickly. The emergence of the 
radiology specialty, the main user group for X-ray devices in hospitals, was an important 
factor in expanding the X-ray market (Tunnicliffe 1974).  
 
Since the early days radiation exposure through X-ray devices was unregulated, which had 
the effect that many patients and people who worked with the equipment had been burned 
or exposed to high levels of radiation later causing diseases such as dermatitis or leukaemia 
(Mould 1993; Kevles 1997). This began to change in the inter-war period, when the 
international radiology community started to unify recommended dosages and guidelines 
for radiation exposure. The US-European communities at the time decided upon the 
                                                 
35 Between the 1910s and 1930s, medical practice was gradually transformed by increased specialisation 
(Kevles 1998). Medical boards in the US and Royal Colleges in the UK were formed to oversee the 
certification of specialists. This began with ophthalmology in 1917, otolaryngology in 1924 and obstetrics and 
gynaecology in 1932 (Kevles 1998:83). The radiology speciality had its own medical board in 1934 (Kevles 
1998). These developments marked the separation of the body in different parts for the purpose of medical 
treatment (Kevles 1998). 
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roentgen and the curie as measures of the strength of radiation emitted from the radiation 
source36. 
 
An important next step was formalising standards for exposure, which was a lot more 
difficult than quantification, and often exposure levels were quite arbitrary (Kevles 1989). 
Acceptable levels of exposure needed to be set for different kinds of persons, those working 
with the machines, clinicians, different kinds of patients, and different areas of the body 
(ibid.). It was often the case that researchers did not agree on what dosage was acceptable. 
Standards were revised many times in the decades following. 
 
While radiology was professionalising and stabilising, the technology was not (Gelijns and 
Rosenberg 1999). Technical changes were the development of tracers and contrast agents, 
which enabled visualisations of processes as they occurred in the body (Kevles 1997:70). 
The most famous tracers, polonium and radium, had been discovered in 1898 by Marie and 
Pierre Curie, but it was not until after 1934 that they would be injected into the body and 
tracked by detectors (Kevles 1997:71)37. Further technical improvements were provided by 
new contrast agents (for example oil and iodine, whose usefulness as contrast agents was 
discovered as doctors made images of the brain and spinal cord) (Mould 1993; Kevles 
1997).  
 
 
4.1.2 WWII and post-WWII: the development of the transistor, and further 
consolidation of policy via public welfare systems 
Wartime research stimulated advances in microwaves, radar, ultrasound and new materials, 
and had an important impact on medical devices advances as well. Military procurement of 
the electronics industries led to the creation of new electronics capabilities which benefited 
                                                 
36 The roentgen measures the amount of radiation that produces one electrostatic unit of charge in one cubic 
centimetre of air at zero degrees centigrade and 760mm pressure; the curie is a measure for the unit of 
radiation emitted from a gram of radium (Kevles 1998:88). Both X-rays and radium emit ionizing radiation, 
but radium has a shorter wavelength than X-rays, and is fundamental in the development of radiotherapy (also 
developed by Marie Curie, in the 1920s).  
37 Advances in the area of radioactivity and radioactive substances followed rapidly and even though they 
were not applied to X-ray imaging directly, they laid the scientific and technical foundations for nuclear 
imaging, which would become important much later on (for example for MRI, described in section 4.3). 
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the devices industries (Mould 1993; Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). The development of the 
transistor, the integrated circuit and the microprocessor were important technical 
developments in the post-WWII era which, through their convergence with X-rays, led to a 
much improved device (Kevles 1997; Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999)38. The establishment of 
public welfare systems following WWII, together with the growth in demand in the 
healthcare sector, growth in the number of skilled radiologists, and the emergence of health 
insurance coverage, transformed the market for and the diffusion of X-ray devices (Gelijns 
and Rosenberg 1999).  
 
Until the 1950s, X-rays were the only technology for medical imaging purposes. The 
technology enabled diverse clinical services in neuroradiology, in coronary care 
(angiography) and in breast screening through mammography (Blume 1992:36; Mould 
1993). In the 1940s and 1950s the use of X-rays expanded to many different health 
conditions, and also gained in popularity in obstetrics. By 1955 one in seven pregnant 
women was radiographed during her pregnancy (Blume 1992:28). Radiology grew 
tremendously in scale and became a universal clinical practice (Blume 1992:28).  
 
In summary, important aspects of technology policy surrounding X-rays in medicine in this 
period were the establishment of its role as a diagnostic device in medicine, the emergence 
of its control by radiologists and technicians as subordinates, the establishment of 
international standards for quantification and exposure, and the nationally-specific 
programs for their distribution (which were implemented in the post-WWII era with the 
formation of public welfare systems). In the 1950s many industrialised countries, such as 
the UK, established publicly financed healthcare systems (Barr 1998) and the distribution 
of X-rays in these countries was centrally organised (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). In the 
1970s X-ray technology converged with computing, leading to a radically improved 
imaging device: the computed tomography (CT) scanner.  
 
                                                 
38 Briefly, AT&T and Bell Labs developed the transistor in 1947. Later improvements in the transistor led to 
the development of the integrated circuit in 1960, and the microprocessor in 1972 (Gelijns and Rosenberg 
1999). The emergence of image amplifiers and the integration of X-rays with electro-optical technologies 
reduced radiation and spatial separation (becoming the basis for angiography) (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).  
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4.2 Computed Tomography (CT): History and technology 
CT is credited as an important example of how computers and electronics revolutionised 
medical diagnostic imaging and the healthcare sector (Mitchell 1988). The development of 
the CT scanner is largely credited to G. Hounsfield, who designed the first device in 1973 
at the firm Electrical and Musical Industries (EMI) (Burrows 1986). Its primary technical 
principles are the computer processing of vast amounts of X-ray signals and their 
reconstruction in 3-D images (Mitchell 1988). Like X-rays, its history is based on 
interactions between science, engineering and medicine. Notable preceding developments 
are computing in the 1930s, ’40s and ’50s, mathematical advancements in the 
reconstruction of 3-D images in the 1950s, developments in the relationship between X-
rays and different object densities and the building of the first model CT (using gamma rays 
instead of X-rays) in the 1960s, experimentation with principles of rotation, radioactivity, 
and connections made between imaging and ‘third generation’ computer processing 
technologies in the 1960s.  
 
One of the first mechanised ways of computing was introduced by the mathematician 
Blaise Pascal in 1642 with the development of the mechanical calculator. Almost two 
hundred years later, in 1833, a device that demonstrated the flexibility of a computer was 
developed by the English mathematician C. Babbage who created the ‘Analytical Engine’ 
which could be programmed to solve arithmetic problems, with inputs and outputs being 
performed using punch-hole cards (Randell 1982; Mahoney 1988). Babbage’s ideas were 
the basic framework of today’s computers; his design, however, was not developed further 
at the time mainly because of engineering limitations.  
 
The history of digital computers is highly contested, and the activities that led to the 
realisation of “firsts” are various39. In the main, there seems to be consensus that antecedent 
                                                 
39 Many different perspectives have been used to explain computer history (for example, Noble 1984 on the 
relationship between computers and productivity, and reviews of advancements in different components of 
computing, for example, on hardware see Randell 1972; 1982; Bashe et al. 1986; and on software, Backus, 
1977 (credited with inventing FORTRAN). Instead of reviewing these fascinating interpretations, I provide a 
brief description leaning more towards a (limited) review of (contested) “facts and firsts” (Mahoney 
1988:114), mainly because of space limitations.  
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activities were concentrated in the period leading up to and immediately following WWII, 
and that they occurred in the UK, Germany and in the US. In the UK, the major inventive 
successes in the early development of computers took place at Bletchley Park in the late 
1930s and the early 1940s, culminating in 1943/44 in the building of the COLOSSUS 
computer by A. Turing, T. Flowers and their colleagues (Randell 1972; 1980; Agar 2003).  
 
The COLOSSUS computer was a result of a collective effort of a group of scientists and 
practitioners focused on the UK’s (secret) cryptographic work pre-WWII and advances in 
electronics for that purpose (Agar, 2003). Briefly, the COLOSSUS was a result of activities 
led by Turing and his team, in collaboration with R.P. Tester, M. H. A. Newman and D. 
Michie (Randell 1980). A. Turing is credited with the first conceptualisation of 
“programmable data processing”, which is similar to the conceptualisation Babbage had 
had (Randell 1980:4). Together with Flowers, with background experience in electronics 
and signalling, and colleagues S. W. Broadhurst and W. W. Chandler, they experimented 
with the development of early electromechanical devices such as the use of cathode gas 
discharge tubes instead of relays for commutators, which would later contribute to the 
electromechanical advancements needed to develop the COLOSSUS (Randell 1980). 
 
At the same time in another “hut” at Bletchley, other people were learning and 
experimenting with similar activities that led to the creation of the HEATH ROBINSON 
machine, which was important because of its advances in operating capacity and operating 
speed (Randell 1980:16). This machine had some limitations (for example, the strain the 
tape was putting on the sprocket drive) and needed other knowledge to solve this. So, 
Flowers was brought into the team and contributed by increasing the electronic complexity 
of the device (he increased the number of valves, and introduced the idea of having the 
equipment on permanently in order to stabilise it) (Randell 1980).  
 
Together, they built the Mark I COLOSSUS, the first “special-purpose program-controlled 
electronic digital computer” (Randell 1980:25); electronic design was done mainly by 
Flowers, Chandler and Broadhurst (Randell 1980:18). The machine was operational in 
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1943. Its key technological features were the clock pulse, binary hard valve electronic 
circuitry, shift register, two-state circuits and clock control, and cathode followers (Randell 
1980:19). When Dr. A. W. M. Coombs joined the group, he helped in the production of the 
Mark II machine, which was five times faster than the Mark I prototype (Randell 1980:19).  
 
After the war, major work in the UK continued in Manchester, where F. Williams, T. 
Kilburn and G. Tootill developed the Small Scale Experimental Machine (SSEM). The 
SSEM is claimed to be the world’s “first stored-program computer” (Lavington 1980). It 
became operational in 1948, and was first in a series of production versions of computers, 
the patents for which were later used by IBM (ibid.).  
 
In Germany in the early 1940s similar advancements to those in the UK were made by K. 
Zuse (Rojas 1996). Zuse’s first computer, called the Z3, was built in 1941 but differed from 
the COLOSSUS in that it was built out of telephone relays. Zuse’s research was partly 
financed by the Nazi government and went largely unnoticed by the UK and US inventors 
at the time. In the German literature on computer history K. Zuse is widely considered as 
the inventor of the modern computer (see, for example, Alex 2007).  
 
In the US, in 1937 a more complex device than the COLOSSUS had been built by J. V. 
Atanasoff and C. Berry, an advancement on the idea of the program-controlled electronic 
digital computer, with program control using plug-boards and punched-card machines 
(called the “ABC” computer) (Randell 1973; Burks and Burks 1989). The ABC is credited 
with introducing electronic binary logic and the capacity to solve 30 simultaneous 
operations (Gustafson 2002).  
 
Also in the US, the “first electronic general-purpose calculating device” was claimed to 
have been developed at the University of Pennsylvania, called the Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC) (Randell 1973). Similar to the Mark I, the ENIAC was a 
massive machine, but by being able to compute a thousand times faster than other 
machines, it was a considerable step forward in increasing the volume and speed of 
computations compared to other existing electronic computers at the time (ibid.). The 
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ENIAC was succeeded by the EDVAC, which was another important step towards the 
modern computer; it had a memory which stored data as well as the program for the data 
(Campbell-Kelly and Aspray 2004).  
 
Both the COLOSSUS and ENIAC were quite similar in that they were both specialised 
program-controlled digital computers (Randell 1980). The proximate step to the modern 
digital computer was made in the ENIAC group, in their production of the EDVAC, which 
is sometimes claimed to have been the “first practical stored-program computer” credited to 
Eckert, Mauchly, von Neumann and Goldstine (although this is not uncontested) (Randell 
1980; Campbell-Kelly and Aspray 2004). In 1973 a U.S. District Court invalidated the 
ENIAC patent and concluded that the ENIAC inventors had derived the invention of the 
electronic digital computer from Atanasoff (Burks 2003). 
 
Further advances in computing involved incremental developments on the COLOSSUS, 
ABC and ENIAC designs, and the addition of transistors in the 1950s. In the 1960s systems 
used integrated circuits, single silicon chips that contained many interconnected transistors 
and other electronic components were developed (Campbell-Kelly and Aspray 2004). In 
1971 Intel made a revolutionary silicon chip containing 2,300 transistors, as much 
computing capacity as the first computers, and with the tiny size of a postage stamp (ibid.). 
Ten years later, Intel released a further chip which contained sixty times as many transistors 
and yet was the same size. In the 1990s the Pentium chips contained millions of transistors. 
Among these previously inconceivable advances, important ones for diagnostic imaging 
have been advancements in programming languages, software, connectivity, and 
communications, as well as flexibility in the acquisition and modification of information 
(ibid.). 
 
Mathematical advances in the reconstruction of 3-D images were made through various 
scientific efforts, of which perhaps the three most important ones were work on the 
reconstruction of sun-sports by R. Bracewell in 1955, and mathematical improvements in 
1967 on this subject by Bracewell and by researchers in England working on the 
reconstruction of a 3-D image of viruses through electron microscopes (Kevles 1997:147-
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148). Bracewell had first used Fourier transforms for astronomical image reconstruction, 
and then in 1967 developed a new mathematical solution that would later be used in CT 
scanners. The virologists in Cambridge, England, although working in another discipline 
from Bracewell’s, were solving similar problems of reconstructing 3-D images from 2-D 
data on viruses and they developed the technique of ‘back projections’ which shot 
thousands of narrow X-ray beams through the body and, using computers to measure inputs 
and outputs (and calculating the energy absorbed by the body), reconstructed 3-D images 
from the information (Kevles 1997:148).  
 
A second scientific contribution is credited to the experiments of W. Oldendorf in 
Pennsylvania in the 1960s, who advanced scientific knowledge on the relationship between 
X-rays and different object densities. Oldendorf is said to have been one of the first 
individuals to model a CT device (Kevles 1997). Oldendorf used gamma rays (instead of 
X-rays) and, by rotating them, sent collimated beams to a photon detector displaying a two-
dimensional image (Kevles 1997:151). The additional data that were created by the rotating 
rays, however, could not be interpreted (without a computer) and Oldendorf soon 
abandoned his project (Kevles 1997).  
 
Critical connections between imaging, computing and different body densities were made 
in South Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s by the nuclear physicist A. Cormack,40 
who advanced these ideas by producing ‘maps’ of different ‘body’ densities using a 
phantom. Working together with the computer programmer D. Hennage, he built an 
experimental scanner which used a computer to reconstruct images of asymmetrical 
phantoms (Kevles 1997:152).  
 
Indirectly or directly building on these advances, and largely through his own efforts at 
EMI, Hounsfield developed the CT scanner (Blume 1992; Kevles 1997). Hounsfield was an 
electrical engineer who had gained experience in radar research in the Royal Air Force 
(RAF), and at EMI he worked most intensely on information theory and pattern 
                                                 
40 Cormack, together with Hounsfield, would in 1979 win the Nobel Prize in Physics for the development of 
the CT scanner.  
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recognition. A key aspect was that, at this time, Hounsfield’s mathematical problems could 
be solved with the available computers, and computers at the time could already present 
pictures in pixel format (Kevles 1997:157). Hounsfield made many of the necessary 
connections between X-ray technology, algorithms, computing power and visualisation 
techniques to produce the 3-D image of the human body that distinguished the CT scanner 
from its predecessor X-ray and other imaging technologies (Hounsfield 1973; 1980). 
Unlike academia where incremental advancements are published as they arise, EMI, led by 
profit motives, guarded its discoveries. Therefore little is known of the precise details of 
Hounsfield’s work prior to EMI putting the CT scanner on the market. 
 
The difference between CT and X-ray devices is not the signals that are emitted (these are 
the same X-ray signals), but how they are produced and processed into image data. The CT 
scanner is composed of a housing within which a rotating “fan” beam of X-rays and a ring 
of hundreds or thousands of small radiation detectors are enclosed (Wolbarst 1999). The 
housing rotates around the patient’s body, sending out narrow beams of X-ray radiation. 
The radiation detectors measure how much radiation emerges from the other side of the 
patient, and sends this information to the computer for processing. The thin X-ray beams 
‘slice’ the body into transverse slices of anatomy, viewing each one separately from the 
side and from multiple angles and from between 700 and 1,500 different perspectives. The 
computer then works ‘backward’ from the data by mathematically reconstructing the spatial 
distribution of X-ray attenuation properties within the body to produce what the 3-D image 
must have looked like to have yielded the transmission data (ibid.). By measuring the 
absorption of X-rays in the human body (building on the work of Oldendorf on the 
relationship between X-rays and different densities of matter), taking cross-sectional cuts, 
and combining this data to produce a 3-D image, the CT scanner is able to eliminate lots of 
interfering patterns, provide a lot more contrast and differentiate between a much broader 
ranges of tissue than traditional X-rays (ibid.).  
 
CT scanners, once they hit the market, underwent rapid technological improvements. The 
diversity of players and the increased complexity of the CT scanner meant that technical 
advances were various and companies created differentiated devices (Trajtenberg 1990). 
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Major changes occurred in the area of image construction time and image quality; first-
generation scanners produced in the 1970s took five minutes to produce an image, second 
and third-generation scanners took 15 and 10 seconds respectively, and fourth generation 
scanners less than 5 seconds (Mitchell, 1988).  
 
CT scanners diffused quickly in industrialised countries. Unlike X-ray technology, CT 
already had an existing market and medical speciality within which to “fit”: healthcare 
structures that were previously established with X-rays technology were there for CT 
(Blume 1992). A few years after EMI commercialised the scanner, large firms such as GE 
and Siemens that dominated X-ray sales started to take over (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). 
Siemens and GE were familiar with navigating the healthcare market (unlike EMI) and had 
already built up their reputation with doctors by previously selling them X-ray devices 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). In privately financed healthcare systems such as the US, CT 
scanners diffused even more rapidly because funding was not centralised and hospitals 
were focused on profiting from the novel service (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).  
 
CT expanded the medical focus in conventional radiology from bones to include imaging of 
soft tissue such as abdominal and pelvic organs, lungs, brain and spinal cord. CT enabled 
better definition and differentiation, making it possible to delineate abnormal tissues such 
as infections and tumours. For example, radiologists can, by seeing the tissue, put needles 
and catheters through the skin and drain infections without having to do surgery. Moreover, 
through enhanced visualisation provided by CT, doctors can treat tumours very effectively 
(Kevles 1997). Most hospitals had no previous experience with CT, and the required 
technical skills were unavailable in hospitals at the time. Similarly to the early days of X-
rays in hospitals, medical doctors struggled to maintain their superior role to technicians 
(Barley, 1986). Because these structures had been established in the past, they largely 
succeeded in doing so (Barley 1986).  
 
Advancements in computing made many other new technologies, products and systems in 
diagnostic imaging possible. One of these is MRI technology. 
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4.3 Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI): History and technology 
The technical principles underlying MRI are entirely different from those of X-rays and the 
CT scanner. Unlike CT which is based upon ionizing radiation technology, MRI is based 
on the principles of magnetic fields and radio-waves (Oldendorf and Oldendorf 1991; 
Lufkin, 1990). Scientific discoveries underlying MRI development are credited to the 
period between WWI and WWII, and to the years following WWII.  
 
Between the two world wars, scientists made discoveries about the atom being composed of 
heterogeneous particles, namely electrons, protons and neutrons. In the 1920s, the Austrian 
physicist W. Pauli discovered that the inside of an atom’s nucleus could be manipulated 
and, when exposed to magnetism, would move with angular momentum and become 
magnetic (Lufkin 1990; Blume 1992). The link between these advancements and nuclear 
magnetic resonance (NMR) are associated with the American physicist I. I. Rabi41.  
 
Rabi produced measurements of the relaxation time for particles to return to ‘normal’ after 
the magnetic field is removed (Oldendorf and Oldendorf 1991). As an alternating magnetic 
induction is turned on at the particular frequency of the atom (its resonance frequency), the 
protons in the nuclei resonate with it (ibid.). The nucleus imaged is usually hydrogen (the 
most common element in the human body). As the magnetic field is altered, the protons 
emit an alternating magnetic signal that can be transmitted to a receiver. When the signal is 
turned off, the protons relax. NMR records two main signals, T1 and T2, both of which are 
relaxation times (the times for the protons or neutrons return to their equilibrium state). 
These discoveries, and further experimentations with radio signals, such as pulsing, gave 
rise to the physics sub-discipline of NMR.  
 
MRI is essentially the medical application of NMR. NMR was first used by chemists who 
used it to understand molecule structures. Its application to organic compounds in the 
1940s and 1950s opened up opportunities for understanding its potential applicability in 
                                                 
41 In 1946 NMR in solids was confirmed by E.M. Purcell at Harvard and by F. Bloch at Stanford in liquids 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). Like Rabi, they later received the Nobel Prize for their discoveries. 
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tracking blood flow and water tissue in mice, and thus its applicability to medicine (Kevles 
1997). The application of NMR principles to medical imaging took place after two 
important technological developments: first, the development of powerful superconducting 
magnets: and second, the introduction of computer processing technologies (Blume 1992; 
Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1999). These connections are credited to the work by R. Damadian, 
P.Lauterbur and P. Mansfield (Oldendorf and Oldendorf 1991).  
 
In his work during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Damadian, one of the first people to 
make the link between NMR and its medical applications, focused on examining the 
differences NMR could pick up between tumorous and healthy tissue in rats. In 1977 
Damadian manufactured the first whole-body NMR imaging machine. Because of the 
abundance of hydrogen nuclei in water, and the differences in water content between 
tumorous and healthy tissue (the spins in healthy cells relax back quicker than cancer cells), 
the data from the experiments was useful in examining tissue health. At the time, however, 
Damadian’s NMR signals had no spatial dimension (Kevles 1997:181).  
 
At the same time, the chemist Lauterbur, was experimenting with the use of magnetic field 
gradients to obtain one-dimensional spatial information (Kevles 1997:181). Lauterbur’s 
gradients were very similar to the problems Bracewell and Cormack, and in particular 
Mansfield42 in the UK, were trying to solve, but being a chemist he was unaware of the 
problems physicists were addressing at the time (Kevles 1997:182). Lauterbur’s work on 
gradients and Mansfield’s work on k-space trajectories, and later on echoplanar and 
volumetric 3-D images, were to be the scientific steps required to link NMR principles to 
imaging on the computer screen (Kevles 1997:183).   
 
The spatial resolution of the image produced by an MRI device is determined by the 
strength of the superconducting magnet, measured in Tesla units (Wolbarst 1999). The first 
MRIs with permanent superconducting magnets were half a Tesla, while at the time of 
                                                 
42 The Nobel Prize for MRI imaging was awarded in 2003 to Lauterbur and Mansfield.  
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writing the stronger MRIs had 12 Tesla magnets, which is 240,000 times more than the 
average magnetic field humans are exposed to on a day-to-day basis43.  
 
Like X-rays and CT, the development of NMR initially had no connection to medicine, but 
was the result of discoveries in physics and chemistry (Kevles 1997:176).  However, 
differently from X-rays for which the medical applications were immediately obvious, 
NMR applications to medicine were realised almost 30 years after their discovery (Kevles 
1997:176). In terms of their dependence on computers to reconstruct images from huge 
amounts of data, MRI and CT are similar. Unlike with X-rays, where differences across 
densities are visible without computing, in MRI the necessary calculations that need to be 
performed to produce a proton-density-weighted MRI image cannot be made without 
computers (Wolbarst 1999). Indeed, MRI was developed a few years after CT, and profited 
immensely from the advancements in algorithms that had previously been made in CT 
technology (Kevles 1997:175).  
 
After the first MRI scanner hit the market, R&D improvements were performed by private 
industry, first EMI and Philips, and in the late 1970s by Siemens (Gelijns and Rosenberg 
1999). The developments in MRI in the 1980s and 1990s led to many incremental 
improvements to the equipment – for example, in the hardware and image processing times, 
and changes in the devices that arose from feedback with adopters who found that the 
strong magnets caused many problems with other equipment in hospitals, which led to 
modifications of buildings, and precautionary measures, as well as improvements in 
visualisation software which continue to take place (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).  
 
In market developments of MRI, CT had played a very important role as a fore-runner to 
expensive equipment in hospitals (Kevles 1997:187). Doctors were excited about MRI, 
having seen what CT could do. CT had created a market for very expensive equipment and 
opened the door to selling expensive MRI machines to hospitals (which were at first three 
                                                 
43 The effects on humans of using strong magnets is considered safe, although much still remains to be 
discovered as the technology develops in practice (Wolbarst 1999). 
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times as expensive) (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999). Both pieces of equipment were the 
single most expensive instruments in hospitals (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1999).  
 
MRI was not immediately conceived as a radiology technology.  Damadian’s first 
applications of MRI were for pathology rather than radiology. But when the first MRI 
machines were produced, they were demonstrated to radiologists not pathologists, because 
it was easier to sell to an already established market (Blume 1992:218). Mallard (in Blume 
1992:218), in his first addresses to the Royal College of Radiology in 1981, stated that 
interpreting MRI images would not be as similar as CT was to X-ray, but rather new 
applications and interpretation methods would need to be found, combining knowledge of 
biological and chemical properties of different kinds of tissue (which are expressed 
differently in X-ray and ultrasound, for example) and their measurement in magnetic 
resonance. 
 
MRI imaging has made the most dramatic improvements in the capacity to see the brain. 
Because it is so powerful in seeing soft tissue (high water – and thus high hydrogen atom – 
content), it is able to detect brain damage and conditions that were not visible before, such 
as consequences of baby shaking in infants, patients suffering from partial paralysis, 
blurred vision, blind spots or symptoms of multiple sclerosis, dementia, soft tissue cancers, 
knee injuries, breast lesions, the heart, and many more (Kevles 1997:194). MRI is both 
superior to CT in terms of visualisation power, and it is also less harmful to the patient 
because it does not involve radiation. MRI, through the process by which it creates signals, 
is extremely detailed, and can map out the body atom by atom (Oldendorf and Oldendorf 
1991; Mansfield 2013).  
 
MRI in comparison with CT is also mostly fast in scanning (less than 15 minutes) and can 
be running and used all day, but it is still a more expensive technology than CT (Kevles 
1997:189). MRI is in many ways considered superior than CT, but often because of factors 
such as the considerably lower cost of CT, greater familiarity on the part of clinicians, and 
more medical guidelines, CT tends to be used more routinely than MRI (Wolbarst 1999).  
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The strength of the magnets makes MRI a lot more difficult to install in hospitals than CT 
scanners (Wolbarst 1999). MRIs require shielding, and sometimes separate buildings need 
to be built to house them and separate them from computer equipment and other 
instruments vulnerable to distortion via magnetisation (Kevles 1997:191). An MRI machine 
needs to be on all the time to prevent a ‘quench’ (this can occur when the helium that cools 
the superconducting magnet boils off, which could cause everyone in the room to suffocate) 
which can make them more expensive to maintain (Kevles 1997:191).  
 
In comparison to X-rays and CT, MRI is the technology which is undergoing the majority 
of changes in terms of its medical uses and applications - for example, in brain imaging 
(Andreasen 1989), in the planning of detailed and sensitive operations, blood imaging, 
imaging free radicals, and many more applications that are continuously being developed 
and broadening in scope and from which new tools are being created, such as functional 
MRI (fMRI), fast MRI cardiology, and electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) imaging 
(Wolbarst 1999).   
 
 
4.4 Picture Archiving and Communications Systems (PACS): History and technology 
PACS is a healthcare sector-wide information system for radiology. In CT and MRI, as 
previously described, computer technology is used for image reconstruction. PACS uses 
other capabilities of computers such as information communication and storage. In a 
hospital, PACS has the potential to connect all digital imaging devices such as digital X-
ray, CT, MRI, nuclear medicine devices, Positron Emission Tomography (PET), other 
radiology units, optical film scanners, long-distance communication links (teleradiology) 
and remote workstations (Wolbarst 1999:88). As the name suggests, PACS is important for 
the acquisition, storage, display, and communication of digital radiographic data 
(Duerinckx and Pisa 1982; Huang et al. 1988).  
 
Digital imaging communication systems were already recognised as a possibility in the 
1970s with scientific and engineering roots in Europe, and innovative developments are 
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credited to scientists in the US44. PACS and digital imaging more broadly arose from a 
number of key contributions from medical informatics research, mathematics and physics 
researchers (Wiley 2005). Its history is closely related to three main aspects – the creation 
of standards for medical informatics in imaging technology, the development of PACS 
prototypes, and their testing in clinical settings.  
 
Standards for digital diagnostic imaging are associated with DICOM (digital imaging and 
communication in medicine), which began in 1983 and was developed by scientists from 
the field of medical informatics (Wiley 2005). DICOM, credited to S. C. Hori of the 
University of Pennsylvania, involved the creation of standards to enable computer systems 
in medicine to interface with each other (Huang 2003). The harmonisation of digital 
imaging standards allowed communication between radiological outputs from different 
manufacturers, such as a CT scanner, an ultrasound scanner from Siemens, and an MRI 
scanner from Toshiba so that they were compatible and viewable on the same PACS 
(Huang 2003). An important consequence of this was the integration of previously digitally 
quite separate specialties such as dentistry, pathology and cardiology to be linked via the 
same data and information systems (Wiley 2005).  
 
In the 1980s in the US, several groups of scientists were instrumental in developing PACS 
prototypes and testing them in the healthcare sector. In 1982 the first PACS conference was 
organized by Duerinckx, who brought together researchers working to create networks for 
single technologies such as ultrasound and CT images. The first PACS system was built in 
the University of Kansas in 1982/83 with support from a private company interested 
capitalizing on radiology information systems in future. Simultaneously, at UCLA, the 
pioneer B. Huang was employing his graduate students to digitise X-ray data in paediatric 
radiology. In the early 1990s DICOM was completed and the harmonisation of standards 
made it easier for PACS systems to be created and connected (Wiley 2005). 
 
                                                 
44 In Europe in the 1970s Jean-Raoul Scherrer in Switzerland developed the first digital medical information 
display system for patients (Huang 2003).  
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PACS has been characterised by rapid technical advancements and new products, systems, 
software and applications. PACS software and hardware can be used to display images in a 
large variety of ways, increasing their flexibility (Wolbarst 1999:85). By providing the 
capacity to view and report on images remotely (wherever there is a networked computer), 
it has enabled practitioners from different physical locations to access the same information 
simultaneously (making possible teleradiology and telemedicine) (Wiley 2005).  
 
PACS enables the processing of images such as enlargement, reduction, rotation, inversion, 
stretching, or transformation (Wolbarst 1999). PACS software can adjust the grey scale and 
optimise apparent contrast in images; it can be used to draw a sharp edge to increase 
artificially the sharpness of a border, and help distinguish clinically relevant patterns 
(Wolbarst 1999:84). Some visual noise can be reduced with digital filters, dramatically 
improving images (Wolbarst 1999:85). For example, some display programs can combine 
different kinds of information (for example from MRI and PET) in a single image, and 
greatly improve its diagnostic value (Wolbarst 1999:86).  
 
A further important aspect of PACS is the ability to archive all available diagnostic images 
in a computer database (Wolbarst 1999:88). It allows for storage as well as integration of 
different kinds of medical information (for example, other diagnostic reports, a patient’s 
historical medical record, lab reports, or previous images) on a patient, which can then be 
transmitted within the hospital and the healthcare system, or, in theory, anywhere. PACS 
can also incorporate software for image analysis and interpretation, using computers for 
pattern recognition and diagnosis (Wolbarst 1999:89).  
 
 
4.5 Policy aspects of diagnostic imaging technologies in the UK healthcare sector 
The UK healthcare sector is a highly regulated and mediated market in which policy plays a 
uniquely important role for reasons such as risk to patients, cost-efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and equity (Barr 1998). This section describes how CT and MRI devices and 
PACS systems are financed and regulated in the UK healthcare sector.  
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4.5.1 Financing, distribution, and procurement of medical devices and systems  
Often advanced as an important distinguishing feature in medical devices policy in modern 
healthcare sectors is the way in which national healthcare is financed (Gelijns and 
Rosenberg 1999). In privately financed healthcare systems such as the US, medical devices 
and systems diffused very rapidly, the main constraint being their price (Lazaro and Fitch 
1995). In other industrialised countries such as the UK and the rest of Europe, which have 
primarily publicly financed healthcare sectors, procurement has, in relative terms, been 
largely centralised and diffusion has been slower (and the size of the market remains small 
compared to the US) (Lazaro and Fitch 1995).  
 
In the UK NHS, national policy concerning the distribution of diagnostic devices and 
systems has changed over time, beginning with regional- and hospital-level distribution in 
the 1980s and 1990s (which was narrowly limited to financing) to more centralised and 
broadly defined national-level programmes such as the NHS Plan and the National 
Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) in the 2000s (DoH 2002). In the 1980s 
and 1990s, regional-level decisions were made by regional Strategic Health Authorities45 
(SHAs) which had a limited budget with which to provide for healthcare in the region 
(NHS, 2003). SHAs distributed funds to NHS Hospital Trusts, composed of one or more 
hospitals and healthcare providers. Trust criteria for purchasing CT and MRI scanners were 
based on the availability of imaging devices in the hospital, the age of the existing scanner, 
the supply and availability of hospital radiology and technical staff, the population 
catchment area of the hospital, whether it was a teaching or non-teaching hospital, and its 
specialisation and specialised services (NHS 2000). Hospitals, if short of funding, also 
engaged in ‘scanner appeals’ for charity from the local population to raise funds or entered 
into ‘public-private-partnerships’ (PPPs) which gave hospital access to scanners that were 
partly financed by private industry (NHS 1999). 
 
                                                 
45 Since the time of my fieldwork in 2005-2006, changes to the organisation and formal structure of the 
English NHS have taken place. In 2012 the UK Government published the ‘Health and Social Care Act 2012’, 
which deals with the abolition of Primary Care Trusts and of Strategic Health Authorities, and instead 
delegates commissioning power to clinician groups (DoH/UK Government 2012).  
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Regional, Trust-level and hospital-level allocation of funds for the procurement of medical 
devices and IT systems in the 1980s and 1990s led to regional disparities in their 
distribution across the UK and to patient access to radiological and IT services (NHS 
Executive 1998). This condition attracted political attention through the Wanless Report 
(Wanless 2002) which formed the basis of the NHS Plan and the NHS Cancer Plan, 
centralised, large-scale programmes addressing, broadly, the “technological needs of 
modern healthcare services” (NHS 2000; 2003) and NPfIT, under which a range of IT 
systems (PACS being one of them) was to be centrally procured and implemented in 
hospitals over a ten-year period (NHS 2000).  
 
In the early 2000s the UK Department of Health implemented the NHS Plan and the NHS 
Cancer Plan, in which the purchasing and procurement of CT and MRI scanners, and the 
improvement of diagnostic imaging services were central political goals, and which led to 
dramatically increased diffusion of new CT scanners in urban and rural hospitals (NHS, 
2000). The NHS Plan addressed the structural and technological challenge to improve 
healthcare services by measures such as changing funding structures, devolving decision-
making, formulating national standards, adding flexibility to clinician professional 
boundaries, and introducing new technology programmes focusing on IT development in 
the NHS. For example, in the period 2000 to 2003, over 200m pounds were spent on 
supplying CT and MRI scanners to NHS hospitals (NHS 2003). The Cancer Plan focused 
more specifically on cancer services, to which diagnostic imaging is central, and by 2003 
these two programmes provided an additional 21 MRI scanners and 52 CT scanners to 
NHS Trusts, as well as 1000 extra cancer care consultants, and launched several new 
initiatives to improve skills and training, information, research and palliative care (NHS 
2003).   
 
NPfIT, a second important set of programmes, was implemented in 2002, addressing a 
broad range of IT systems (NHS 2003). NPfIT was allocated a budget of 12.4 billion 
pounds (NHS, 2003) and attracted a lot of political and media attention mainly because it 
has been heralded as a ‘failure’ in IT implementation in healthcare (BMA 2007) and 
criticised for its ‘top-down’ approach to implementation, in particular because of the 
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difficulty in proving itself successful and its exclusion of end-users in decision-making, 
systems design and integration in work practices (Clegg and Shepherd 2007; Collins 2007; 
Cross 2005; Hendy et al. 2000; Kuhn and Giuse 2001).  
 
The NPfIT programme was administered via the UK Department of Health’s Agency 
‘Connecting for Health’, in a process that involved private industry healthcare service 
providers (BT, Cable & Wireless and Atos Origin) (National Audit Office 2006; Clegg and 
Shepherd 2007:213) who managed projects at the regional level. The Central National 
Programme Team’ was responsible for the procurement and development of NHS IT 
systems at the national level, in liaison with industry service providers (National Audit 
Office 2006; Clegg and Shepherd 2007:213). The programme was managed at the regional 
level (London, Southern Cluster, Eastern Cluster, North West & West Midlands Cluster 
and North East Cluster), in cooperation with regional Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). 
The SHAs cooperate with the local NHS organisations (NHS Trusts, Primary Care Trusts) 
and local service providers (CSC Alliance, Fujitsu, BT) (Clegg and Shepherd 2007:213).  
 
 
4.5.2 Policy formulation processes  
In the UK healthcare sector, technology regulation in medical devices and information 
systems is institutionalised in various organisational forms and processes such as formal 
and informal regulatory authorities, health technology evaluation organisations, healthcare 
research organisations and professional medical bodies and associations. Regulatory 
authorities include the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) which 
was set up in 1999 to produce information and guidance for healthcare decision-makers and 
clinicians as aids to resource allocation, processes and treatments in the form of regulatory 
advice, directives, and medical guidance (NICE 2001; 2002; Birch and Gafni 2002). 
NICE46 influences health technology policy by publishing medical guidance47 and 
                                                 
46 NICE has a series of programmes for the evaluation of medical devices such as the Medical Technologies 
Evaluation Programme focusing on cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of new technologies (DoH 2011; 
Campbell, 2012). Despite its international reputation, the centralised aspects of technology policy formulation 
such as NICE is contested. For example, Birch and Gafni (202:188) state: “In a population as large and 
diverse as that of England and Wales one might question the validity of centralised decisions about 
technologies based on information on national averages as a way of maximising health gain”.    
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evaluating medical technologies through a policy process regarded as international best 
practice in health technology regulation (OPSI 2009; Schlander 2007; Campbell 2011; 
Birch and Gafni 2002). NICE informs health technology policy through processes of 
technology appraisals, clinical guidelines, and cost-effectiveness studies through what is 
considered by some as a democratic and independent process with a broad and diverse 
range of actors such as clinical experts, patient groups, manufacturers, and national 
collaborating centres specialised in the epidemiology of specific disease conditions, over 
diverse formulation and consultation periods (Schlander 2007). 
 
Medical guidance for diagnostic imaging is also issued by the professional medical body, 
the Royal College of Radiologists, who formulate and implement education and training 
standards, and continuing professional development (CPD) standards for clinical 
professionals in radiology and oncology (RCR, 2011). The Royal College of Radiologists is 
also engaged in a series of other activities, such as public involvement and informing 
patients about imaging service quality in the NHS, patient and public engagement in 
radiology services, and informing patients about local services (RCR 2011). The Royal 
College of Radiologists process of standard-setting is informed by a variety of interactions 
with other organisations and thematic priorities such as the National Radiotherapy 
Awareness Initiative (NRAI), the Society and College of Radiographers (SCoR), Cancer 
Research UK (CRUK), the Institute of Physics and Engineering and Medicine (IPEM), the 
NHS and others (RCR 2011).  
 
Technology evaluation authorities such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Authority (MHRA) are separate from regulators such as NICE, but they also 
rely upon similar data once technologies are in use, specifically regarding the safety and 
workability of devices, making sure they are safe and meet the radiation standards 
                                                                                                                                                    
47 For example, in 2003 NICE issued a clinical guideline for the treatment of people who suffered a head 
injury, specifying medical indications requiring a CT scan (NICE 2003). NICE guideline formulation is 
managed by the National Collaborating Centre (NCC) for Acute Care: “a group of health professionals and 
patient/carer organisations who manage the development of clinical guidelines for NICE. The NCC follow 
international standards of guideline development. They establish the guideline development group consisting 
of service users and carers, health professional and academics who reviewed the worldwide data alongside 
current clinical practice and the experience of service users; and the feedback they receive from two rounds of 
widespread consultation” (NICE 2003:2). 
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(Campbell, 2012). For medical devices, the MHRA implements EU Medical Devices 
Directives in the UK (OPSI 2009).  
 
Health technology assessment (HTA) more generally has gained in importance in the UK 
since the 1980s and 1990s. HTA addressed factors such as the increasing complexity of 
new technologies, increasing healthcare costs, and advancements in evaluation in the social 
and medical sciences (Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973; Anderson and Steinberg 1984; 
Davis et al. 1990; Menon and Marshall 1996). The UK Department of Health has 
implemented programmes and commissioned organisations to examine the technical, 
economic and social consequences of technological applications (Luce and Brown 1994). 
Technology assessments differ for drugs and medical devices. Technology assessment for 
drugs includes more peer-reviewed clinical trial data, whereas purchasers of medical 
devices often have to rely on information that has not been as critically reviewed (Luce and 
Brown 1994). 
 
Considered the most important organisation commissioning research in healthcare 
technology in the UK is the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), a funding 
organisation of the Department of Health, which commissions studies through a number of 
programmes such as the UK Government’s ‘Best Research for Best Health’ strategy48  
(DoH 2006). These programmes include areas such as evaluation of efficacy and health 
service and delivery research, and ‘response mode’ research programmes, for universities 
and research institutes, and through formal research networks, clinical research facilities 
and centres for applied research (NIHR 2012). The NIHR has a budget of approximately 
200 million pounds per year and has a specialist liaison team working with companies 
manufacturing medical devices, diagnostics, and pharmaceuticals (NIHR 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
48 This is also part of the UK Government’s 10-year ‘Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-
2014’ (DTI and HM Treasury 2004).  
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4.6 Summary and reflections 
Diagnostic imaging technologies emerged from interactions between science (for example 
the discovery of X-rays, the principles of NMR and advances in mathematics) and 
technology (for example progress in electronics and in medical diagnosis). Social and 
political aspects such as the setting of standards, the professionalisation of the medical uses 
of X-rays, formalisation of training, and regulation to reduce the dangers of radioactivity 
and magnetism on people, shaped the role of these technologies in medical care. The 
evolution of diagnostic imaging technologies shaped medical practice through the 
establishment of the radiology specialty, and the rise in importance of other specialties such 
as surgery and influenced neurological capabilities (e.g. MRI and psychiatry, Andreasen 
1989). Nobel Prizes were awarded to individuals credited for the inventions, in recognition 
of their significance in science and in society.  
 
UK policies shaping the conditions under which these devices and systems are supplied, 
distributed, financed and regulated in medical care are complex and diverse. Much has been 
invested in improving access and quality of diagnostic services in the UK NHS. This thesis 
argues that further important insights into the evolution of these technologies in the UK 
healthcare sector can be revealed by investigating technological accumulation processes of 
CT, MRI and PACS at the practice level. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Learning and Innovation in Clinical CT Practices 
 
This chapter analyses changes in learning conditions and operational routines involving CT 
technology in two cases of hospital work practices.  
 
Section 5.1 describes changes in learning conditions in two procedures part of a cancer 
diagnosis and treatment routine in a large urban teaching hospital. Section 5.1.1 explains 
how conditions for knowledge co-ordination and exchange shifted to enable the solution of 
diagnostic problems. It describes how changes in medical guidance, diagnostic information 
and disease complexity affected the process by which clinicians solved complex cancer 
cases. Section 5.1.2 describes changes in individual learning and collective action in the 
planning of radiotherapy treatment. It explains how planning capabilities were created 
through tacit knowledge accumulation and changes in knowledge breadth, depth and 
flexibility of a community of practice.  
 
Section 5.2 describes the development of departmental capabilities in CT scanning in a 
rural general hospital. Section 5.2.1 describes how historical social norms for changes in 
departmental roles,  mentoring, and participation in a CT department created learning 
conditions which supported the creation of capabilities and increase productivity to meet 
higher demand for CT scans and accommodate a hospital shortage in radiology skills. 
Section 5.2.2 describes how the acquired departmental knowledge provided a basis for 
national medical guidance in CT scanning, and processes that affected the integration of the 
protocol in another hospital.  
 
Section 5.3 summarises the main findings of the chapter.  
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5.1 Changes in innovation conditions for diagnosis and treatment planning of pelvic 
cancer in a large urban teaching hospital 
Cancer diagnosis and treatment are amongst the most important clinical services of modern 
healthcare (NHS 2000). They involve a wide range of procedures such as diagnosis with 
imaging and pathological testing, cancer treatment with radiotherapy and medications, and 
monitoring and after care49. The interviews for this case were carried out in a hospital 
whose cancer services are the main services for a region with over two million people. 
During the time of fieldwork the hospital was partially restructured and the catchment area 
of its cancer services expanded from 500,000 to 2 million people, encompassing large parts 
of the South East region of the UK (BSUH 2004).  
 
This section explores changes in learning conditions in two procedures forming part of the 
same operational routine in the hospital. The change in learning conditions for the diagnosis 
procedure involved integration of national medical guidance for “multi-disciplinary team 
meetings” (MDTMs), which were meetings between diverse clinicians for the diagnosis of 
cancer in specific areas of the body50. Since approximately 2005, medical regulation for the 
implementation of multi-disciplinary team meetings was integrated in NHS hospitals which 
provide cancer services (NHS 2000; CfH 2005). This routine involved the diagnosis and 
treatment of pelvic cancer, and therefore I focused on learning and change aspects of 
MDTMs on this topic.   
 
Radiotherapy planning, the second procedure in the routine, involved ‘mapping’ the region 
of the patient’s body with a CT scanner, to mark the parts that need to be treated with 
radiotherapy. The change in the radiotherapy planning routine involved the creation of 
capabilities within which changes in learning conditions originated at the individual and 
                                                 
49 Cancer is an extremely difficult disease to diagnose and treat. There are more than 200 different types of 
cancers which can develop in any of the 60 organs of the body (cancerresearchuk.org, accessed 19 July 2012).  
50 For example, MDTMs were held for lung cancer, dementia, colon cancer, and so on.  
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group levels51. The following sections explore regime features and learning conditions in 
the case examined.  
 
5.1.1 Changes in learning conditions for diagnosis  
Complex cases of pelvic cancer were previously diagnosed by radiologists looking at plain 
X-ray film and sending the diagnostic report to the oncologist for treatment planning. This 
case focuses on elements underlying the transition from such an X-ray procedure to a 
procedure part of a digital diagnostic regime in which the radiologist no longer uses X-ray 
film, no longer communicates one-way to the oncologist, but instead uploads the digital 
image with an initial diagnosis to a central database, and makes the final diagnostic 
decision in a multi-disciplinary team meeting in which radiologists, oncologists and other 
clinicians decide upon a diagnosis collectively.  
 
 
Interpreting 
Interpreting is a conscious learning process involving the creation of a cognitive map of a 
knowledge space at the individual or the group levels (Crossan et al. 1999). Learning 
processes entail, for example, making connections between what is known and what is 
being found and communicated, the augmentation of individual and group language 
capacities, and interaction and communication with other individuals and groups (Crossan 
et al. 1999).  
 
The search for more information is driven by the risk of a wrong diagnosis for the clinician. 
The legal costs of making a wrong diagnostic decision changed as it became more likely for 
clinicians to be exposed to higher degrees of accountability and the threat of being sued 
were a mistake to be made. According to a surgeon interviewed: “At the back of everyone’s 
                                                 
51 I interviewed clinical and technical staff in the radiology and oncology departments, as well as nurses, and 
departmental and hospital managers. The interview focused on changes in learning conditions that happened 
in the last five to ten years in the departmental unit for two main reasons. First, this time span was chosen 
partly because respondents kept emphasising this period as the one in which most innovation occurred, in 
particular the move to digitalisation of diagnostic images and learning requirements that were affected by this. 
Second, I focused on this period because this is how long the CT scanner had been located within the cancer 
unit (prior to that period oncologists had used simple X-ray film for planning radiotherapy treatment, the 
acquisition of the CT scanner was essential for CT innovation in the hospitals (as explained in Chapter 4).     
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minds is always the legal. Will I be sued for missing out on something? Will I lose my 
license for this? This influences the search for more and more information. Whether it is 
more accurate information, I don’t know.” 
 
Interpretation by radiologists and oncologists was influenced by increased disease 
complexity, knowledge requirements and changes in behaviour by raising the imperative 
for inter-disciplinarity and specialised tacit knowledge. Over time, the complexity of 
diagnosing pelvic cancer, and making a decision about its type, severity, localisation, and 
treatment options increased. This made knowledge exchange of “knowledge from different 
clinicians working on the same area” (according to one radiologist interviewed) more 
important on the one hand, and decision-making based on specialised competencies (“the 
radiologist has to make the final diagnosis because to me everything looks like cancer” 
(according to one oncologist interviewed), on the other.  
 
 
Integrating 
Integration is a learning process occurring at the group level and visible in behavioural 
processes such as coherent action based on a shared language, common tasks and a 
collective goal (Crossan et al. 1999).  
 
Medical guidance transmits social values of technology. Participation in the meetings was 
voluntary but clinicians attended them because they considered the information they would 
receive as valuable and attending the meetings was perceived as closely linked to 
improving patient treatment. One interviewee stated: “It’s all about having as much 
information as possible, so that you can provide the best service to the patient.” If not 
attending, clinicians were concerned about the affect this would have on their work: “I 
attend all the meetings for my specialty area with different specialists even though I don’t 
have to. I could not go but then I would be a bad oncologist.”  
 
Technical and functional diversity of CT had increased and changed the importance of 
different skills. Tacit skills of visual comprehension had increased in importance as did the 
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level of specialisation in acquiring them. Instead of being an expert on a ‘diagnostic 
procedure’, the importance of understanding visual representations of a small group of 
diseases in a much more localised area of the body (an organ or a group of organs) within a 
specific technique area became much more important. Specialists collaborated on making 
sense of large volumes of different types of information independently of their original 
training and departmental boundaries. Knowledge was much more dispersed across 
specialists and it became difficult to detect which types of knowledge would be useful and 
from where a solution to a problem might come.   
 
The systemic features of CT technology made information available to a broader range of 
specialists, supporting the creation of interpretation capacities in different parts of the 
hospital. An oncologist interviewed had accumulated knowledge of diagnosis using CT on 
her specialised area due to access to the information, its large and increasing volume, and 
the repeated practice and experience she had in using it. She recalled an occasion in which 
her knowledge influenced the radiologists’ report in a multidisciplinary meeting: “I now 
look at a lot of scans, I’m thinking of a meeting we had last week when we discussed a 
rectum I was looking at, and I didn’t agree – I thought the radiologist was underreporting 
it. The radiologist who was there said “Yeah, well in the context of the clinical information, 
that changes the report slightly”, so we changed the report. We [oncologists] do influence 
the reporting.” 
 
Some social norms hinder the internal evolution of the technical system.  To a certain 
degree the systemic features of the technology were developed in the hospital, and 
improved learning conditions for non-radiologists. On the other hand, many aspects were 
not permitted to develop because decision-making processes had not changed. Decision-
making structures (for example, who made the decision on technical aspects of CT such as 
the size of images to be transported, who could access them and how often) was a legacy of 
other technologies which did not have the same systemic features (e.g. X-rays). The ‘old’ 
structure was maintained by limiting information flow to non-radiologists: “The images we 
get to see as oncologists are a different resolution from what a radiologist gets to see. 
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Ideally, because we are looking at scans all the time, we would see the same image and 
have access to the requesting information that the radiologist has.” 
 
To sum up, changes in learning conditions for CT were supported by the hospital’s 
implementation of the medical guidance, the voluntary adherence to it by clinicians and the 
‘meaning’ given to the adherence of that guidance by individual clinicians involved in the 
routine change, changes in knowledge requirements of diagnosing pelvic cancer because of 
increased disease complexity, changes in the cognitive and functional diversity of CT 
technology and increase in uncertainty that arose therefrom, and the systemic features of 
the technology that developed through tacit knowledge accumulation by non-radiologists. 
The development of the technology in the hospital was hindered by the remaining social 
hierarchy in the hospital stemming from the previous stand-alone technology. The 
‘feedback’ effect (Crossan et al. 1999) occurred from the sectoral to the group and 
individual levels, not from the organisational level, supported by the transmission of values 
through the change in external social norm of the technical system (Hughes 1987). 
 
 
5.1.2 Changes in learning conditions for planning radiotherapy treatment 
Radiotherapy treatment planning in this hospital was in the process of change from 
planning with X-ray images to planning with CT scanners. This changed the oncologist’s 
tasks from marking areas to treat with radiotherapy on plain X-ray film, to using computer 
technology and enhanced visualisation techniques to map out the area of the pelvis affected 
by cancer. The case explores factors affecting learning conditions for CT radiotherapy 
planning for a small group of radiation oncologists, radiotherapy physicists, medical 
physicists, and radiographers in the period 1998 to 2005. An oncologist interviewed stated: 
“Before the radiology department gave us the CT scanner about seven years ago, planning 
was done using X-rays. Now, more than 50% of what we plan is planned using CT”.  
 
Interpreting 
Unsupported by hospital managers and radiologists, the oncology team built its CT 
capabilities by gradually adding individuals with different knowledge bases to the team. 
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The cognitive explanation for this is traceable back to the knowledge requirements of IT-
based systems technologies (Hobday 1998) such as knowledge about the technical 
engineering aspects of the equipment, knowledge about radiation and radiation exposure, 
and software skills.  
 
A rapidly evolving technology element, software skills had the shortest life-cycle in the 
department. Moreover, changes in CT radiation doses and radiation regulation over time 
made CT planning more dependent on knowledge of physics, which was changing because 
of external changes in regulation on radiation exposure. This created problems for the 
oncology unit because it had very few links with other parts of the hospital and with other 
organisations, from which it could obtain information and knowledge, and generally 
remained relatively isolated in its learning structures from other parts of the hospital. At the 
same time, its learning requirements grew because of its replacement of X-ray by CT 
devices for planning. In comparison, the radiology department had linkages to external 
manufacturers and software specialists, and made frequent use of them. The oncology 
department had tried to solve this knowledge gap by including IT specialists and medical 
physicists in their department.  
 
Even though more people with diverse skills were added to the department, this did not 
change the condition that CT created novel and unknown problems in its use. This point is 
illustrated by a statement from a radiation therapist I interviewed: “It’s not that we don’t 
know; it’s that we don’t know what the problem is. Something stops and then we don’t 
know where to start to look for a solution, because we don’t know what went wrong.” At 
the same time, the requirements of skill types became more difficult to predict. Problems 
were unexpected as were learning outcomes, the impossibility of ‘knowing’ in which 
individual the requisite capabilities resided grew. Over time, this uncertainty was reduced 
with repetition of parts of practices, only to grow again when new sub-systems were 
installed and new problems arose (Rosenberg 1982; Hobday 1998; Pavitt 1998). 
 
The process of building up its interpretative abilities by adding more people to the 
department instead of building connections with other hospital departments was due to the 
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hospital’s adherence to existing structures which maintained divisions between 
departments, as well as the connection between oncology and external firms. For example, 
this was reflected in the way in which the CT scanner had been acquired in the oncology 
department, namely without manufacturer involvement (the oncology department 
‘inherited’ the old scanner from the radiology department). 
 
 
Integrating 
The separation of decision-making on technology elements from the locus of learning is a 
barrier to the development of capabilities of an emergent systems technologies such as CT 
and MRI. Over the time period explored, changes had occurred in CT devices, their 
systems, sub-systems, and connectedness to other parts of the hospital, as well as in 
expectations of radiotherapy planning service performance. The development of CT in the 
hospital was affected by decisions on product and systems design features which were 
made separately from where the learning of CT planning of radiotherapy treatment took 
place. The choice of MRI scanner, for example, did not allow for a linking up with the 
oncology radiotherapy planning system because it was considered too costly. Decisions 
such as these were made by managers (concerned with budgeting), less informed by clinical 
considerations: “The radiologists said what they wanted but the final decision was made by 
the managers.” The technologies were being treated as stand-alone artefacts instead of 
systems technologies and the existing structure had not created conditions under which 
systems aspects could be developed. 
 
Integration of oncology procedures with other parts of the hospital was difficult because 
structural changes to support learning interdependencies between oncology and radiology 
had not fully taken place. The oncologists extended their skills repertoire in CT planning by 
trying out different techniques, software programmes, and experimenting with the images 
and planning software. The formal procedure was that they would be supported in their 
learning by radiologists who would supervise and transfer their tacit skills to them, but this 
never happened. This was a retention of the ‘old’ division of labour where the two groups 
of clinical specialists performed their tasks separately. A radiotherapy physicist interviewed 
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stated: “The division of tasks - diagnostics done by radiologists and planning for 
radiotherapy done by oncologists –  made a lot more sense with traditional X-ray; now we 
would benefit a lot more if they (the radiologists) would teach us about (CT) scans”. 
 
Integration of new CT tasks caused problems at the individual level because CT diagnostic 
and planning capabilities are highly dependent upon individual-level capabilities. Using CT 
for radiotherapy planning in the oncology department made the acquisition of a broader 
range of specialised skills, such as software skills, imperative. The more time passed, the 
more complex the planning process became, the more problems arose, and different skills 
were required in their solution. Treatment of areas of the body could be located and marked 
on a ‘phantom’, whereas previously the patient would have had to lie still for hours. This 
was considered to be a highly positive outcome for patients. Paradoxically however, 
planning the treatment now took much longer than previously, because of the large increase 
in information that was not previously available: “Whereas before I had one image to look 
at, now I have tens of images, from different angles, different planes, and in 3D, which 
means a complete dependence on good imaging and accurate immobilisation, all of which 
is increasing every year.  It all takes much much longer and I spend much more time on one 
patient, whereas previously I could get through many more patients in a day.” 
 
 
Institutionalising  
Institutionalising was helped by the flexibility of oncologists working in different hospitals 
at the same time, and the harmonisation of PACS systems across hospitals. The abolition of 
images on X-ray film meant that if the communication system was not working, clinicians 
could not access the required information and deliver the service. To circumvent these 
problems, oncologists developed their own solutions: “When I cannot access the data here 
(in this hospital), I go to the other site where I have access to better screens”.  
 
Institutionalisation of CT within the oncology department was helped by the creation of a 
community of practice. It was created gradually through practices emerging from social 
interactions between diverse localized specialists focusing on highly contextualized 
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problems of CT planning in the cancer unit. At the same time the group became 
increasingly specialised with a community identity being formed. At first the oncologists 
focused on learning the tasks themselves, but gradually exceeded their capacities so they 
called for additional specialists to be located in the department. Medical physicists who had 
previously been located in the medical physics department, specialist nurses, therapy 
radiographers, and others joined the group and built an allegiance to it.  
 
The learning processes described demonstrate some aspects of Wenger’s (1998) 
‘communities of practice’ concept focusing on a multi-dimensional social interpretation of 
collective learning through practice, generating a sense of belonging, formation of group 
identity, and the creation of collective meaning of specific practices and a collective goal. 
Wenger (1998) considers practice processes to have dual implications, first through the 
‘inclusion of newcomers’ and secondly through the transformation of their individual 
identities through their inclusion in the same practices. Both of these I found as occurring 
processes as new specialists were added when problems arose, new skills were required, 
and stability was achieved as it became more obvious what the usefulness of individual 
skills was for individual processes. An additional consideration was that these processes 
were conditioned by the community’s narrow focus on CT planning and radiotherapy: 
“Here in this (oncology) department we work as a team. In the other hospitals I work at 
this does not happen; they (the hospitals) are much smaller and they do not have the 
specialists so people work in different departments at the same time.”  
 
A collective identity was formed through making decisions and rules on how to use the CT 
artefact or a group of artefacts by working together. The emergent quality of the CT 
artefact, its associated systems, and the novelty of its applications to the oncology 
environment, were all suitable conditions for a community of practice to emerge.  The 
scope for experimentation and creativity was large as the rules were relatively unwritten, 
the cancer centre was in the process of formation, and there was no rigid structural legacy 
to constrain relational processes. I would thus add to Wenger’s (1998) observations that 
such conditions support the creation of communities of practice (ibid.).  
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The unpredictability of problems and uncertainty of applying ‘solutions’ made access to 
other peoples’ experiences of similar problems much more important. For example, a 
medical physicist interviewed stated: “If I have a problem I cannot solve, I ask other 
medical physicists in the UK or globally. There is a sort of gentleman’s agreement that we 
all share what we know. We communicate a lot more now than we did in the past; there are 
many more problems, questions people have, and more fora to share solutions”. Moreover, 
external links to specialized system-wide communities of practice became more important 
over time also because of quick-changing product and systems designs, with more inputs 
required for radiation regulation, and more changes in regulation.  
 
Features important for the creation of CT radiotherapy planning capabilities in the cancer 
unit demonstrate a ‘feed-forward’ learning process from individual to the group level 
(Crossan et al. 1999). In summary, important factors were the acquisition of a broader 
range of specialised skills and the inclusion of individuals with different capabilities within 
the cancer unit, the creation of a community of practice, and the links between the 
individuals in the community with other  specialists outside the hospital.  
 
Institutionalisation of team-working across the oncology-radiology boundary was not 
uniform across the diagnosis and planning procedures part of the routine. In the planning 
part of the routine, unlike the diagnosis part, top-down institutionalisation did not change 
practices. A possible explanation for the different degree of oncology-radiology 
collaboration in the two parts of the routine may be that the first part of the routine involved 
changes in conditions for knowledge coordination and exchange, whereas the second 
involved changes in conditions for the transfer of tacit knowledge, a much more time-
consuming and difficult process (Nonaka 1994; Nelson 1998). The findings also suggest 
that a more finely-grained inspection of routines is required for a deeper understanding of 
processes and to understand which parts of the routine are transformed, and which parts 
remain the same (Feldman 2000), and the social and cognitive factors that affect learning 
conditions underpinning procedural and routine change.  
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5.2 Changes in learning conditions in CT scanning in a medium-sized general town 
hospital 
In this section I present my results on the creation of capabilities in CT scanning in a 
medium-sized general town hospital. During the time of the fieldwork, improving hospital 
efficiency in CT scanning was a national government priority (NHS 2000; DoH 2002). At 
the same time, the pressure on hospitals to save costs had also increased (Department of 
Health 2002; BSUH 2004). Recently the UK government had issued formal support for 
‘role extensions’ of hospital technical staff to perform new ‘higher-order’ functions in 
radiology departments in hospitals (DoH 2001; DoH 2002).  The following case focuses on 
a hospital where role extensions of technical and nursing staff have been the norm since the 
1990s. The department had contributed to national medical guidance for role extensions 
during the time of fieldwork.  
 
Section 5.2.1 describes how through historical social norms for changes in departmental 
roles, mentoring, and participation, a CT department created learning conditions for CT 
capabilities and helped to meet higher demand for CT scans and hospital shortage in 
radiology skills. Section 5.2.2 describes how the acquired departmental knowledge 
provided a basis for national medical guidance in CT scanning.  
 
 
5.2.1 Creation of departmental capability in CT scanning 
Hospital learning in CT occurred by coaching and mentoring technical and nursing staff to 
perform parts of an operational routine, and helped transform roles and individual functions 
in the procedure. The procedure that was learned was the preparation of patients for CT 
scans. In this hospital, the main conditions affecting CT capabilities creation were: 
(1) social norms for mentoring and participation, (2) the small hospital size and uncertainty 
in availability of radiology staff on the one hand, and immobility of technical and nursing 
staff, on the other, and (3) the tacit nature and high resource intensity of knowledge 
accumulation for the task, making role reversal back to radiologists inefficient.  
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Interpreting 
Interpreting was helped by departmental social norms for mentoring. The radiology 
manager explained that supporting individual members in the department to learn tasks that 
were a ‘level up’ in their professional grade had been standard practice in the department 
for over 20 years. One way in which this reflected itself in individual behaviour was 
through mentoring of junior staff by senior staff. As senior staff was performing 
cannulations, junior staff were permitted to observe. After some time junior staff were 
performing these tasks and senior staff remained to support them until they were able to do 
it themselves. Mentoring, copying and imitation were important elements in the 
advancement of human capabilities in the department. These technological processes 
support Barley’s (1986) analysis of social norms as ‘scripted’ in individual learning 
behaviour resulting in role changes in routines. It also supports the idea of ‘retention’ of 
social norms and path dependencies in learning behaviours in the organisation (Nelson 
1998).  
 
Over time, horizontal processes for learning through practice (mentoring, teaching) 
changed the types of specialists that prepared patients for CT scanning from radiologists to 
technicians, trainees, aides and nurses. Preparing patients for CT scanning involved tasks 
such as injecting contrasts, performing cannulations and barium enemas. In a gradual but 
active and persistent process, technicians, trainees, aides and nurses learned to carry out 
different tasks and procedures in these processes and replaced radiologists in performing 
these functions. As a result, their roles in the routine changed. Over time, they too mentored 
other staff in the department.  
 
Interpreting by staff in ‘lower’ grades was, in addition to support by technical, nursing staff 
and the departmental manager, also strongly supported by radiologists in the department. 
Radiologists had encouraged and supported the delegation of their tasks to technicians for 
over two decades, each ‘generation’ of staff continuing to support the next generation in its 
skills accumulation. This confirms Wenger’s (1998; 2000) positive relationship between 
community social norms, the history of the community and its future. 
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The social norms of supporting functional shifts based on skills empowered members in the 
unit, improving motivation to learn, which was emphasised strongly by the members 
interviewed. Empowerment in combination with commitment from the staff to engage with 
one another was considered to be an important underlying factor in improving departmental 
performance in meeting CT scan requests and bringing waiting lists down.  
 
 
Integrating 
Integration was supported by continuous repetition of specific tasks. Performing 
cannulations on patients was a highly tacit skill in a sensitive context. It was performed by 
single individuals and needed to be performed well for the patient not to be harmed. Once 
learned, individuals needed to carry it out frequently in order to remain proficient at it. If it 
is done occasionally, the skill is lost, and the individual must re-learn it. These 
characteristics hold for most of the tasks that the staff in the radiology unit had learned and 
were now doing routinely instead of radiologists and other staff in higher grades than them. 
This created a situation in which a shift ‘backwards’ to old roles was very difficult to 
achieve. After some time of not performing these tasks, the radiologists did not perform 
them at all: “I have been doing this every day, and now if I can’t get a cannulation in, the 
radiologist won’t even come and try because they know I am doing it all day every day and 
they are not doing it” (radiographer interviewed).  
 
The skills being learned were in themselves not novel – the novelty was in the individuals 
learning them. Observation and imitation was also facilitated by the low mobility of 
technical staff and the localised nature of this part of the routine. As stated by Zollo (1997), 
tacit knowledge accumulation is partially dependent upon the relevant tacit knowledge 
being physically proximate to the individual trying to learn it, so they are able to observe 
and imitate. 
 
The delicate nature of the task (it involves inserting a cannula into the body) meant that 
experimentation was impossible and trial-and-error not permissible. Instead of 
experimenting, individuals spent a long time observing other members of staff perform the 
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tasks. A positive perception of the senior staff of a learner’s ability to carry out the task was 
fundamental in role change. Staff members who were mentoring junior staff were very slow 
in giving the responsibility to junior staff because of the high cost of making a mistake. To 
reduce uncertainty, staff spent a long time mentoring juniors. The sensitivity of the context 
made learning difficult. Moreover, incremental learning was complicated because tasks 
needed to be performed swiftly and confidently, and could not be partitioned into 
incremental steps, as other tasks (which did not involve patients) could be.  
 
The hospital was situated in a small town, where “people do not move around as they do in 
big cities, people come here to have a family and settle down, so we have time to get to 
know each other and build trust” and “there is a group here who have been here for over 
20 years” (radiology manager interviewed). Continuity in professional relationships, in 
particular with engagement in processes where people ask and give help to one another, 
was an important factor for the staff to maintain a sense of community52, which helped in 
task integration.  
 
 
Institutionalising  
A further important norm in the department was the formal recognition of having learned 
new tasks and gained new experience. The manager of the department had started as a 
trainee in the hospital and over time was promoted from trainee, radiographer, and 
reporting radiographer, to departmental manager. Formal internal recognition by 
progression to different roles was an important factor in her motivation, commitment, and 
confidence in taking on new responsibilities. The knowledge and experience she had 
acquired during this process also reflected itself in the external recognition she was 
receiving from other departments in the hospital, as she was giving lectures in other 
departments to teach them about CT scans.  
 
                                                 
52 The difference in social norms supporting role changes was also found by Barley  (1986), who compared 
social ‘scripts’ in an urban with a suburban hospital, the suburban hospital being more flexible in changing 
roles with the new demands of the CT scanner than the radiologists in the urban hospital. 
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Flexibility in role changes of technicians carrying out radiologists’ tasks was both 
influenced by and supported by the small size of the department. A department with a small 
number of staff, tasks and procedures were carried out by the individuals who were there 
and were available. Staff shortage was a problem that was solved by making sure that 
individuals knew how to do different things, so they “would not have to wait for a 
radiologist to do them” (radiology technician interviewed). Participation in different 
processes was an important prerequisite for individual learning, and for maintaining 
departmental self-sufficiency when radiologists were not there.  
 
The hospital had recently merged with another hospital which also had a radiology 
department and radiologists were shared amongst the departments. This change made their 
local availability unpredictable, and as a consequence their availability in performing the 
tasks in the department uncertain. The uncertainty was ameliorated by participatory 
learning and role changes of technicians who were able to perform the tasks instead of the 
radiologists, ensuring a smooth workflow.  
 
Radiologists’ delegation of tasks to technicians also helped the department in coping with 
increased demand for CT scans. Staff flexibility in carrying out different tasks was a 
favourable condition for maintaining efficiency in changing external circumstances:  “we 
have to get the scans through, and keep waiting lists down; this involves training people to 
do different tasks” (radiology manager interviewed).  
 
Capabilities creation was supported by the contractual agreement with the manufacturing 
firm and previous experience with the same CT device. The department had quick, reliable, 
direct and proximate access to the information and the support of the manufacturing firm, 
which had over time impacted positively on departmental learning practices, and enabled 
the creation of directly applicable knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994). CT technologies and 
their knowledge components progress at different rates, reflecting higher rates of external 
technical change relative to internal (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Nelson 2003). Because the 
firm had contractual permission to intensify and diversify its interactions, it was able to 
shorten the mediation process with the hospital on aspects such as problem-solving with 
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maintenance, usage, and impact on patients (and gain feedback on these aspects). The 
radiology manager stated: “our scanner is PPI, which means it is funded by public-private 
initiative, part funded by a private firm, who in return for providing us with the scanner 
wants to know all the problems with it, how we are using it.”  On the other hand, the 
contract had restricted the department’s technical choices such as for components and 
systems specificities to technical choices made by the firm: “whenever we have a problem 
with the scanner, we have to go through them first. That is not always the best option for us 
but we have a contract with them so we have to do it that way.” 
 
In summary, the capabilities creation in CT scanning was supported by social norms for 
mentoring, participation which enabled tacit knowledge accumulation by different members 
of staff in the department. Different types of specialists learned similar technical skills 
which improved departmental flexibility in meeting higher demands for scans, and 
managing workflow if other members of staff were not there. Collective learning 
empowered members in the department, as did formal recognition and moving up the career 
ladder, as supported by radiology and managerial staff. The small size of the department 
and low mobility of nursing and technical staff helped people to build trust.  
 
The procedures in the routine were highly tacit and occurred in sensitive contexts, which 
made experimentation and trial-and-error learning impossible, so learning primarily 
involved long periods of observation. The tacit components of the routine were later 
acquired through repeated practice, and the skills were soon lost if not practiced. In this 
case, under conditions where routine components are highly tacit and making mistakes can 
carry a huge cost, learning may be much slower and routines may change slowly, even 
when social norms supporting change are present. Thus, it is not only institutions that may 
cause ‘inertia’ with regard to change (Hannan and Freeman 1984), but characteristics of the 
context of application that are impossible to change (interactions with patients will never be 
low-risk).  
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5.2.2 Creation and implementation of a hospital guideline 
This section explores aspects of the process of codification of CT practices in the same CT 
department as in section 5.2.1, and problems with its integration into another hospital 
department. It looks at changes in learning conditions and factors affecting them.  
 
Making explicit the tasks, processes, radiation doses, and reporting procedures in the form 
of medical guidance and protocols is important in departmental innovation in CT and in the 
regulation of operational routines and services in healthcare services more generally (North 
1990; Edquist and Johnson 1997). Theoretical approaches to institutionalisation suggest 
that codification is an important organisational learning outcome (Rosenberg 1976). 
Standards and laws regulate behaviour, lower uncertainty, and equalise processes across 
organisational contexts. In healthcare systems, institutions in the form of medical guidance 
and protocols are considered to have the potential to harmonise routines across 
departments, hospitals and Trusts (Wenger 1998). In the NHS, organisations such as NICE 
and the Royal Colleges are important for formulating and issuing guidance. Medical 
guidance and protocols are also formulated (codified) at the local level, at the level of the 
region, the Trust, hospital or, as examined in this case, at the departmental level.  
 
 
Integrating 
The main contextual factors that changed and affected the codification and integration 
processes were changing demand conditions and the merger of the hospital with another 
hospital. The main cognitive and social factors that affected the integration of the protocol 
into the other hospital site were, in the codification process, the increased interdisciplinarity 
in the codification process over time, and in the integration process, the differences in 
social norms between the two departments, the tacit components of the routine that were 
impossible to transfer, and the differences in the technical properties of the CT device 
between the two hospitals, making integration of the same protocol difficult.  
 
Demand for CT scans at the hospital departmental level was strongly influenced by 
changing individual radiologist preferences and by the increased pressure from the local 
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community for CT services and improved access to high-end imaging techniques. 
Radiologists in the hospital had changed their preference towards CT scans over other types 
of imaging, which directly influenced the workload of the CT department, prompting 
reorganisation to increase productivity. Demand for CT scans is in part funnelled through 
radiologists’ requests shaped by a variety of factors such as changing research evidence, 
medical guidance, and individual perceptions of technical superiority over other 
technologies such as X-rays and ultrasound: “I’ve actually been asked to do a trendchart 
showing the increase, and we’ve actually had a 10% increase every year in scans. So the 
workload is going up a lot more. Whereas years ago respiratory patients would have a 
chest X-ray, we now have a consultant whose first line of investigation is a CT scan. So 
things change as technology changes; the baseline examinations become more complex so 
you have more pressure on the workload. Workloads go up constantly” (radiology manager 
interviewed). 
 
The integration process of the protocol in the second CT department was restricted by 
differences in contextual specificities which affected learning and change. Codification, 
however, did not ensure integration and the two departments remained highly 
differentiated. A radiologist interviewed summarised some of the main departmental 
differences which made integration difficult: “The two departments are run very 
differently; they cannot be compared, or expected to do things similarly. It is down to the 
tiniest details that are different that makes it impossible to change. The individual 
consultants running the department do it very differently. Here we are supported in doing 
role extension, there they are not. Here we have a 1-slice CT scanner, there they have a 64-
slice CT scanner. Here when a radiologist is on leave, we do not have lists booked, 
whereas there they just carry on; the structure of their day is completely different to the 
way ours works. So they have shorter lists, more of them covering the day. A lot of our 
radiologists like to follow up certain scans, whereas they don’t follow up in [the other 
hospital].” (radiologist interviewed) 
 
Processes were difficult to learn and integrate through protocols because of the tacit 
component of the CT scanning routine. The tacitness of CT technology increased over time 
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as the products and its systems became more complex and intertwined with behavioural 
processes that were difficult to express and make understandable to others not involved in 
the routine. This suggests that investments in knowledge bases and changes in social norms 
reflecting technology demands may be a more suitable option for policy than integration 
through protocols.  
 
The different technical characteristics of CT scanners made it difficult to learn procedures 
by imitating the other hospital. The two hospitals had very different CT scanners. This was 
not a problem with previous X-ray devices which were relatively similar in their diagnostic 
power, calibration, and so on. Some differences in the two CT scanners became obvious 
once integration of the protocol was in the process of taking place, and it was ‘too late’ to 
change the protocol (radiographer interviewed). More generally, this illustrates the 
unpredictability of technology (Granstrand and Sjolander 1990; Granstrand 1998) in 
hospital contexts. One way in which unpredictability was reduced was with previous 
experience with the exact same device, as in the hospital that published the protocol.  
 
Little previous experience using the existing scanner made integration of the scanning 
protocol slow. The other department had an older scanner and had gained a lot of 
experience with it, and was more flexible in changing its processes to adapt to a changing 
technology environment. The integration of the protocol from the other department was 
also made more difficult by changes in the technological capabilities of the CT device 
during the integration process. CT scanners are technological artefacts that are conditioned 
by technological capabilities in manufacturing firms. Part of the interactions between CT 
artefacts and the radiology department examined were modes of mediation and 
directionality of information flows between the department and the firm. In the second 
department, this process was slow and did not involve long-standing contacts and 
corresponding familiarity which had been built up over time.  
 
Hospital end-users in the department integrating the protocol had restricted technical 
choices and opportunities to get involved at various decision-points, which made learning 
more difficult. As the technology was complex with rapidly changing (electronics and IT) 
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capabilities, it was very difficult to ‘unpack’ and understand those capabilities (Lawton and 
Parker 1999). A further mediation was through technology assessment processes, which the 
radiology manager had engaged in but not for ‘this’ scanner, as the scanners changed very 
quickly and processes for similar outcomes needed to be re-learned. The process of product 
acquisition was important because it had implications for what happened when problems 
arose. The acquisition of equipment was mediated by the Trust in the second department 
and hospital users had very little choice.  
 
The difficulty of integration and a low degree of contact with the manufacturing firm was 
exemplified by the condition that CT manufacturing firms more generally have relatively 
little structured contact with hospital users, making translation of capabilities more difficult 
than with other medical technologies such as drugs, for example. Devices firms rarely have 
direct contact with patients in the development of their work; their devices are usually 
rolled out and have first contact with users after they have been produced, and after the 
technical problems with their functioning (which are determined and conceptualized from 
the point of view of an electrical engineer or a technician, and not so much a clinician or 
via patients). Medical devices, in comparison to drugs, reach the user interfaces later in the 
product life cycle, whereas for drugs the translational hurdle is skipped earlier, first of all 
with the nature of the problem which is biological, and tested and evaluated within a similar 
scientific and disciplinary framework (the intellectual/cognitive space between biology and 
the application of the drug to a patient’s biological condition is not as large as from an 
electrical engineer’s to a patient’s condition and experience of the device) (radiologist 
interviewed).  
 
 
Institutionalising  
The hospital had recently undergone a merger with another hospital, which affected its 
learning strategy. Prior to the merger, the two hospital departments had been managed 
separately. Following the merger, they were managed as one department, with the 
requirement of making operational routines similar in their execution and performance. 
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This requirement initiated the codification of CT organisational processes in one 
department, and its integration into the second department. 
 
The codification process involved the creation of a CT scanning protocol, which the 
department had experience in, and was able to report on changes in. Over time, the 
diversity of knowledge requirements for codification changed. The technicalities of the 
process became more complex and involved a broader variety of people and organisations. 
In the formulation of certain protocols in the department, the type of specialists involved  
changed to include a broader diversity of knowledge bases (in addition to radiologists and 
radiographers) including individuals inside and outside the hospital such as oncology 
specialists, patient representatives, medical physicists (for radiation doses, for example), 
and the PACS manager. Whereas previously the protocol was focused on a limited 
specification of tasks, now it involved a much broader range of tasks, more knowledge 
inputs, and consultations, for specifications. A consequence was an increase in the process 
of organising codification, the number of people involved, and the time it took to design the 
protocol. This increased the importance of contacts in different departments and the wider 
community of practice (Griffiths 1983; Kelleher et al. 1994). Individuals outside the 
department were involved in the formulation, partially reflecting the complexity of 
knowledge and the procedural demands of the multi-technology product (Hunter 1994). 
 
The departmental social norm with regard to role extension described in section 5.2.1 was 
one aspect that created different learning conditions between the two departments. It had 
implications for which individuals could carry out which tasks, the technical choices of the 
department, and its capabilities in adapting to changing staff availability. Thus, CT 
technology was highly interdependent on departmental social norms that could not be 
transferred across hospital sites.  
 
To sum up, the codification process was triggered by changing demand conditions and the 
merger of the hospital with another hospital, ‘merging’ the two radiology departments. The 
main cognitive and social factor that affected the codification process was increased 
interdisciplinarity over time. The integration process in the second radiology department 
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was affected by social norms for experimentation and vertical role changes in the 
department, the tacit elements of the routine which were impossible to transfer, and the 
technical differences in the device between the two hospitals making integration of the 
same procedure via a common protocol difficult. Technology elements of CT continue to 
evolve despite codification and creation of protocols, an important aspect which is under-
emphasised in the literature on institutionalisation, as well as the importance of continuous 
contact with manufacturing firms.  
 
 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter explored changes in learning conditions in two cases of learning in CT clinical 
practices. In the case of the first procedure, section 5.1.1, which focused on learning in CT 
diagnosis, described changes in the conditions for knowledge correspondence and 
coordination. In this procedure, the factors affecting changes in learning conditions were 
the technical and functional changes in the CT device and its systems over time, and 
changes in its systemic features. Social factors supporting learning were social values 
transmitted by and reinforced by medical guidance, and learning was hindered by social 
norms restricting the systemic expansion of the CT system across the hospital. Other 
factors affecting CT technology learning in the hospital were increases in the complexity of 
the cancer disease, and increases in the risks and perceived costs of making a wrong 
diagnosis for doctors.   
 
With regard to the second procedure in the routine, section 5.1.2 focused on learning in 
planning radiotherapy treatment in CT, and explained changes in arrangements for 
accumulating highly specialised skills for collective action. Technological accumulation in 
this procedure was affected by changes in the knowledge requirements of CT devices and 
systems from outside the hospital, and by the lack of any obvious cognitive or social 
boundaries to the technology, and was supported by interactions with individuals in other 
parts of the hospital and the wider community of practice. Structural factors that hindered 
learning were the separation of decision-making on technology elements from the locus of 
learning, and by the lack of structures to support learning interdependencies across the 
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hospital, while learning was supported by the creation of a community of practice in the 
hospital which was supported by the inclusion of newcomers, and the transformation of 
individual functions, professional identities and roles in the practice.  
 
This chapter also examined changes in learning conditions with respect to CT in a second 
hospital, this time focusing on the creation of CT capabilities, and processes of codification 
and integration of a medical protocol. The first part of the routine, described in section 
5.2.1, involved the creation of capabilities in CT scanning. Capability creation was 
supported by the observation of other individuals performing the tasks, physical proximity 
for tacit knowledge transfer, practice, interaction with manufacturing firm, and long-
standing experience with the specific CT device. Social factors supporting the creation of 
capabilities were social norms for mentoring, participation and delegation, empowerment of 
individuals in performing the tasks, formal recognition, and time to build trust and 
familiarity.  
 
The second procedure in the routine involved codification of the CT scanning procedure in 
one hospital site, and the beginnings of the process of integration of the same protocol in 
another hospital site. The codification process was supported by change in individual 
preferences, changes in learning strategy, experience with the practice, diversity of 
knowledge requirements which were met in the codifying department, and experience with 
the CT device. Social norms for role extension supported codification. Integration was 
hindered by differences in social norms, different departmental structures, fragmentation of 
decision-points and learning loci during the process, and a low degree of structured 
communication within the department. These aspects are summarised in Table 5.1 below.  
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Table 6: Summary of learning processes and changes in learning conditions in the CT clinical practices examined 
CT operational routines and 
procedures 
Organisational learning 
processes 
Knowledge factors  Social factors  Other factors 
CT diagnosis and planning     
Brief description of case: This 
case describes a change in a 
diagnosis procedure in a hospital 
Interpreting Change in artefact 
complexity; increase in 
ambiguity in interpretation 
of diagnostic information;  
change in artefact 
‘systemness’ properties 
changing interpretive 
requirements in different 
parts of the hospital. 
 
Extra-hospital changes in 
values and expectations.  
 
Change in the complexity 
of pelvic cancer. 
 
 Integrating Change in technical and 
functional aspects of CT 
devices over time affecting 
skills requirements and 
their accumulation; CT had 
no obvious cognitive or 
social boundaries so 
difficult to locate know-
how and to predict future 
knowledge requirements.  
Change in medical 
guidance and their 
interaction and 
reinforcement with existing 
social values in the 
hospital; changes in social 
groups involved in the 
procedure; learning 
obstructed by static 
elements of regime, 
specifically decision-
making structure and rules 
on access to other devices 
part of the system (for 
example, high-resolution 
monitor screens). 
 
Increase in the risk and 
perceived costs of making 
a wrong diagnosis. 
Brief description of case: This 
case describes a change in a CT 
planning procedure in an 
oncology department (in the 
same hospital as the CT 
diagnosis procedure) 
Interpreting Oncology department 
interpretation processes 
influenced by gradual 
additions of individuals 
with diverse skills 
(software, medical physics) 
to the department.  
 
Learning conditions were 
affected by hospital 
adherence to social norm of 
departmental divisions and 
division between oncology 
department and CT 
manufacturing firm.  
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 Integrating Separation of decision-
makers (e.g. radiology 
department) from locus of 
learning (e.g. oncology 
department) is a barrier to 
integration in emergent 
systems technologies such 
as CT; departmental CT 
capabilities are highly 
dependent upon individual-
level CT capabilities, 
which need a long time to 
be accumulated (i.e. 
clinicians have many other 
tasks to accomplish in a 
day and CT had the effect 
of increasing their 
workload). 
 
Integration was helped by 
reducing the burden on 
patients (before patients 
needed to lie on a table for 
hours while treatment is 
being planned, now 
treatment can be carried 
out on a phantom without 
the patient having to be 
there).  
 
 Institutionalising Institutionalisation was 
helped by the accumulation 
of skills and collective 
learning over time; it was 
hindered by structural 
norms such as departmental 
divisions.  
Institutionalising was 
helped by the flexibility of 
oncologists to work at 
different sites to access CT 
images, and the 
harmonised PACS systems 
across these sites; 
institutionalisation was 
helped by the creation of a 
community of practice in 
the oncology department; a 
common goal in the 
department, and no existing 
relational norms within the 
department from the X-ray 
regime which might have 
constrained the creation of 
feed-forward learning 
processes underpinning the 
creation of the new routine. 
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Creation and implementation of 
a CT diagnosis protocol 
    
Brief description of case: This 
case describes aspects of a CT 
regime in a small town hospital    
Interpreting Tacit knowledge 
accumulation by staff in 
‘lower grades’ through 
copying, mentoring and 
imitation. 
Social norms for 
mentoring, empowering 
staff in lower grades 
through skills acquisition, 
active support by the 
departmental manager, and 
by the radiologists in the 
department, incentives to 
interpret and acquire new 
skills through 
empowerment.  
 
 
 Integrating Continuous repetition of 
highly tacit aspect of 
procedure; observation 
(over long periods of time), 
imitation. 
Small hospital in small 
town so long time to build 
trust and familiarity 
between individuals, and to 
build a collective identity 
and a community.  
 
 
 Institutionalising Interaction with 
manufacturing firm and 
manager’s long-standing 
experience with the 
specific CT device; small 
departmental size (shortage 
of skills) so need to train 
others to lower uncertainty 
of skills unavailability 
(radiologists move around 
hospitals and are not 
always available, but 
waiting lists continuously 
need to be kept low).  
 
Recognition of learning 
through promotions; small 
departmental size so 
flexibility in roles required 
to meet performance goals.  
 
Brief description of case: This 
case explores codification 
aspects of a CT regime in the 
same small town hospital, and its 
Integrating Increase in demand for CT 
scans; integration of 
externally formulated 
protocol difficult because 
Change in individual 
radiologists’ preferences in 
favour of CT scanning. 
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attempted transfer to a hospital it 
recently merged with.  
of contextual differences 
such as: high tacit 
component of routine 
impossible to transfer, 
differences in CT scanner 
devices; differences in the 
ways in which the 
processes are organised in 
the two hospitals. 
 Institutionalising Feedback processes of 
institutionalisation difficult 
because of contextual 
differences (as described 
previously); limited 
technical choices of end-
users. 
Institutionalisation difficult 
because of differences in 
social norms of hospital 
having to introduce the 
protocol and the hospital 
which had produced it 
(specifically skills 
accumulation associated 
with norms for teaching 
lower grade staff to 
perform higher grade 
tasks).  
Change in learning strategy 
prompted by the merger 
with another hospital. 
  Change in individual 
technology preferences; 
change in learning strategy; 
experience with the 
practice; diversity of 
knowledge requirements 
met in the department; 
experience with the device. 
Social norm in role 
extension (codification 
context); restriction of 
technical choices of end-
users through 
fragmentation of decision-
points in the process; low 
degree of structured 
communication in the 
integration process. 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Learning and Innovation in Clinical MRI Practices 
 
This chapter analyses changes in learning conditions and institutionalisation processes 
involving MRI technology in two cases. Section 6.1 describes aspects of the creation of a 
learning environment through the institutionalisation of an MRI procedure for the diagnosis 
of dementia in a large urban teaching hospital. This section explains how organisational 
learning processes enabled change in an MRI medical practice regime. Section 6.2 explores 
change in learning conditions in one case of institutionalisation of medical guidance for 
MRI for the diagnosis of breast cancer. This section describes how external medical 
guidance, differences between MRI devices, changing research evidence, processes of user 
configuration, changes in patient preferences, and non-uniformity in patients and their 
medical conditions, built hospital routinisation processes of MRI. Section 6.3 summarises 
the main findings of the chapter.  
 
 
6.1 Changes in learning conditions for an MRI procedure for dementia patients in a 
large urban teaching hospital 
This case traces the formulation and implementation of a medical protocol53 for the 
diagnosis of dementia patients in a large urban teaching hospital. A medical protocol is an 
example of a codified institution that specifies aspects of a medical procedure by which 
patients with certain health conditions are to be treated (Lawton and Parker 1999). In the 
English NHS, protocols are said to enable control over clinician activities (Griffiths 1983; 
Kelleher et al. 1994). They can also standardise healthcare practices and raise healthcare 
quality (Hunter, 1994). Medical protocols can be formulated by specific individuals and 
professional groups in single hospitals (Lawton and Parker 1999). In the UK, NHS medical 
protocols can be formulated by a variety of clinical specialists in hospitals as well as in 
specific organisations such as NICE and the Royal Colleges (NICE 2003).  
                                                 
53 The protocol involved a change in image sequencing for dementia patients, the specification of higher 
resolution images and different scan parameters (neurologist interviewed).  
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In the case explored, the formulation and implementation of a protocol was led by an 
individual neurologist scientist and occurred at the hospital level. The following section 
identifies some of the learning processes and factors that shaped aspects of MRI evolution 
in this procedure and hospital context.  
 
 
Intuiting 
Individual intuition is impossible to observe, so in order to understand aspects of this 
process in the MRI learning in the hospital, I focused on the origin of intuitive insights and 
the ways in which they were shared between individuals (Crossan et al. 1999). Learning 
through intuition was based upon knowledge accumulated in the past which guided 
research questions in the present. At the beginning stage of the process of protocol 
formulation, the intuition of the neurologist was based upon the knowledge he had 
accumulated throughout his scientific career and clinical practice, and his vision and 
intention to investigate different MRI sequences and resolutions in their application for 
imaging different conditions and types of dementia. Both at the formulation and 
implementation stages, his scientific intuition broadened the search space of the technology 
in this particular hospital context by opening up the process to different areas of discovery 
(in addition to providing a service to patients and informing and standardising hospital 
practices). The narrow restriction to dementia patients and the combination with the 
individual neurologist’s knowledge base increased the depth of his investigations, by 
increasing the knowledge of the applicability and usability of MRI for dementia, and by 
adding to the scientific understanding of dementia.  
 
Intuition was prominent as a learning process because of the early stage of evolution (i.e. 
the low level of stabilisation) of MRI technology in the hospital and the healthcare sector. 
Guidelines for MRI for dementia imaging were not numerous or well-known in the 
hospital, and their creation required intuition about what would work in the specific 
practice context, on the one hand, and what would produce the research results that would 
be useful for the scientific enquiry, on the other. In contrast to the CT case explored in the 
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previous chapter, the protocol for CT (an older technology in the UK healthcare sector for 
which some national guidelines existed at the national level at the time) the protocol for CT 
could not be innovative (it had to follow national guidelines). MRI, in contrast, was still in 
the process of finding its role in dementia imaging in the hospital and the wider healthcare 
sector, and innovativeness at the hospital level, and the need for intuition, was more 
important than for some more stabilised aspects of CT.  
 
 
Interpreting 
Experience in one specific technology area made communication between differently 
skilled professionals easier. Communication was helped by a collective language to do with 
the one technology area, which crossed organisational departmental and professional 
boundaries. The individual experiences of the neurologist, and the experience in different 
‘bits’ of the MRI technology bundle of the other professionals he interacted with during the 
codification process were aided by their focus on a device in which their experiences as 
well as their previous medical, technical and scientific knowledge converged.  
 
Interpretation was aided by their individual past experience with different aspects of the 
technology (for example, PACS and medical physics), and it was their combination through 
mutual exchange that helped the innovation process because different information was 
required throughout the process, and sometimes they were unknown so the neurologist 
needed to go back and forth between differently skilled individuals to proceed with 
codification. The neurologist, guided by his research interest and requirement for access to 
patients to answer his research questions, needed to create a medical protocol that could 
answer his research questions and be followed in the hospital. To formulate a feasible 
protocol, he needed to combine his intuition and interpretative abilities with others who 
were familiar with the hospital organisational processes and capacities in MRI imaging and 
neurological imaging. Interaction with medical physicists, neuroradiologists and 
radiologists at the hospital was helped by incremental problem-solving at the formulation 
stage. Medical physicists possessed the intuition and knowledge on physics aspects of MRI 
imaging, neuroradiologists were familiar with MRI sequencing and diagnosis of dementia 
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through MRI, and radiologists were important because the MRI scanner was located in their 
department and they needed to specify how and when it could be used for this specific 
purpose. Through interaction with these individuals, the neurologist slowly and 
incrementally collected the information and different knowledge aspects of the technology 
in the hospital that he required for his codification process of the new guideline. 
 
Interpretation had to focus on specific technical characteristics of the device and individual 
and group familiarity with them. MRI devices were highly heterogeneous in their technical 
capacities and the device that was used in the hospital had to be researched for its specific 
technical capacities. Interpretation therefore was not, as the literature suggests, only an 
interaction between individuals and groups, but also with the technical artefact which was 
being learned. It was unsure if the scan parameters in the protocol could be repeated 
elsewhere with a different device (which also reduced the possibility of transferring 
existing dementia protocols to the hospital), and whether it would yield the uniform results, 
so the process of knowledge accumulation with regards to technical aspects was site-
specific. More generally, the neurologist stated that non-uniformity in devices made it 
increasingly difficult to institutionalise clinical practices in MRI across hospitals.  
 
Interpretation was aided by leadership. The neurologist was in a position of power because 
of the role of MRI research in the hospital, the importance of the neurological centre for the 
strategic orientation of the hospital in the region, and his accumulated knowledge and 
acquired capabilities for codification. His position of power shaped the inclusion and 
exclusion of social groups in the process. Inclusion in the process of interpretation was 
important for subsequent feasibility in carrying out the protocol at a later stage. If 
individuals were included during formulation and interpretation, they had an easier time in 
understanding the requirements of the protocol later on and helping its routinisation. 
 
The interdependence and interaction with the (local) scientific community benefited 
interpretation processes because it made a wider variety of interpretative abilities available 
to the individuals and groups in the hospital. The reorientation of the hospital from a 
general to a teaching hospital changed the individuals included in the interpretation process 
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of MRI technology. The neurologist who led the protocol formulation process was a 
researcher from the nearby medical school, and he was newly involved in the development 
of MRI at the hospital. By bringing into the hospital additional language and skills of MRI 
research, he changed how people in the hospital thought about the technology and initiated 
new ways of thinking (for example, using MRI for investigative purposes as well as for 
patient services). The strategic reorientation of the hospital brought with it new resources 
(researchers, doctors, students, equipment) which influenced interpretation by combining 
different search spaces (clinical, scientific, and operational) to the overall knowledge base 
of the hospital. It also played a crucial role in the implementation process because the 
research-minded doctors in the hospital and the students were familiar with using MRI for 
research and could follow the protocol’s instructions.  
 
The strategic change of the hospital to a teaching hospital changed individual attitudes in 
the hospital towards experimentation. In the protocol formulation and implementation 
stage, dialogue and communication between individuals involved questioning and testing 
because of the protocol’s investigative nature. This is different from the CT case explored 
in Chapter 5, where the protocol specified an operational procedure that was not 
experimental.  
 
Involvement of individuals in the interpretation process and formulation stage of the 
protocol reduced technological uncertainty. Learning through interpretation which occurred 
at the protocol formulation stage allowed individuals such as the neurologist leading the 
process, and other neurologists and radiologists involved, to participate in the definition of 
tasks in the protocol, and to shape the routinisation of the technology. Language and skills 
that were involved in this process at the formulation stage made it easier to steer the 
evolution of the technology at a later stage, and increased the probability that certain 
problems would be reduced later on.  
 
Commitment benefited interpretation. The individual neurologist scientist was highly 
motivated and committed to producing a feasible protocol that would also answer his 
research questions and enhance his scientific standing. He needed to have access to patients 
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for this and the hospital was a requisite for that. His commitment to furthering his research 
motivated him to overcome any obstacles to interpretation and collective understanding of 
the individuals who would carry out the protocol. He was familiar with making connections 
between different types of knowledge and had a broader view of MRI technology than 
some other personnel in the hospital. His research interests inspired other neurologists and 
radiologists in the hospital to participate in the formulation of the protocol and its 
integration into clinical practice. Science had a high status in the hospital and people 
enjoyed being part of scientific discovery. This increased their commitment to it.  
 
The availability of new and different technological resources influenced capability 
development in the hospital positively. By asking new (scientific) questions, the hospital 
was solving different problems from those that it encountered in its operations and, in turn, 
made different knowledge resources available to the hospital and the science system. 
Interpretation was helped by the hospital’s connectedness, through the medical school, to 
the wider scientific and technological system of MRI. The protocol was guided by the 
research questions shaped by the wider scientific community (a knowledge aspect of the 
wider system which, by bringing with it additional resources to the hospital, influenced 
learning positively), which helped in individual learning in the hospital (the neurologists 
and radiologists involved in the new routine learned through interpretation and interaction 
the wider meaning of the protocol), and improved MRI capabilities in the hospital. 
Connectedness and interaction with the scientific community changed problems and 
solutions.  
 
Specialisation of the protocol on dementia focused the language in the interpretive process, 
the specification of tasks, and provided a common topic of convergence for the individuals 
and groups involved. MRI became more complex and to understand its processes and 
capacities in the narrow field of dementia imaging the neurologist had to become more and 
more specialised, narrowing the breadth of language involved in interpretation. At the same 
time, the hospital was a complex organisation and many different people were involved in 
carrying out individual tasks, and this had increased with MRI usage over time. Both 
scientific enquiries and technological change in MRI became deeper and broader. The 
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neurologist summed these aspects up in the following observation: “the times when you 
could be good at many different techniques are over. Nowadays you have to be really good 
at one thing, an expert in one small technique of one small area, and do everything else in 
a team of professionals who know how to do the other things.” 
 
During the interviews with the neurologist scientist, and neurologists, neurosurgeons and 
neuroradiologists in the neurosciences centre, it was evident that the neurologist scientist 
did not view the hospital as an organised form of separate departments as did the other 
interviewees, but instead he saw the hospital as a variety of people who knew different 
things and whose tasks needed coordination regardless of their professional boundaries. 
Interpretation benefited from the more open and flexible map of the hospital of the 
neurologist scientist, in contrast with the more hierarchical organisational structure of the 
hospital which was how some of the other interviewees saw things. This benefited the 
search process of interpretation, by broadening the scope of knowledge that was exchanged 
and used. For example, learning in the new MRI technique was unpredictable and it was 
unknown at the outset which inputs of information would be important in the process of 
protocol formulation and implementation. The openness of perception of the neurologist 
scientist and his familiarity with uncertainty of the research processes helped him in 
consulting a diversity of specialists in the hospital, thereby benefiting the final protocol by 
adding to its knowledge value and increasing certainty in its execution.  
 
The integration of research questions about dementia in the protocol reflected the need for 
experimentation and discovery in MRI. MRI had over time increased its technical 
capacities in neurological imaging of changes in brain volume, which opened up a new 
avenue of investigative enquiry into the relationship between dementia and the brain. The 
interpretation process thereby overlapped with the discovery process, and the possibilities 
for the creation of new language, instruments, and techniques for the disease. Interpretation 
was characterised by the need for translation of technical capacities of the specific MRI 
device to the complex knowledge requirements of sophisticated clinical enquiries. In the 
implementation phase of the protocol, interpretation benefited from interactions between 
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the clinical and scientific understanding of the neurologist scientist, and the data obtainable 
from the MRI artefact.  
 
Creating associations between scan parameters, patient diagnostic requirements, and 
scientific requirements involved a complex process of interaction between the two bodies 
of knowledge (bodies of understanding and bodies of practice), which was helped by the 
capabilities of the individual neurologist scientist, and his boundary-spanning role between 
the hospital and scientific context of knowledge production. In a direct way, the 
formulation and implementation of the scientific MRI protocol created an overlap between 
the locus of scientific, technological and organisational learning processes and search 
spaces.  
 
 
Integrating 
Integration involves the development of a shared understanding and the undertaking of 
coherent and collective action (Crossan et al. 1999). I found the following factors important 
in changing learning conditions for MRI integration in the hospital: at the protocol 
formulation stage, the changes in technical capacities and knowledge requirements of MRI 
neurological imaging influenced by technical change outside the hospital system, change in 
requirements of scientific discovery, and organisational changes in the hospital which 
changed the types of patients treated in the neurological centre and changed the role of the 
hospital as the main provider of neurological services in the region.  
 
At the stage of protocol formulation, integration involved the coordination and exchange of 
knowledge between various medical specialists (neurologists, neuroradiologists, medical 
physicists) at different points in time in a non-linear, experimental way as shaped by the 
knowledge requirements of the MRI procedure being formalised, interaction with scientists 
for the inclusion of scientific research questions, changes in patient requirements, and the 
organisational changes of the hospital context. At the implementation stage of the protocol, 
as learning conditions had been influenced by explicit formulation and sequencing of new 
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tasks and procedures in dementia imaging, learning through integration was more 
organised.  
 
A collective goal of protocol formulation helped in organising individuals to provide their 
collective inputs. Communication and interaction between individuals was shaped by the 
knowledge requirements for the protocol, which was affected by changes in technology and 
changes in research on dementia, and changes in neurological services in the hospital. The 
neurologist scientist who was driving the protocol formulation process invested much effort 
in gaining support for the protocol from the other members in the hospital and the medical 
school. Collective contributions to the protocol were helped by the organisation of 
neurological meetings in the neurosciences centre.  
 
Conditions for learning through collective action for specialised MRI diagnosis were 
changed by the transformation of the market (the type and volume of patients) for 
diagnostic services for the hospital. A recent national healthcare reform had changed the 
types of patients for neurological services at the hospital. After the reform, the hospital 
received a higher proportion of acute neurological patients, relative to chronic neurological 
patients. Chronic patients were diverted to community and general practitioners. A 
neurologist interviewed summed up the implications of the reform54 for himself and the 
hospital’s neurological services: “Prior to the reform the ratio of new patients to old 
patients (patients I had a diagnosis on), would be 1:3. For old patients I knew they had 
Parkinsons or myasthenia and was monitoring their care and therapy, I wasn’t making a 
diagnosis. Now it’s more than 60% new patients, so more scans are being requested and 
being made, more new diagnoses being made, so more need for neuroradiological 
services”. Thus, the intensified focus on diagnosis (relative to monitoring) provided more 
patients for the new dementia protocol in the hospital.  
 
                                                 
54 The reform is part of a government policy to treat chronic patients closer to home, so they do not have to 
travel to the neurosciences centre for check-ups, and the hospital gets more funds for treating new patients 
than for treating old patients (neurologist interviewed).  
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Integration was helped by the use of a hospital-wide research project for MRI imaging for 
neurological conditions. This formalised the interaction between different specialists at the 
hospital, advances in the science base, and all the information that the hospital has on the 
patient (which would in a different condition remain confidential). The research project 
enabled researcher access to patient information, and collective problem-solving on specific 
complex cases, supporting inter-disciplinary knowledge exchange. It also provided funds to 
send students to different hospitals in the country to learn new MRI skills and software 
techniques and come back to the neurosciences centre in the hospital and teach everyone 
else. Integration benefited from the openness of the hospital to resources external to the 
organisation. In contrast to what is suggested in some studies on organisational learning 
(e.g. Grimshaw, Thomas et al. 2004) the organisation is not a closed but an open system, 
and learning processes are influenced by interactions with other organisations and systems.  
 
 
Institutionalising 
Processes of institutionalisation involve learning through rules, procedures and 
standardised and repeated organisational practices (Hobday 1998). Learning through 
institutionalisation in this case benefited from capabilities that individuals had accumulated 
in the past, their familiarity with other staff in the task sequence, and the structural legacy 
of the neurology specialty which encompassed radiological services within the department 
itself.  
 
Learning through existing neurology routines helped in the MRI innovation process. It took 
a long time of repeated practice of reading different types of scans for individual 
neurologists to build up expertise in their specific medical area. The techniques with which 
knowledge had been accumulated changed over time, but the narrow specialised focus on 
one specific medical area did not change, making interpretation of new techniques and their 
integration in clinical practice easier. As one neurologist stated: “I see a lot of people with 
back pain. I look at discs compressing nerves. At first I saw images of discs in the back and 
I was not sure whether the discs were actually pressing on the nerve producing the pain. To 
learn this, I had to see a lot of people who were ‘normal’ who had no back pain, so to see 
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what was normal I had to compare it with what was abnormal. What I learned then is 
useful for me now, no matter which imaging technique I use”. 
 
To have confidence in learning through routinised processes, it was important to know the 
people who were doing the reporting: “because there are radiologists who over-report and 
radiologists who under-report and until you know which person is reporting, you can’t rely 
on the report”. MRI images could be transmitted and reported remotely, but because 
diagnosis depended so much upon capabilities that were embodied in individual 
radiologists, people had to know each other to be able to rely on each other’s’ inputs.  
 
The MRI routine benefited from the historical integration of radiology within internal 
processes of neurology. Neurology, a surgical specialty, had integrated and routinised 
radiological practices within its core functions for a very long time. For other non-surgical 
medical specialties, radiology was a remote service, making learning in MRI through 
routinisation less common.  
 
Learning benefited from the integration of neurological research practices with the already 
practiced network structure (a relatively stable institution) of neurological services. A 
separate clinic had been set up for imaging dementia patients and other patients specifically 
for research purposes. The competencies used were spread out over different sites for 
research projects (a multi-centre study). The clinic that was set up ensured that specific 
dementia patients were sent to the clinic and underwent the specified tests. The network-
type practices of multi-centre research work overlapped with the network structure of 
neurology services: “we (at the neurosciences centre) work in a network, which is very 
different from other medical specialties who work in a team. This makes working with 
different people and people from imaging very common. In other specialties the 
relationship to other specialties is very different…more remote…”.  
 
Feed-forward and feedback 
Crossan et al. (1999) state that learning processes are not distinct from one another but 
there are feed-forward and feedback processes between them. Feed-forward, as described in 
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Chapter 2, is a concept used to denote the process of learning from the individual and group 
levels (intuition, interpretation, integration) to the organisational level (institutionalisation). 
Feedback, in contrast, represents the changes in learning conditions for the individual and 
group levels that are brought about through institutionalisation (from the organisational to 
the group and individual levels).  
 
In this case, the feed-forward process of MRI innovation (the protocol formulation stage) 
was led by the neurologist scientist, who shared his interpretation by communicating with 
individuals with whom there was a convergence on MRI knowledge, helped by his 
commitment and leadership, and collective clinician interests in research activities and 
improving services to patients. Feedback during protocol formulation was governed by the 
strategic orientation of the hospital towards research and teaching which, in turn, supported 
feed-forward by the neurologist by institutionalising the process of investigative patient 
treatments. During protocol implementation, feed-forward benefited from individuals 
having been previously involved in protocol formulation now having to carry out the 
procedure. External factors such as changes in the patient population of the hospital to more 
acute patients, increased the repetition of the procedure and its institutionalisation 
supported feedback learning processes.   
 
 
Section Summary  
In summary, both knowledge and social factors relating to MRI technology influenced 
learning processes in the hospital. Intuition in protocol formulation was helped by past 
experience in related technology areas (imaging, neurology). Scientific knowledge 
embodied in key individuals broadened the search space in the hospital to scientific 
problem-posing and –solving in addition to operational problem-solving, and helped in 
intuiting during the protocol formulation and implementation stage. The early stage of role-
finding and evolution in MRI technology area (in comparison with CT) in the hospital 
placed importance on intuition (in particular on guesswork and experimentation).  
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Interpretation processes were aided by individual experiences in the same broad technology 
area (MRI imaging, diagnosis, protocol formulation, implementation of routines in the 
hospital) through convergence on similar language and familiarity with dementia imaging, 
making communication easier. On the other hand, interpretation was helped by differences 
in knowledge bases and experience in the hospital because of the differentiated knowledge 
requirements of the protocol and the boundary-spanning role of the neurologist. 
Interpretation was site-specific because of the technical idiosyncrasies of MRI devices, and 
their connectedness to other social processes in the hospital (patient treatments, information 
exchange, imaging sharing and distribution, meetings, and so on). Interaction between the 
interpretation process was characterised by these other systems aspects of MRI, some of 
which were unknown at the outset. Interpretation was aided by leadership and commitment, 
supported by the neurologist’s power in the hospital and his research interests. Change in 
the hospital strategic reorientation towards scientific research improved interpretation by 
changing attitudes in favour of experimentation.  Involvement of different social groups in 
interpretation reduced technological uncertainty. Increased specialisation on a narrow 
technique in a particular medical area focused interpretation and simplified the problem. 
The open and horizontal cognitive map of the organisation of the neurologist leading the 
innovation process helped facilitate inter-departmental communication.  
 
Integration was helped by the availability of skills and a collective research goal provided 
by the creation of and integration with the medical school. Integration was helped by the 
change in market, which channelled to the hospital the patients that were required for the 
protocol. The research project, aided integration by creating organisation-wide institutions 
in favour of dementia research.  
 
Learning through practice of neurologists in the past had benefited MRI institutionalisation, 
as did familiarity with other specialists in the routine (for example, whether they leaned 
towards over- or under-reporting). The historical role of radiology within neurology 
benefited the institutionalisation process of new radiological routines. The institution of a 
networked way of working helped in the innovation process (operational routines and 
structures overlapped with innovation structures).  
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At the protocol formulation stage, feed-forward processes occurred between the individual 
neurologist scientist, and other members of the hospital through communication of aspects 
of imaging that they converged upon. It also benefited from including different bits of 
information supplied by the individuals in the process into the protocol. Feedback during 
protocol formulation was helped by the strategic reorientation of the hospital towards 
research and teaching. During implementation, feed-forward was helped by previous 
involvement in the formulation stage, and external factors such as changes in patient 
population which influenced the extent and degree to which the protocol was repeated in 
clinical practice (more repetitions aided routinisation).  
 
 
6.2 Changes in learning conditions for an MRI procedure for breast scanning in a 
group of hospitals in a region 
This case traces the creation of a breast imaging routine using MRI in the South East region 
of the UK. It explores aspects of the formulation and implementation of an MRI protocol55 
for breast cancer diagnosis in a regional cancer network organisation and group of three 
hospitals providing cancer diagnosis services to the regional population. The formulation 
and implementation of an MRI protocol was chosen to explore aspects of learning 
processes framed by codified forms of institutions, a relatively common policy to influence 
hospital organisational behaviour and technical change in the healthcare sector (Crossan et 
al. 1999). The MRI protocol was formulated by a the regional cancer network, an 
organisation that had been set up two years before I conducted my fieldwork, to monitor, 
audit, and steer the standardisation of cancer services in the region. Their main staffs in the 
organisation were clinicians such as breast radiologists and breast surgeons (who were also 
consultants in the local hospitals) and administrators. I carried out interviews with medical 
and administrative staff in the regional cancer network organisation, and with breast 
radiologists, breast surgeons and a hospital manager in the local hospitals. This section 
describes learning processes of intuition, interpretation, integration and institutionalisation 
                                                 
55 The protocol specifies, amongst other things, that women who fulfil the criteria that they have BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes qualify for an MRI examination of their breasts. 
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in the formulation and implementation stages of the new MRI breast imaging protocol, and 
highlights the technological barriers and supports to learning. 
 
 
Intuiting 
Intuition was supported by previous experience with MRI in breast imaging. Patients 
differed in terms of factors such as disease heterogeneity and change in health conditions 
over time, which made experience in pattern recognition through MRI an important 
personal resource. The use of MRI scans for breast imaging was, prior to the formulation of 
the protocol, a relatively rare procedure in the region (the majority of diagnostic services in 
breast diagnosis were performed using different imaging techniques, such as 
mammography) and long-standing experience (as much as over twenty years) was required 
to build a solid understanding of the role of MRI in breast diagnosis (for example, MRI for 
breast diagnosis was mainly used for special cases such as silicone implants, ruptured 
implants and scarred tissue, which are not very frequent occurrences). Moreover, breast 
radiologists worked in different hospitals in the region and their experience within different 
organisational settings was important for intuiting in which hospital which aspects of the 
protocol may or may not work, and narrowing down the protocol specifications so they 
could be implemented in the small but diverse hospital population.   
 
Intuitive insights were provided by knowledge inflows from outside the hospital system. 
The discovery of the relationship between higher rates of breast cancer and certain genes 
was a scientific discovery that had been increasingly gaining in recognition as a basis for a 
change in clinical practice. This information had been shared amongst the clinical staff in 
the regional cancer network through their institutionalised interactions for protocol 
formulation of cancer services, and between them and the local medical school.   
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Interpreting 
Interpretation was helped by individuals making connections with their practices in the 
distant past because experience with techniques was not uniform but changed continuously 
over time. The formulation of the MRI guideline was in part an accumulation of previous 
experience of local breast radiologists in the use of MRI: “The equipment was bought in 
about fifteen years ago and we tried it out, I did a lot of MRIs back then. Then I didn’t 
anymore because I didn’t see the benefit. Now again I am using more MRI as new research 
results come up.” 
 
Collective action in changing MRI clinical practices was made more difficult by structural 
changes in decision-making in the hospitals in the region. In the last decade or two the 
hospitals had a narrower range of decision-makers (mainly clinicians) on protocol 
formulation and implementation. Over time this diversity increased to include managers, 
finance staff, patient representatives, and local charities. A further feature of the structural 
change was the increase in the power of managers and finance staff, and a decrease in the 
power of clinicians and patients. This had the consequence that discussions were (narrowly) 
focused on price, and as the clinical value of MRI protocols was difficult to measure (it was 
measured by the financial and managerial social groups who made the decisions), clinicians 
had to invest a lot more resources in interpretation of the value of the routine MRI 
screening in the region.  
 
Interpretation at the protocol formulation stage was made more difficult by the uncertainty 
of the implications of the protocol in the different hospitals in the region (hospitals differed 
in their MRI devices, availability of radiology staff, patient population, and many other 
aspects which were involved in implementing the protocol but which were not all known to 
the staff in the regional cancer network). Moreover, MRI devices were characterised by 
rapid technical advances which increased the differences between the hospitals as time 
went by (for example, differences in software, image size, and connectedness to the 
hospital and regional PACS system).  
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Integrating  
Integration in protocol formulation was helped by the creation of new organisational forms 
(such as the regional cancer network) which institutionalised communication processes, 
monitoring and auditing of cancer services in the region, and the formulation and 
implementation of new techniques. A formal imperative for collecting information for the 
protocol eased communication between the staff in the regional cancer network and the 
staff in the hospitals who would later implement the protocol.  
 
Integration in the protocol formulation stage was difficult because many times the 
information that the regional cancer network required for the formulation of the guidance 
was unknown to the hospital with the MRI scanner. A breast radiologist in a hospital 
summed up this problem: “Each time a new MRI machine was introduced to the hospital, it 
was treated as an improvement on the old one, usually limited to phrases such as ‘higher 
resolution’”. Often the staff in the hospital would declare that they knew how to solve 
certain issues that were predicted to come up were the protocol implemented, but later the 
‘solution’ to the problem would not work, and the staff from the regional cancer network 
had to go to the site to suggest a solution. Inter-organisational interactions for learning 
showed that hospitals were highly open organisations whose interdependencies for the 
creation of new institutions with other organisations and parts of the regional healthcare 
system were comparatively high.  
 
Some aspects of the medical institution for MRI were easier to implement than others, and 
this differed across hospitals. One aspect of the new MRI protocol defined which patients 
to treat and which not to treat using MRI. In one hospital, this was used as a reason for 
rationing services and an explanation to patients (for clinicians to defend the choices they 
made in their clinical practice), at the hospital level. One breast radiologist interviewed 
stated: “all the time patients are coming and they are saying we want this (MRI) treatment, 
so we try to meet those demands, although it is difficult because it is not cost-effective to 
treat everyone with MRI. So now when we have a protocol, so then we can say we have no 
choice – this patient does not meet these criteria so this is what we have to do”. In a second 
hospital in the region the protocol required the acquisition of an MRI scanner, and started a 
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process of a local scanner appeal. This showed that it was relatively unpredictable what 
feedback processes (from the regional to the departmental level) new institutions would 
have on the regional hospital population. 
 
Increased pressure for performance (as one breast surgeon called it: “the push for 100% 
accuracy”) was in conflict with what patients would tolerate. Accuracy in diagnosis was 
highest with biopsies, but patient tolerance for such invasive diagnostic techniques had 
reduced over time, in favour of non-invasive techniques such as MRI. Moreover, other non-
invasive techniques such as mammography, which had been the norm for a long time, were 
increasingly considered as intolerable because of the pain inflicted on the patient from 
compressing the breast during the process. Together these factors increased pressure on 
clinicians to use MRI and to provide an accurate diagnosis with the technique. The same 
breast surgeon summarised this point: “In the past we would do an operation just to look 
inside. If we suspected breast cancer, we would do many more biopsies, a lot of which were 
negative; now this is no longer acceptable. You have to be almost certain that there is 
something there to get at (to perform a biopsy), and at the same time to not miss any breast 
cancer, and one way is to improve your imaging. But biopsies still remain the 100% 
(accuracy).” 
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Learning was challenged by pressures for performance before stabilisation of the 
technology in the hospital. Moreover, trial-and-error and experimentation processes, 
requirements for learning, were not tolerated. The pressure to ensure and secure a highly 
accurate diagnosis, with the least possible invasiveness, made MRI imaging a highly 
attractive option for patients. However, the low level of stabilisation of the artefact in the 
hospital was reflected in statements such as: “[…] we do not know how applicable it [MRI] 
is, how reliable it is, it was not developed for medical applications so we do not know 
whether it is really better (than other imaging techniques)”. At the same time, expectations 
that patients placed on accuracy in diagnosis had increased over time, at a much faster pace 
than the techniques were learned: “In making diagnoses in the past for ten thousand 
women, it was considered acceptable to miss four or five cases of cancer; now even missing 
one or two is considered unacceptable” (both statements made by breast surgeon 
interviewed).  
 
Integration at the regional level was hindered by the technical dynamism of MRI devices, 
and their heterogeneity across hospitals in the region. The intended outcome of the medical 
protocol was to harmonise practices in the region. This had been easier with relatively 
‘simple’ artefacts such as X-rays, but not for MRI. It was said by a consultant breast 
radiologist that: “each MRI is different, each machine is completely different from the 
other. If you calibrate one and get a scan, in another hospital it will be a different scan 
because you can’t calibrate that machine the same way, it’s a different machine. Every 
machine is completely different from the other, and they get more different as more 
software is added to them”. 
 
The process of institutionalisation via learning feedback processes (from the regional to the 
hospital level) worked better for the drugs paradigm than for the devices paradigm for two 
main reasons. First, medical guidance for implementation in different hospital organisations 
was a way in which the regional cancer centre aimed to change clinicians’ behaviour in 
local hospitals. Processes of institutionalisation that were initiated in this way were the 
same for a variety of medical technologies such as drugs and devices, even though drugs 
and devices were very different technologies. A consultant radiologist interviewed summed 
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up this point: “with drugs you know what you’ve got; you can manufacture 10,000 pills of 
the same kind, and you can be pretty sure that they are all identical. With MRIs that’s not 
the case. Every MRI is different.” MRIs, which had features of complex products (Crossan 
et al. 1999), were much more difficult to institutionalise for reasons such as heterogeneity 
of devices in the hospital, making it difficult to implement norms to guide clinicians’ 
behaviour.  
 
Second, medical devices were not exposed to the same processes of clinical trials as other 
medical technologies such as pharmaceuticals, and this often had the consequence (unless 
hospitals had learned to use the technologies for a long time) that a medical device was 
introduced to the hospital without a substantial knowledge gap or role gap of the device in 
the organisation. For drugs, guidelines had more knowledge to draw on as knowledge was 
accumulated during the clinical trials and spread through publications, the process of 
ethical commissioning, and so on, all of which preceded guidelines. Drugs also largely had 
predefined roles in hospitals. Medical devices, in contrast, were not subject to the same 
rigour as clinical trials and the knowledge surrounding them was not made available to 
clinicians to the same degree as for drugs.  
 
Learning through integration was hindered by the complexity and diversity of other 
processes in hospitals, which had to be carried out before and after the MRI diagnostic 
procedure was carried out. The protocol over-simplified the extent and degree to which 
other aspects of the MRI process had to be changed to accommodate the changed protocol. 
For example, MRI scanning of the breast was only part of the process; there were still many 
other decisions that had to be taken in the process that could not be codified, predicted or 
pre-defined. There was a strong element of uncertainty and unpredictability in clinical 
practice; every patient was different, and every condition was considered as different, 
making routinisation difficult. For example, a surgeon needed to decide how to proceed 
with the information that was obtained from a scan: “If the scan shows microcalcifications 
(early stage cancer) which cannot be felt but show up on the scan and if the 
microcalcifications are extensive and there is a lump somewhere else, do I just remove the 
lump or the microcalcifications as well? And what if the microcalcifications are in both 
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breasts, do I remove both breasts? These decisions I have to make all the time, use my own 
judgment all the time.” Moreover, MRI provided more information that was previously 
non-detectable, but now the clinician was faced with a more extended set of decisions to 
make, which increased even more as the machines became more powerful.  
 
Learning through integration was made more difficult by some clinicians’ ambivalence 
towards following medical guidelines. On the one hand, clinicians’ had trained for many 
years to be able to make relatively autonomous decisions about which patient treatments to 
provide, and guidelines restricted those choices. On the other hand, following the 
guidelines reduced the possibility of being sued. A surgeon interviewed summarised these 
points: “There is a big debate about guidelines – are they making us (clinicians) like 
robots? We have a lot of training [so] why can’t we decide for ourselves if a woman needs 
MRI? But if we do not follow the guidelines and something goes wrong, it becomes difficult 
to justify. If the patient fell outside the guidelines and developed breast cancer, then it is 
defensible (not to have used MRI), but if not, then I can get sued”. Learning in hospitals 
was thus a complex interaction between individual capabilities, choice restrictions, and 
legal threats shaping behaviour (the latter two mediated from outside the hospital and 
relatively unpredictable to the clinician).  
 
Collective action in MRI at the hospital level was made more difficult by changes in, and 
level of importance of, the science system external to the hospital organisation. Part of the 
process for informing MRI use for breast diagnosis was several years of ‘medical evidence 
of effectiveness’ or ‘solid evidence’ for support (oncologist interviewed). Evidence was an 
important driver of guidance formulation. Over time the importance of scientific evidence 
in guiding protocol formulation has increased. In the case of breast cancer in particular, 
public fear had grown, focusing pressure on hospital medical innovation in the area of high-
end diagnostics. However, the translation of ‘evidence of effectiveness’ to clinical practice 
involved individual and organisational operational capabilities which were difficult to 
accumulate. For example, individual clinicians needed to build up their knowledge of MRI, 
creating a group within the hospital who would support them in carrying out the process, all 
of which had to happen before the process had a chance of being effective in the hospital.  
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A further aspect governing clinical practice are clinical audits, which are national level 
assessments that “make sure that people are keeping up with the standard” (breast 
radiologist interviewed). Once the MRI guideline had been introduced at the regional level, 
a few years later the cancer network would review regional cancer services using an audit. 
A further important dimension in the formulation of the MRI breast regional guidelines is 
that cancer is a priority of the strategic health authority (regional health authority) and the 
national NHS Cancer Plan (Crossan et al. 1999; Feldman 2000). Both institutional and 
political supports at the regional and national levels were important co-evolutionary 
mechanisms of the change process for MRI innovation.  
 
In the process of implementation of the new regional MRI guidelines, hospitals were 
treated like organisations with organisational capabilities but instead they depended much 
more on individual capabilities. A breast surgeon interviewed summarised this point: “no 
matter what they (the regional cancer network) say in the guidelines, if there is not a 
radiologist in the hospital that knows how to use MRI, it will not get implemented; we will 
send the patient somewhere else, or not do it.”  
 
Integration was made more difficult by MRI competition with other technology areas. 
Different technologies were used in the regional hospitals for cancer screening, such as 
mammography, ultrasound, scintimammography, and image-guided biopsy. As new 
technologies such as MRI were assessed for their applicability for breast cancer screening, 
this changed the process of consideration of the other technologies in imaging services. For 
example, mammography had previously been the first line of inquiry for all clinicians in the 
main regional hospital for breast screening, but over time more clinicians first screened 
with MRI. In some cases, they were added on to the screening process and used in 
progression after the other tests had been made, in others they replaced existing technology 
areas for those applications, and the application was moved to a different technological 
realm such as MRI. This required a lot of adjustment and learning which was made more 
difficult because of the individual level of action, and in some cases the areas moved back 
and forth and back again, as new information was gained and opinions shifted, making 
149 
 
 
routinisation very difficult. Such shifts had consequences for other members of the breast 
screening team, who had to adjust their behaviour to accommodate it but could not predict 
when another change would be required.   
 
 
Institutionalising 
Institutionalising involves the organisational-level exploitation of what had been learned at 
the individual and group levels. To understand the factors that were important for the 
institutionalisation of the MRI practice at the hospitals in the region, I explored the goals of 
the individuals and groups in the hospitals regarding the technique, the conditions required 
to routinise it, and the factors supporting and hindering the stability of the new MRI 
routine.  
 
In every hospital in the region the MRI protocol provided the impetus for a creation of an 
organisational routine for MRI breast diagnosis of women with certain genes. In every 
hospital this had been interpreted in different ways, had different interactions with hospital 
processes and resources, and required different adjustments. In all hospitals, it can be said, 
that the external impetus (scientific evidence mediated through the regional cancer 
network), was more challenging to existing hospital structures than feed-forward learning 
processes, which started from the individual and group levels and ended with their 
institutionalisation at the organisational level.  
 
A further aspect of MRI technology which came from a different social group (patients) to 
those involved in its translation (clinicians) is demand for MRI services. Patients 
(customers) had power to demand services, which unlike in the private sector, whose direct 
cost consequences they did not have to bear (the price mechanism did not work in this case) 
created a condition in which production needed to be increased without an increase in 
resources, often at the expense of learning. Patients demanded equality, but the complexity 
of service provision in hospitals made it difficult to provide that (also patients were 
different, and health conditions were different).  
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The MRI breast process was helped by its conceptual connection to the improvement of 
diagnostic accuracy and care: “in spite of cost and the trouble it will take, we look for better 
methods for not missing out on a diagnosis and that is where MRI may help. It’s not 
because we have learned how to do MRI or because we know it’s better but because we 
want more accuracy and to improve the care we give” (breast radiologist interviewed). 
 
Institutionalisation was more difficult because of differences in the power of individuals in 
the routine, and significant parts of the routine were at the discretion of the individual 
clinician. Some considerations were implicit in the MRI guideline for breast imaging and in 
the selection of patient-users that were not included in the guideline itself. One example of 
this was the age of persons to be treated. Formally, the guideline did not specify the age 
range of patients to be scanned with MRI, and in that way promoted inclusivity. Informally, 
a surgeon stated, this was not the case: “You see a forty-year old woman comes with a 
breast lump and you can’t really make the diagnosis with a mammogram, and she qualifies 
for the MRI, then you do an MRI, but if a ninety-year-old comes with a similar lesion and 
she qualifies, I would probably not do that. Everyone will tell you there is no ageism in the 
NHS, but there is.”  
 
Skills supported institutionalisation, especially experience with MRI for breast imaging as 
this knowledge is cumulative and highly tacit. Even if the data may have been accessible to 
everyone as an image, the interpretive knowledge was acquired through experience (“a 
thousand mammograms a year, six years training, three sessions a week dedicated to 
breast imaging, that is what you need to be a breast radiologist”) (breast radiologist 
interviewed). Difficulty in interpretation did not necessarily increase with artefact 
complexity – in some cases ultrasound (a relatively simply easy-to-buy machine) may be 
more difficult to interpret: “the physical skill you can learn very quickly, but the mental 
skill, and the experience of understanding what you are seeing, understanding the physics 
and the experience of seeing thousands and thousands of patients so you know what you 
are seeing and subsequently correlating it with pathological findings takes years” (breast 
radiologist interviewed). 
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Routinisation was helped when clinicians saw MRI testing as part of wider diagnostic 
processes and integrated MRI testing with other diagnostic processes they understood and 
were experienced in. Breast scans were normally carried out as a process of elimination and 
it was the integration of the tests from different diagnostic techniques, and the information 
accumulated from the combination of these tests that provided the basis for a diagnosis. 
Even under conditions where the data could be obtained in different departments, the 
interpretative knowledge and coordination of tests were important factors and it was 
important to have the tests integrated and not have partial bits of information dispersed in 
different departments and hospitals. Routinisation was helped when the tests were used in 
progression, one incrementally building on the other “like a better magnifying glass” 
(breast radiologist interviewed). The transition to new technologies in this case was easier 
when they had not replaced one another but rather complemented each other in providing 
more information to the clinician.  
 
Routinisation was helped by the length of time MRI had been used for breast cancer 
diagnosis in the hospitals. MRI breast imaging procedures took a long time (approximately 
twenty years) between the time when it was first used heavily in the local hospitals in the 
early 1990s until hospital routines were in place and until medical guidance in the area 
were produced. Individual clinicians in the regions were very enthusiastic about using MRI, 
but these were the early stages of evaluation of its efficacy in detecting cancers. This period 
slowly tapered off and users reverted back to already established processes for breast 
screening, and increased selectiveness as to which patients were to be treated with MRI. In 
the last five years the research evidence of associations between genetics and cancer 
incidence had increased, raising the interest in improving diagnostic services for higher risk 
patients.  
 
Routinisation was helped by research evidence on MRI, and the high importance of 
scientific research in guiding behaviour in the sector. The increased evidence for MRI 
efficacy in breast cancer diagnosis aided the hospital organisation to change internal 
structures to exploit existing MRI resources in the hospital. This was also influenced by an 
intensification of cancer as a research and national service priority, a socio-political choice. 
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Discoveries that connected cancer incidence with new ‘objectively’ quantifiable ways to 
characterise patients, such as the existence of specific genes, increases the patient 
population and thereby the demand for the service. 
 
Different types of guidance made more information available and MRI routinisation easier. 
The extent and degree to which MRI services were assessed, such as through audits and 
standards for quality of cancer services at the regional hospitals, had increased over time. 
Moreover, new organisations such as the regional cancer network and specialised 
community cancer services had been set up, which created bigger technical systems for 
MRI. The increase in assessments and guidance had made more information on MRI 
procedures available, helping its integration. Moreover, doctors in the region worked at 
different hospitals at the same time, which helped them understand the barriers and 
supports to routinisation in different hospital contexts, and obtain more information to draw 
on as problems arose.  
 
The national priority for the improvement and expansion of cancer services (NHS 2003) 
had focused clinicians’ attention on specialisation in diagnostic techniques. Factors such as 
increased pressure to meet clinical standards in diagnosis (of which there were more over 
time) had changed hospital organisational ‘species’ towards more focus on specialisation 
on diagnostic services. This had supported the routinisation of MRI by giving it a broader 
institutional imperative. External factors such as the reorganisation of regional and local 
healthcare provision priorities, acquiring new types of clinicians, and changes in the 
definition of the patient population had affected these changes. Moreover, the creation of a 
local university teaching hospital, and the medical school, brought more and different 
resources to the local hospitals, helping specialisation and routinisation in diagnostic 
techniques.  
 
 
Feed-forward and feedback 
Through feed-forward learning processes new ideas and actions flow from the individual to 
the group to the organisational level, and through feedback processes what has already been 
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learned moves from the organisational to the individual level (Sutton 1998). This case 
explored aspects of formulation of a new institution for MRI clinical practice at the regional 
level, for implementation at the hospital level.  
 
Feed-forward learning processes in the MRI procedure were helped by individual previous 
experience with MRI for the same technique, and individual and hospital organisational 
experience with using MRI in integration with other diagnostic tests. Feed-forward was 
also helped by individual specialisation in breast cancer diagnosis, which influenced 
hospital specialisation in the same area. Feedback learning processes were initiated by the 
formulation and implementation of the MRI breast screening protocol from outside the 
hospital organisations (from the regional cancer network organisation), information 
provided by scientific evidence and changes in patient conditions and preferences.  
 
 
Section Summary 
This case study explored changes in learning conditions in the process of 
institutionalisation of a new MRI routine for diagnosis of breast cancer in a regional 
hospital system. This section summarises some of the main technological and contextual 
factors that changed and affected learning processes of intuition, integration, interpretation, 
and institutionalisation of the MRI routine in the regional hospitals.  
 
Learning through intuiting was helped by previous experience in MRI for breast imaging 
and by scientific insights from outside the hospital organisations on the connection between 
MRI and breast cancer diagnosis. Interpreting was aided by past knowledge accumulation 
in MRI at the individual level. Collective action through processes of interpretation were 
hindered by structural changes in the regional hospitals such as changes in the actors 
involved in decision-making who imposed different organisational goals (for example, 
financial and managerial instead of clinical goals). The implementation of the protocol 
formulated by the regional cancer network organisation differed across hospitals because 
each hospital had a different MRI device which had developed differently within the 
hospital structures, and had different, sometimes unpredictable, interactions with other 
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hospital processes. Interpretation was supported by the increased availability of information 
about MRI techniques in the national and regional healthcare sector, changes in pressure for 
diagnostic accuracy, and a change in patient preferences for non-invasive diagnostic 
techniques. Interpretation was made more difficult by the technical dynamics of MRI in the 
different regional hospitals, which were rapid and relatively unstandardised across the 
region. MRI techniques rely heavily on individual capabilities and numerous factors and 
incremental decisions in the process (for example, the interpretation of the patient’s 
condition, and fuzzy boundaries in decision-making in cancer treatment). The integration of 
a new MRI routine via medical guidance was made more complex when the clinicians’ 
relationship to medical guidance was ambivalent (for example, “are guidelines making us 
like robots?”). Integration was supported in hospitals where MRI techniques were used in 
integration with other diagnostic techniques which were already routinised (for example, 
when MRI scanning was used as a complement to other technologies in breast cancer 
diagnosis and not as a substitute).  
 
Institutionalisation processes differed across hospitals and were helped by the clinicians’ 
belief that they improved accuracy in diagnosis. Institutionalisation was led from outside 
the hospital system (initiated by the regional cancer network) and in some cases was more 
difficult to manage than if it had developed from within the hospital organisations 
themselves in accordance with existing individual and hospital organisational capabilities. 
Institutionalisation was helped by an increase in the availability and importance of 
scientific evidence on MRI for the sector more generally, the opening of the new medical 
school in the region, the creation of a regional teaching hospital, and the increase in 
individual hospital resources that came with these changes. More guidance on MRI 
procedures increased the availability of information on the technology and influenced 
individual clinicians’ beliefs in the technique as superior to previous techniques, which, 
given the high degree of clinicians’ power in individual hospitals, helped the 
institutionalisation process. Changes emphasising the importance of cancer services as a 
national healthcare priority brought more resources to individual hospitals in the region, 
and positively affected MRI routinisation by influencing the areas of specialisation within 
which MRI techniques were routinely integrated (such as breast cancer diagnosis).  
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6.3 Summary  
Section 6.1 described processes of codification and routinisation of a medical protocol for 
MRI for the diagnosis of dementia patients in a large urban teaching hospital. Briefly, 
intuition in protocol formulation was helped (as all learning processes) by past experience 
in related technology areas (imaging, neurology), scientific knowledge embodied in key 
individuals, and the early stage of role-finding and evolution in MRI technology area. 
Interpretation was aided by knowledge accumulated in the past by different individuals in 
the hospital, by leadership and commitment to problem-solving, by hospital strategic 
change towards research (which made more resources available to the hospital), by the 
involvement of diverse social groups in the protocol formulation process which reduced 
uncertainty in routinisation, and by increased specialisation on a narrow technique and the 
communication structures that emerged therefrom which helped interpretation, as did an 
open and horizontal cognitive map of the hospital organisation leading the innovation 
process. Integration was helped by skills availability and a collective research goal, changes 
in patients, and the creation of parallel supporting institutions for dementia research. 
Institutionalisation was supported by the learning through practice of neurologists in the 
past, as well as by familiarity with other specialists in the routine (for example, whether 
they leaned towards over- or under-reporting). The historical role of radiology within 
neurology benefited the institutionalisation process of new radiological routines. The 
institution of a networked way of working helped in the innovation process (operational 
routines and structures overlapped with innovation structures). Feed-forward learning 
processes were initiated by the individual neurologist scientist, and by group 
communication in the hospital on aspects of MRI their know-how converged upon. Feed-
forward learning was aided by search for and inclusion of different know-how in the 
hospital by the individual neurologist scientist. Feedback learning processes were helped by 
the change in hospital strategy towards research and teaching, involvement of key 
individuals in the process of codification for the protocol, and also involvement of the same 
individuals in the routinisation of the specified processes. External factors changing and 
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supporting learning (MRI) within the hospital were changes in patient population 
channelled to the hospital’s neurology centre.  
 
Section 6.2 traced aspects of the process of learning in MRI and the formulation and 
implementation of an MRI protocol for breast cancer diagnosis in a regional cancer 
network and hospitals in a region. In summary, learning was aided by previous experience 
in MRI for breast imaging and by scientific insights from outside the hospital organisation. 
Interpreting was aided by individual MRI capabilities. Learning was made more difficult by 
structural change in the regional hospital regarding decision-making, creating a dichotomy 
between organisational goals and goals of the MRI protocol. Institutionalisation of MRI 
processes was hindered by differences in MRI devices and their evolution across hospitals, 
and by unpredictable interactions with other organisational processes. Interpretation was 
helped by increased availability of information about MRI techniques, changes in public 
and patient pressure for diagnostic accuracy, and preferences for non-invasive diagnostic 
techniques. Interpretation was more difficult in conditions of rapid technical change in MRI 
devices (from outside and inside the hospital). Learning in MRI was helped by capabilities 
at the individual level, and made more difficult if the clinician had an ambivalent attitude 
towards medical guidance. Integration was supported in hospitals where MRI techniques 
were used in combination with other diagnostic techniques that were already routinised (for 
example, when MRI scanning was used as a complement to other technologies in breast 
cancer diagnosis and not as a substitute).  
 
Institutionalisation in this case was initiated from outside the hospital, and was supported 
by individual clinicians’ belief in MRI for diagnostic accuracy, by the availability of 
information, and by existing individual and hospital organisational capabilities. 
Institutionalisation was helped by increased availability of scientific information and skills, 
and by the increased resources supplied to the region following the creation of the local 
teaching hospital and medical school. Increased resources to individual hospitals were also 
influenced by changes in the importance of cancer services as a national healthcare priority. 
Learning processes characterised by feed-forward aspects were helped by individual 
previous experience and specialisation in MRI for the same technique, and its integration 
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with other diagnostic tests. Feedback learning processes were initiated, and to a certain 
degree supported by, the formulation of the MRI breast screening protocol from outside the 
hospital organisation, and by information provided by scientific evidence and changes in 
patient conditions and preferences towards less invasive diagnostic techniques.   
 
The table below summarises the main learning processes and factors affecting learning 
conditions in hospitals in the two cases of MRI innovation examined in the chapter. 
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Table 7: Summary of changes in learning conditions MRI clinical practices examined 
MRI clinical practice Organisational learning 
processes 
Knowledge factors Social factors Other factors 
Diagnostic technique for MRI 
scanning of dementia patients 
    
Brief description of case: the 
case describes how a medical 
protocol for scanning dementia 
patients using MRI was created 
and implemented in a large 
urban teaching hospital.  
Intuiting 
 
 
 
 
 
Past experience and skills 
accumulated in MRI 
technology areas such as 
diagnostic imaging and 
neurology; knowledge 
accumulated through 
scientific experience 
(broadening the search 
space of discovery in the 
hospital).  
Early stage of role-finding 
of MRI in the hospital 
allowed for flexibility in 
the creation of structures 
and norms; creation of 
norms for experimentation 
and guesswork in the 
newly formed teaching role 
of the hospital.  
 
 Interpreting Past experience and skills 
in related technology areas 
in medical care; diversity 
in knowledge bases within 
the hospital which met the 
differentiated knowledge 
requirements of the 
protocol (for example, 
medical physics); 
knowledge of site-specific 
resources and structures 
which helped in 
codification and 
routinisation at the hospital 
level; increased 
specialisation of the 
hospital towards diagnostic 
services; open and flexible 
cognitive map of the 
neurologist scientist in 
leading inter-departmental 
communication in the 
protocol formulation 
process. 
Individual leadership and 
commitment to problem-
solving; distribution of 
organisational power in 
favour of scientific 
experimentation; creation 
of social norms supporting 
scientific experimentation 
and discovery.  
Hospital strategic 
reorientation towards 
teaching and research.   
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 Integrating Hospital organisational 
availability of individual 
capabilities and skills;  
Structural change in the 
types of patients who were 
channelled to the hospital 
neurological services (i.e. 
more acute and less chronic 
patients, a change that 
required more imaging 
services). 
 
 Institutionalising Familiarity between 
individuals and groups in 
how they performed their 
individual practice 
elements;  
Historical central function 
of radiology within 
neurology; historical 
networked way of working 
of neurology which 
overlapped with 
requirements of networked 
MRI routinisation. 
 
 Feed-forward and feedback 
between the learning 
processes 
Feed-forward: Individual 
neurologist scientist 
communication with 
different individuals in the 
codification process; 
creation of an MRI routine 
in the hospital with 
scientific enquiry at its 
core; changes in patient 
population (repetition of 
the practice aided its 
routinisation).  
Feed-forward: inclusion of  
individuals who were 
involved in carrying out the 
routine in the process of 
codification. 
Feedback: strategic 
reorientation of the hospital 
towards research and 
teaching; changes in 
patient population. 
Diagnostic technique for MRI 
diagnosis of breast cancer 
Organisational learning 
processes 
Knowledge factors Social factors Other factors 
Brief description of case: the 
case describes aspects of the 
process of formulation of a 
medical guidance for diagnosis 
of breast cancer using MRI for a 
group of three hospitals in the 
same region by a regional cancer 
network organisation.  
Intuiting 
 
 
 
 
 
Previous experience in 
MRI for breast imaging; 
scientific insights from 
outside the hospital 
organisations.  
  
 Interpreting Past knowledge 
accumulation in MRI for 
Structural change in social 
groups involved in 
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breast diagnosis; more 
information and guidance 
on MRI techniques made 
available through 
communication channels, 
some steps in the 
interpretation process from 
scientific evidence towards 
applicability to the hospital 
contexts; more difficult 
because of technical 
dynamics of MRI for 
which language did not yet 
fully exist in the hospital; 
rapid technical change in 
MRI devices. 
organisational-level 
decision-making; change in 
public and patient pressure 
towards accuracy in 
diagnosis (for example, 
lower tolerance of 
mistakes, increase in 
perceived threat and cost of 
being sued for making a 
mistake); change in patient 
preferences for non-
invasive diagnostic 
techniques. 
 Integrating MRI devices highly 
heterogeneous from one 
another making integration 
difficult; technical 
dynamics of MRI devices 
(for example, through the 
addition of software 
components); high reliance 
upon individual 
capabilities; supported by 
integration with processes 
of other diagnostic 
techniques. 
Clinicians’ ambivalent 
attitude towards medical 
guidance (for example, 
“are they (medical 
guidance) making us like 
robots?” 
 
 Institutionalising Differences in hospital 
resources in the region (e.g. 
MRI devices, availability 
of radiology skills for 
MRI); initiated from 
outside the hospital 
organisations (not the 
organisational level); 
availability of skills and 
capabilities at the 
individual and group 
Structural mismatch 
between organisational 
performance goals defined 
at the hospital level (for 
example, cost-saving) and 
requirements of the 
protocol defined at the 
regional level (for example, 
learning, experimentation, 
and adjustment of other 
organisational processes) 
Creation of a medical 
school in the region; 
creation of a regional 
teaching hospital; change 
in clinicians’ power for 
institutionalising MRI 
influenced by protocol; 
increase in resources for 
cancer services influenced 
by change in national 
priority and creation of 
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levels; increase in technical 
and organisational 
resources that came to the 
regional system of 
hospitals with the creation 
of the medical school and 
the teaching hospital; 
changes in information 
availability on MRI for 
breast cancer diagnosis. 
(hospitals are open 
organisations). 
large-scale government 
programmes for the 
improvement of cancer 
services. 
 Feed-forward and feedback 
between the learning 
processes 
Feed-forward: helped by 
individual experience with 
MRI for the same 
technique; individual and 
group experience with the 
integration of MRI with 
other existing diagnostic 
processes in the hospital; 
helped by individual-level 
experience and 
specialisation in breast 
cancer diagnosis. 
Feedback: the formulation 
and implementation of the 
MRI breast screening 
protocol from outside the  
hospital organisation (the 
regional cancer network); 
information provided by 
scientific evidence; 
changes in patient 
conditions, perceptions, 
and preferences.  
Clinicians’ belief that MRI 
improved accuracy in 
diagnosis. 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis.  
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With regard to the relevance of the findings for the understanding of organisational 
learning, several points stand out. First, hospitals are not closed organisations, as some 
organisational learning scholars seem to suggest (e.g. Crossan et al. 1999). Rather, learning 
processes and conditions are shaped by technological changes both internal and external to 
the organisation, and interactions between them. Instead of being localised within the 
hospital organisation, hospital resources (for example, skills, information, patients) flow 
freely across hospital organisational boundaries. Second, the importance of different 
learning processes differs according to the organisational and sectoral interpretation of the 
technology for clinical purposes (for example, dementia or breast cancer diagnosis, as 
described in this chapter), over time (for example, interpretation was more important during 
codification and institutionalisation dominated by feed-forward learning processes, as in the 
case described in section 6.1, whereas integration was more important in feedback learning 
processes where institutionalisation was initiated from external impulses as described in 
section 6.2). Third, changes in hospital organisational routines are not strictly driven by one 
performance goal, as Feldman (Crossan et al. 1999) suggests; rather, they can be driven by 
a variety of factors such as external standards (for example, as in the breast cancer imaging 
case) or by individual research motivations (for example, as in the case of dementia 
imaging using MRI). Fourth, while the end-service may be comparable across hospitals 
(e.g. a diagnostic service using MRI), the process of routine change in every hospital differs 
strongly according to the knowledge accumulated, the social agency processes they interact 
with, and the market structure (Crossan et al. 1999). Fifth, in clinical practice contexts, 
capabilities are highly embedded in humans, which means that the ‘organisational memory’ 
of routines existing when a person leaves the organisation may be limited to simple tasks 
rather than complex operational routines. Sixth, medical technologies have multiple points 
of mediation, which makes organisational learning processes difficult to predict. Finally, 
complexity and heterogeneity of MRI devices makes institutionalisation of processes across 
different hospital sites uncertain, and user involvement in codification reduces uncertainty 
in the routinisation process.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Learning and Innovation in Clinical PACS Practices 
 
 
This chapter explores changes in learning conditions and processes involving PACS 
technology in two hospital cases.  
 
Section 7.1 traces innovation in PACS in a medium-sized general hospital located in a town 
in the South East region of England. It explains how institutionalisation aspects of a 
technological regime involving hospital-wide PACS medical information systems were 
enabled by managerial organisation of gradual step-wise restrictions of technology choice 
and knowledge exchange conditions for unlearning. Changes occurred in organised 
repetitive problem-solving focused on the inclusion of clinical specialists with diversified 
skills, incremental feedback and feed-forward processes with managed directionality 
towards system change (for example, involving rule changes, changes in specifications of 
actor inclusion and exclusion, and changes in access to patient information). Organisation 
of individual and group interactions for changing features of the internal X-ray regime were 
informed by goals of the healthcare regulatory authority and contracted firm.  
 
Section 7.2 presents the second case of PACS integration in a large urban teaching hospital. 
It shows different learning conditions and outcomes from the previous case and reflects two 
learning phases. The first phase shows unmanaged and unplanned processes of knowledge 
accumulation and the gradual emergence of learning and service production structures with 
group and hospital-wide integration. The second phase shows an external imposition of 
managerial and structural norms in conflict with internal learning, subsequent resistance, 
emergence of parallel structures, and signs of beginning gradual convergence between 
internal and external norms.   
 
Section 7.3 summarises the main findings of the chapter and provides some reflections on 
their implications for learning theory.  
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7.1 Changes in learning conditions for PACS in a general hospital in a town 
This case describes processes of PACS institutionalisation in a medium-sized general 
hospital in a town in East Sussex. As described in Chapter 4, PACS is an information 
system for radiological imaging partially enacted in the form of a large-scale UK 
government programme involving contracts, timelines, and rules of operation and product 
and systems specifications (NPfIT, 2004). This case describes PACS innovation and 
organisational technological processes following NPfIT execution in a hospital, and some 
of the factors enabling and obstructing the hospital’s transition from an X-ray imaging 
regime to a digital imaging regime.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, PACS is a broad term for a radiological information system that 
includes software for the storage, manipulation and sharing of radiological images and data, 
monitor screens, computer hardware, MRI, CT and digital X-ray scanners, to replace 
elements of analogue and paper-based diagnostic imaging in hospitals. In my investigation 
I focused on aspects of PACS that were newly learned in the hospital, where my interview 
partners had been directly involved at the individual, group and organisational levels, and 
for which key events and processes were recent enough so they could be recalled in the 
interviews. At the time of the fieldwork PACS had been in the hospital for approximately 
one year. Three main changes in learning conditions in the building up of PACS 
capabilities in this hospital in the period since PACS installation were identified: the first 
was creating conditions for routinisation by restricting choices for operational behavioural 
processes and providing support for problem-solving and unlearning of previous habitual 
actions and interactions in hospital operations; the second was incrementally adjusting rules 
and procedures to reinforce, expand, and maintain PACS routines as they gradually 
included different individuals and groups in the hospital; and third, maintaining 
connections with and absorbing changes in external technical systems as they evolved. As 
in the other cases examined, some learning phases overlapped, and within them some 
learning processes occurred simultaneously. In the following sections I present the main 
findings on learning processes at the individual, group and organisational levels.  
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Intuiting 
Intuiting involves comprehension, gaining insights and new ideas and an unconscious 
recognition of patterns via previously acquired tacit knowledge (Crossan et al. 1999). These 
processes are impossible to observe, and to identify their existence and understand their 
relevance for hospital PACS learning I focused on the source of ideas and the ways in 
which they were communicated, shared and used between individuals in the hospital 
(Crossan et al. 1999). The main individuals directly and actively involved in the phase of 
specification and formulation of changes in behavioural rules in the hospital (for example, 
seizing the production of paper-based images) were the hospital PACS manager, nurses, 
and radiologists who had experience in using PACS in other hospitals.  
 
The PACS manager had seven years of experience in the transition to PACS imaging in 
another hospital, during which time he had accumulated knowledge that helped in 
presenting the system to this hospital. He needed to ‘feel’ how to present the PACS 
integration process in a way that would provoke least personal resistance by radiologists, 
ideas which were built upon his previous experience, and at the same time keep his 
intuition open for pre-empting, identifying and finding solutions for problems that arose in 
the hospital context of application. Part of the difficulty in PACS integration in hospital 
organisational processes was that it required a regime shift involving, for example, radically 
different work practices for radiologists and all other staff in the hospital (for example, in 
the information radiologists and others obtained, how radiologists and others obtained it, 
and how radiologists and clinicians in the hospital interacted with other staff and patients 
while carrying out individual tasks during the delivery of the diagnostic service).  
 
Sharing of preliminary insights by the PACS manager occurred most frequently with 
nurses. The hospital nurses were “sympathetic to my questions and problems with getting 
radiologists to use PACS” (PACS manager interviewed). Nurses, a group of staff whose 
experience was broad rather than specialised, were a group in the hospital who had earlier 
experience in the radical transition to IT for all their main work tasks (for example, for 
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activity logs and recording patient data). This had helped in understanding certain learning 
difficulties and incompatibilities that might arise in the hospital transition to PACS. Nurses 
were also a group of staff whose main location for work was the hospital (they did not 
move around between hospitals, as clinicians did), making their availability more 
predictable and easier for the PACS manager to build up familiarity and trust with them. 
Experience with other staff and in the hospital context meant that nurses could rely on their 
intuition to understand aspects that might work and those that would come up against 
resistance from radiologists in the hospital.   
 
The second organisational learning phase involved the adjustment of radiologists’ work 
tasks to obtaining imaging information digitally, reading and analysing it in this changed 
form, and reporting it. Intuition for recording and recognising disease patterns on digital 
representations of radiological images drew on radiologists’ previous experience in 
analogue pattern recognition. Some insights came from what had been learned by using 
ubiquitous IT systems in clinical practice such as email and booking systems, as certain 
solutions were applicable to PACS. Insights on, for example, the uploading of radiological 
images (MRI images, for instance, are of a large size and could not be uploaded onto the 
hospital PACS) were communicated and managed by technical staff who had more practice 
in the process.    
 
Intuition was important for understanding changes in the wider technical system, via 
products, systems and regulation. Connectedness to other hospital and healthcare 
organisations, and understanding guidance for PACS that came from outside the hospital 
organisation were important. Familiarity with decision-making processes within the NHS, 
and between the hospital and private firms (such as the main IT firm administering PACS 
implementation in the South East region) helped in learning. The PACS manager, for 
example, made decisions on system specifications within the hospital, aided by interaction 
with the local firm to understand changes in technical requirements and diagnostic imaging 
industry developments. Moreover, PACS implementation in the hospital was part of a 
wider government program (NPfIT) which continuously influenced hospital goals and 
requirements. PACS was a systems technology highly interconnected and interdependent 
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with the national healthcare sector, so it was important to be able to detect sector-specific 
institutional changes.  
 
 
Interpreting 
Unlike intuiting which is largely an unconscious process, interpreting is the conscious 
creation of a cognitive map of a knowledge space, and the making of connections between 
understandings using language capacities either individually or through communication 
with others (Crossan et al. 1999). In order to capture these processes, I explored aspects of 
communication with regard to problem-solving in the use of PACS for pre-specified tasks, 
the interpretive processes involved in the replacement of diagnostic functions of the X-ray 
regime with the digital imaging regime, and the creation of a collective meaning of PACS 
in the various social groups in the hospital.  
 
Interpreting, or the making of connections between different cognitive maps of user 
individuals (nurses, radiologists and technicians), was helped by physical proximity 
between problems and their communication (i.e. Mode 2 knowledge production). PACS 
know-how is highly tacit and individuals were proficient in its software techniques to 
varying degrees. The localisation of PACS users to an area in the hospital with monitor 
screens of the highest resolution, concentrated learning activities and diverse users in the 
same physical space. This helped communication between individuals and the showing of 
solutions to one another. Individuals participated in joint problem-solving in one physical 
space in the hospital, and then left the area to work on PACS in their respective 
departments, and to share what they had learned in other parts of the hospital. This helped 
make radiology a systems technology by ensuring its functions, techniques and language 
were relatively spread out or more ubiquitous throughout the hospital.  
 
The transition of certain radiological processes to PACS was largely a managed process 
and certain aspects of learning were forced by choice restrictions and changes in the rules 
of operation. For example, the radiology manager imposed the rule that images were no 
longer to be available on paper, but only in digital form: “I’m not paying for film for 
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anyone (any clinician) anymore; either you use the [PACS] system or you don’t get to see 
the image” (radiology manager interviewed). This method of controlling clinicians’ 
behaviour was considered effective in this hospital because the formation of a community 
of practice was supported by the manager as well. For example, the largest monitor screens 
were located in the PACS department, in close proximity to nurses with experience in 
hospital information systems and PACS. As radiologists clustered around the monitor 
screens throughout the day to see their images in the highest resolution, they interacted with 
nurses and other radiologists when there was something they did not understand. Over time, 
the PACS department became a main location for communication and learning.  
 
PACS know-how was highly tacit, learning processes relatively unstandardised and the 
novelty of PACS made it difficult to identify individual capabilities and manage the 
internalisation process. Therefore, a recognised location in the hospital for informal 
interactions offered an important opportunity to uncover the limits of one’s knowledge, 
communicate the problem to others by, for example, pointing to the area on the computer 
screen that required interpretation, and to ask others for help. Over time, the clinicians got 
better at using PACS and these types of interactions became less important, until technical 
changes or regulatory changes occurred again.  
 
PACS had a different meaning for every user group in the hospital. The learning of PACS 
in the hospital was interpreted by some individuals as an opportunity to modernise and 
improve services, and by others as an imposition on their existing practice, making their 
work more difficult. Some clinical staff, in particular consultant radiologists, who had a 
superior position in the hospital hierarchy, resisted direction. The opportunity for staff to 
gather in the PACS department, and voice complaints and at the same time be supported in 
their problem-solving by others, made it easier to integrate the system into their work 
practices. The informal location in the PACS department made collective interpretation 
easier, and helped in the creation of a community of practice of PACS users in the hospital. 
The informal interactions that occurred in the PACS department allowed for individuals 
with different functions in the hospital to share their interpretations of the technology, and 
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build an understanding of PACS interpretations and functions in the hospital, helping their 
own learning and routinisation of different aspects of the technology. 
 
For the manager, it was a system that needed to be integrated into radiologists’ work 
practices as quickly as possible at the lowest possible cost. For several of the nurses 
interviewed, in the first phase it was a source of many problems that at first they did not 
know how to solve, or work around. The way in which digitisation had impacted directly 
on their work tasks was through logging of scanning requests and logging of scans. 
Previously the nurses had done this on paper. They had had many problems and crashes 
with the system, with the result that they kept both written logs and digital logs. PACS had 
doubled their workload at first. Later on, they became more confident in PACS and no 
longer needed the paper back-up of logs.  
 
For radiologists in the hospital, PACS changed their ways of interpreting scans and the 
‘ritual’ of the radiologist interacting with patients. For example, prior to PACS the 
radiologist visited the patient with the paper image of the scan as part of the patients’ file, 
so they could look at the image while they were talking with the patient. Now the clinicians 
in the hospital were annoyed that they could no longer do that: “I can’t possibly have all the 
images in my mind of all the patients I am visiting in the ward, it is much harder now, I 
have to go back and forth between the computer and the patient, it all takes a lot longer” 
(consultant radiologist interviewed).  
 
The creation of a PACS community in the hospital changed both individual and group 
understanding of what radiology is in the hospital. Certain aspects of radiology changed 
from being a centralised service within the hospital with a distinct hierarchy and 
department, to possess elements of a service that incorporated different groups of people in 
the hospital, changing radiology from a relatively vertical to a more horizontal structure and 
with emerging aspects of a decentralised and generic technology (but still requiring highly 
specialised skills). This process involved unlearning of what radiology is, of individual 
tasks in the hospital, and making new interpretations of what was previously known of IT 
systems (for example, the evolution of interpretations of IT systems as data storage and 
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communication to an understanding of IT as a diagnostic tool replacing more centralised 
functions of the X-ray regime).  
 
Interpretation in the early phase of PACS institutionalisation changed the forms of 
interaction between individuals. In the main, it increased communication between 
previously relatively disconnected social groups. Communication was relatively 
unstructured and more trial-and-error, before a collective meaning of PACS was created 
through communication and management between individuals familiar with specific 
technical processes (for example, technicians, managers and nurses) and the shaping of this 
function by individuals who had more power in the process (for example, managers and 
radiologists).  
 
Unlearning was characterised by two main stages: first, directed radical adjustments to 
rules of operation (directed from outside the hospital and the manager); and second, 
incremental adjustments based on feed-back about what worked and what did not work 
(from inside the hospital). The manager of the PACS department was the main actor who 
changed some important rules in PACS imaging in the hospital, and drew his information 
from NHS guidance for PACS implementation (for example, the rule to shift from film to 
digital images). When he had set this rule in the hospital, the learning and organisational 
changes required became apparent, and he had to set up a location for the transfer of PACS 
know-how in the hospital so that radiologists and other users could learn and inform the 
manager of further changes required.  
 
Interpretation at the individual and group levels was affected by industry interpretations of 
PACS and interpretations of the formal healthcare regulatory authorities. In this hospital, 
the main users had had little experience with PACS changing existing radiology functions. 
However, most users had information on PACS and were familiar with some of its potential 
functions in the hospital, but did not know the precise details of how it would change their 
work. Over time, context-specific interpretations were created, stabilising PACS within the 
various groups. However, actors in the external technical system continued to be important. 
For example, rules for accessing PACS images were under negotiation and changed several 
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times during the interview process (for example, whether family members can view each 
other’s digital images), as did the technical specificities of which images would be 
transferred via hospital PACS (just CT or both CT and MRI images).  
 
 
Integrating 
To understand learning through integration and the relationship between PACS features and 
group action in the hospital, I focused on the groups where I was told changes in learning 
and operational processes were happening, namely in the radiology group, the nurse group 
in the hospital, and the broader emerging PACS user community. 
 
In the radiology group, integration was mainly associated with radiologists using PACS to 
analyse images and produce diagnostic reports. This involved the accumulation of PACS-
specific skills, which were learned through trial-and-error and interaction with other 
hospital users, and the application of previously acquired diagnostic skills and IT skills. In 
the hospital, the majority of radiologists had not been trained to perform their tasks using 
IT, and this was a radical change for them (they had been trained to use film images and 
were long into their career by the time they had to use PACS). As stated previously, the 
PACS manager created a separate physical structure for learning PACS skills. In this space 
the main users of the system were localised in one part of the hospital which was centrally 
accessible to them, and it emerged as an area within which people could ask each other and 
help each other to solve problems, and thus replace and unlearn elements of the X-ray 
regime.   
 
Certain norms changed over time, with doctors becoming less and less resistant to using 
PACS, although it had a personal cost to them. An advantage of PACS was that the 
throughput of diagnostic information was much faster, but radiologists had a lot more 
information to deal with per patient because the images were far more detailed: “your eyes 
don’t get a break. Before with film you could get approximately 10 images and had to look 
at each one in detail. Now you get one image with CT and MRI side-by-side on 
workstations and you can manipulate images and its 3D so there is a lot more work for us 
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and information and [it’s all] very detailed, which takes a very long time to go through.”, 
was what one radiologist stated. 
 
Nurses emerged as an important user group in terms of gaining knowledge and spreading it 
to other clinicians in the hospital. Unlike the hospital radiologists, the majority of nurses 
had had experience with hospital IT systems from previous programs, and were able to use 
and transfer these skills to radiologists and other PACS users. Their familiarity with 
individual clinicians, regular direct contact with patients, and overall organisational 
processes made them very important in supporting change. 
 
PACS integration was helped by the creation of a PACS user community in the hospital. 
This process had two main features which helped in integration, an informal one internally 
created and a formal one which was created externally from outside the hospital. The 
informal norm, the localisation of PACS users in the PACS department, has already been 
described. The formal norm was the externally led institutionalisation of multi-disciplinary 
team meetings (MDTMs) involving weekly meetings (depending on the clinical specialty 
area) on patient diagnosis in which PACS was a central tool for the presentation and 
discussion of individual patient cases. Overall, PACS increased interactions between 
diverse staff in the hospital and helped in changing internal relationships and structures for 
integration. However, many other behavioural and structural adjustments are still in 
process. As the radiology manager stated: “What has changed with these meetings is the 
increased workload; radiologists now spend many more hours looking at images and 
preparing for the meetings. (Making diagnosis about patients) has become much more 
imaging driven and imaging dependent; all of them (clinicians participating in the 
meetings) will be looking at the images and finding the areas to treat. Previously a report 
would land on a desk and no conversation would take place.”  
 
Integration processes were affected by wider systemic features of the technology. First, 
PACS has specific components which, in order to work as a system, need to be compatible 
with other components both within the hospital and within the wider healthcare sector. IT 
more generally but PACS specifically made radiology a systemic rather than a comparably 
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stand-alone hospital service, and changed both the structure of radiology and the structures 
of other hospital services such as nursing and management. Second, PACS emergent 
systemic aspects were closely related to decision-making structures external to the hospital 
organisation. At times, for example when access allowances were being given out in this 
hospital, this created a dichotomy between what had been decided outside the hospital and 
what would work within the hospital context.  
 
Integration was difficult because decision-making structures either fitted elements of the X-
ray regime (for example, when devices were not very different from one another, were 
more stand-alone, and their role had been stabilised for almost a century) or they had been 
pre-determined at a very early stage of PACS implementation. This restricted the emergent 
nature of learning and integration, by narrowing choices and restricting context-specific 
flexibilities that were required for learning processes to occur. It also imposed unrealistic 
expectations on doctors, who said that PACS had increased the time they required for each 
patient, rather than decreasing it, but they were paid to spend the same amount of time on 
the patient as before.  
 
The creation of a user community helped in developing a shared understanding of what is 
going on with PACS technology in the hospital but challenged existing structures. 
Confirming the relationship between technology and organizational structure (Barley 
1986), PACS implementation was delayed because of “professional boundaries” 
(interviewee CBR156). At first, the PACS hierarchy reflected the traditional radiology 
hierarchy of radiologists as the main users, and all other staff as subordinates. A few 
months after the initial formalization of its use through hospital management, it became 
clearer that individuals who used PACS on a day-to-day basis, building up their tacit skills, 
were those that were most frequently asked for help with the system. The PACS manager 
soon drew attention to the nurses and technicians who had gained the expertise, re-labelled 
them as ‘super-users’ and thereby named a  different social group for what was at first 
considered an area of expertise for radiologists. The process of redefining individual roles, 
along with the unpredictable nature of where knowledge will be accumulated and how tacit 
                                                 
56 Consultant Breast Radiologist 1.  
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know-how will be transferred, is a feature of technology areas at early stages of 
development in organisations. 
 
Integration was helped by the small size of the hospital with relatively few specialists and 
more generalists, which helped in the creation of a relatively large PACS community in the 
hospital. Access to patient images, for example, was not restricted to radiologists, but other 
staff members could have access to them because radiologists were not always available. 
There were far fewer specialists so, in order to deliver the service, doctors had more 
responsibilities in the process, and had to be more flexible in the application of their skills. 
As a consequence, learning in PACS was more widespread, and many more people were 
involved in the routines and in the development of the technology. Less emphasis on 
specialists was also reflected in another part of the process, which meant that there was a 
limit to what could be done in the hospital. Some of the diagnostic areas are highly 
specialised, such as MRI musculoskeletal, and in this hospital these images would never be 
made or looked at, because the specialist to perform the service was not part of the hospital. 
A radiologist interviewed stated: “there is a good average of widespread skills (in the 
hospital), but highly specialised areas are not represented. Size matters because with size 
you get more diverse specialisations, but you have to be careful that the diversity does not 
cause separations between them so that technologies such as PACS are limited to certain 
(departmental) areas as well.” 
 
Integration was to some degree slowed down by regulatory changes in external financing of 
PACS, and the greater dependence of the hospital on these changes. This was one of the 
first hospitals in the region to introduce PACS, but this was not perceived as favourable, 
since according to one interviewee: “in the end we paid for parts that everyone else got for 
free. This makes us more careful in making other changes because we might later find that 
there could be more money coming in.” Thus, individual motives to support internal 
adaptation to an externally changing technical environment were dampened by changing 
forms and outcomes of mediation.  
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Institutionalising 
Institutionalising involves the organisational-level exploitation of what has been learned at 
the individual and group levels. Two main phases of learning underpinning 
institutionalisation were recognisable. In the first phase, organisational goals and rules were 
set externally by the healthcare regulatory authority and contracting firm before hospital 
capabilities were created. Problems arose from the misfit between external norms and 
internal learning requirements to meet them. One radiologist interviewed expressed his 
frustration as follows: “potentially there is value in IT in healthcare but you need to change 
it to something that produces value for us. For that, you need to talk to us, to include us, 
not just the vendor – they don’t know what we do.” Similarly, another radiologist stated: 
“people [decision-makers implementing the NPfIT program] have this vague idea about IT 
technology, that IT will improve the kind of care that we can provide. But mostly it has 
been a disaster because doctors were not consulted; people were not asking us what we 
want. Maybe we would have said the PACS system, but they never asked us – they never 
ask anybody. They just gave the contracts to the major vendors.”  
 
In the second phase, supports for learning were created within the hospital, enabling the 
emergence of an internal community of practice by changing conditions for knowledge 
exchange. In this phase, various features of technology stabilisation were visible, such as 
unchanging rules for access and usage, a designated physical space for communication 
across professional and departmental boundaries, and inclusion in rule-making for internal 
hospital PACS processes.  Hospital PACS capabilities were highly embodied in 
individuals, and thus individual learning played a very important part in organisational-
level institutionalisation, more so than learning at the group level.  
 
 
Feed-forward and feedback 
Feed-forward learning processes involve the flow of ideas from the individual to the group 
to the organisational level. In contrast, feedback learning processes occur from the 
organisational to the individual level, which requires changes in the institutional order to 
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allow individual intuition to emerge . In the case explored, individual- to group-level 
learning processes followed feedback processes of externally-led institutionalisation. The 
impetus for change was an institutional system external to the hospital (for example, the 
national healthcare sector programme for PACS implementation, firms, and other regional 
and national hospitals which had built up PACS capabilities) for changing from aspects of 
the X-ray regime, such as paper-based imaging, to a digital imaging and communication 
system.  
 
Feed-forward learning was, in part, a directed process of rule-setting, communication 
support and inter-disciplinary meetings, and partly an informal process of localised 
problem-solving in the hospital supported by the emergence of a community of practice of 
PACS users. Shared understanding of PACS was cultivated through the localisation of 
PACS devices in one part of the hospital, aiding interactions between users, the sharing of 
problems, and the construction of a shared identification, and also helping in the collective 
transition from the X-ray to the IT-based diagnostics regime that emerged, gradually 
replacing the previous atomistic radiology structures.  
 
 
Section summary 
This section described the learning processes and technological changes that occurred in the 
hospital during PACS implementation. To sum up, intuiting was helped by the PACS 
manager’s previous seven years of experience in PACS implementation in another hospital, 
which made him better able to understand personal resistance against PACS by 
radiologists. Intuitive insights by the PACS manager were shared with nurses who did not 
feel threatened by the changes, and had a certain familiarity with radiologists in the 
hospital, and acted as boundary spanners between different professional groups in the 
hospital. Radiologists’ intuition for the direct implications PACS had for their work at the 
time (in particular for image analysis and interaction with patients) was helped by previous 
experience with analogue imaging and IT systems. Intuiting at the individual level was also 
helped by previous experience of the PACS manager with private industry, for 
understanding product and system dynamics external to the hospital.  
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Interpreting of PACS technology in the hospital was helped by the localisation of PACS 
users in one physical area. This aided interaction between individual PACS users, the 
exchange of tacit components of know-how (they were otherwise difficult to locate in the 
hospital), and for the exchange of interpretations of the systems technology by different 
user groups, increasing their social connectedness within the technology space. Choice 
restrictions helped direct interpretation and joint-problem solving, because it created 
problems, on the one hand, and provided an opportunity for exchange, on the other. 
Overall, interpretation was aided by rules and supports for unlearning via choice 
restrictions, behavioural guidelines, human agency, and interpretations that flowed into the 
hospital from external firm agents.  
 
Integration was helped by different factors for different user groups in the hospital, because 
PACS rules, systems and operational constraints had different implications for every group. 
For radiologists, PACS meant more information on diagnosis, more time spent per patient, 
and changes in the doctor-patient relationship. This was helped by the local area in which 
radiologists could examine images and ask for help with visualisation, network or wider IT 
problems with the system. Changes in the doctor-patient relationship were demanding on 
radiologists’ time, and the change of certain rituals, such as visiting patients in wards with 
paper-based images on file, were seen as an inconvenience by the doctors. Nurses felt the 
transition through changes in the way they logged scanning requests, and integration of 
PACS in this process was helped by practice and by slowly gaining trust in the system. 
Integration was helped by the creation of a PACS user community in the hospital, which 
improved inter-disciplinarity by crossing departmental boundaries. Integration was further 
helped by the small hospital size, which required generic skills and flexibility in operations, 
social norms which were a legacy from other changes that occurred in the hospital over 
time. Integration was made more difficult by requirements for technical compatibilities 
with other hospitals in the region, and the separation of where these adjustments were 
required and where the decisions were made.  
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Aspects of PACS processes were defined in the hospital and stabilised after long periods of 
intensive communication, decision-making, and knowledge accumulation by individual 
specialists. Learning was made more difficult by the dependence on external aspects of 
decision-making, continuing changes in regulations, and regulatory mediation of changes in 
products and systems restricting technical search processes and technical choices.  
 
 
7.2 Changes in learning conditions for PACS institutionalisation in a large teaching 
hospital in a city 
This case analyses aspects of the creation of PACS capabilities in a large urban teaching 
hospital. The process I traced with my interviews involved the changes in learning 
conditions that the interviewees recalled from the first beginnings of PACS usage in place 
of paper-based imaging in the hospital, and the later phase which was defined by the 
national programme for PACS implementation (NPfIT). The case shows the importance of 
individual enthusiasm and leadership, informality and unpredictability in the accumulation 
of knowledge, and the difficulties in changing informal internal structures with externally 
created social norms.  
 
 
Intuiting 
Intuiting played an important role in the first learning and integration phase of PACS in the 
hospital, which occurred before the externally-led programme for PACS implementation. 
The origins of the development of PACS within the hospital were traceable to the 
motivation, commitment, and intuitive capacities of one particular medical physicist. He 
was a forerunner in investing his time in the installation, technical compatibility checks and 
trouble-shooting in the hospital. The medical physicist began to lead the development of 
PACS based on his own previous knowledge of IT systems and network development, and 
the support of hospital management to buy-in specific components from outside.  
 
His intuition had been supported by several key aspects of his practices that arose from the 
position and nature of the medical physics service to the hospital and the region. First, 
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medical physics was a central service to the hospital and to regional radiology and nuclear 
medicine based on providing informational support services to the radiology community. 
Thus, it had a relatively high degree of IT and systems technology components integrated 
within its processes already. Second, by providing services to the hospital and the region, 
the medical physicist had knowledge of the social norms of the actors who were assumed to 
be most affected by the transition from the X-ray regime to the PACS regime. This helped 
in intuiting where there might be problems with PACS, for example with regards to the 
technical requirements of image transportation, access, and individual radiologists’ 
preferences. Third, the medical physicist had experience with existing institutionalised 
communication procedures with radiology and nuclear medicine in the hospital, which 
supported quick and frequent testing of intuitive notions complemented by user information 
feedback.   
 
 
Interpreting 
Interpretation processes had different characteristics before formal PACS implementation 
was initiated by the NPfIT program, and after. Before NPfIT, interpreting was helped by 
the individual commitment of the medical physicist to collaboration in PACS 
interpretation, technical support by the medical physics department, use of existing 
knowledge and communication structures, experience with the procedural order involving 
changes in general hospital IT systems, and physical proximity and established 
relationships with the radiology department. Interpretation was also helped by 
communication with the wider medical physics community outside the hospital, and the 
practice of inter-disciplinary knowledge accumulation, which revolved around existing 
social norms within the medical physics community. Interpretation was also helped by 
communication between radiologists and medical physicists, who cooperated in the 
integration of PACS in work processes. 
 
The second phase of PACS learning was initiated by changes in learning structures marked 
by the creation of an entirely new hospital PACS department, a new PACS manager, and 
contracts and timelines negotiated with a private firm. This changed the existing decision-
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making structure and formalised different social norms from the ones that had been 
previously informally created (through feed-forward learning processes), and launched a 
new learning phase for the hospital. In this phase, interpretation processes occurring in the 
PACS department, the medical physics department, and the radiology department were 
central for changing existing procedures. In the PACS department, interpretation was 
helped by the previous knowledge of staff of hospital IT systems (though not in this 
hospital) and the overlap between the knowledge of the regional IT network, IT know-how, 
and the formal requirements of PACS in the hospital. However, this knowledge alone was 
insufficient to overcome the existing structure of the medical physics department as the 
main department underpinning PACS capabilities in the hospital. The PACS department 
lacked knowledge of social groups in the hospital whose processes and structures had been 
affected by PACS previously, and who had already built up systems and operational 
routines through feed-forward processes.  
 
The most important processes of interpretation involved dialogue and communication 
between the new PACS department, and the existing PACS community of medical 
physicists and radiologists in the hospital. This was difficult because it took a long time for 
the two groups to become aware of each other and to understand their respective roles. 
Dialogue between the two groups was difficult to establish because the medical physics and 
radiology community did not at first include the PACS department in its processes, and, on 
the other hand the PACS department made decisions without consulting them. The two 
social groups had different cognitive maps of the processes of integration of PACS in the 
hospital. The PACS department focused more on rules and formal technical requirements 
of the programme, whereas medical physics focused more on what worked within the 
existing hospital processes, and made changes according to those.  
 
 
Integrating 
Integration involves coherent and collective action . The first learning phase underlying 
collective tasks was characterised by continuous interaction between the definition of 
technical system requirements, task learning requirements, and task specification leading to 
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integration. These processes were at first led by the individual medical physicist, and later 
by the medical physics department.  
 
Definition of system technical requirements involved acquiring specific details of existing 
IT and network systems in the hospital, the different imaging devices and size of images 
that needed to be transported via PACS, and defining roles for who could access the 
information, and who could change it. Commitment by medical physicists to acquiring this 
information, testing the possibilities of the systems, making changes to them, supporting 
radiologists in problem-solving, and communicating with other hospital users were 
important for PACS integration within radiology and the wider IT regime in the hospital. 
As a nuclear medicine physician interviewed stated: “nuclear medicine and medical physics 
have always been inter-disciplinary, we have to be, but radiology only now has to be 
(because of PACS, MRI and CT).”  
 
Task learning requirements and task specification were supported by existing social norms 
of intra-hospital and extra-hospital interactions. Internal to the hospital, integration was 
supported by the existing central service function of medical physics and its inter-
departmental and inter-hospital communication, search processes, and service provision. As 
such, medical physics mediation of PACS requirements and possibilities in the hospital 
built upon its existing mediatory function for hospital-wide technical and radiology 
support. PACS integration was also helped by existing norms associated with external 
aspects such as working with private industry (for example, in the maintaining of diagnostic 
devices and obtaining up-to-date software), and with regulatory agencies (for standard-
setting for radiation doses, for example). Moreover, nuclear medicine and medical physics 
experts were few in number compared to radiology, so there were already many user 
networks in place before PACS, and reliance on them for hospital problems and questions 
was common. This kind of networked structure with communication links outside the 
hospital was very useful for PACS implementation in the hospital. This is different from 
the social norms in radiology, which is a much bigger professional community nationally, 
and does not rely as much upon IT-based user networks for problem-solving.  
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In the second learning phase, after NPfIT, decision-making structures and goals changed in 
the hospital. The PACS department was not able at first to establish itself as an 
organisational leader or authority on PACS in the hospital because of the existing learning 
structures that had been built previously. Procedural capabilities for PACS (image analysis 
and sharing by radiologists) had already been created by existing users in the hospital, but 
the programme brought with it different rules and goals for the organisation, which 
disrupted integration processes. A radiologist interviewed stated: “I have never had any 
contact with the PACS department, only medical physics, for PACS questions. I wasn’t 
even aware of their existence until recently. But the PACS department made all the 
decisions, with no communication, with us nor with nuclear medicine. This created many 
problems for us, for example now the PACS system cannot take images produced by 
gamma cameras which we have two of in this hospital. The images are too big (to 
transport) for the (existing PACS) system.” This external definition of technical system 
requirements started off a new process of interaction with learning requirements and task 
specification, but without the supporting relational structures in the previous learning 
phase.   
 
 
Institutionalising and feed-forward and feedback learning  
Similarly to the previously discussed learning processes, factors and conditions supporting 
PACS institutionalisation in this hospital can be categorised into before and after the NPfIT 
programme was implemented in the hospital. The first learning phase, characterised by 
feed-forward learning from the individual to the group and organisational level, began with 
informally motivated and managed individual and group level dialogue, communication, 
experimentation and rule-creation within the existing hospital structures in the medical 
physics department. Conditions for learning such as previous IT know-how, established 
relationships with pre-defined user groups such as nuclear medicine and radiology, 
relationships and norms of working with wider IT user networks, and time resources 
(medical physicists primarily provide a service to other clinicians and technicians in the 
hospital and the region; they do not treat patients, so they repeatedly stated that they had the 
available time to commit to PACS integration) to devote to learning PACS skills, system 
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compatibility requirements, and to solving problems as quickly as they came up, supported 
the development of PACS in the hospital. Over time, the stable and predictable aspects of 
PACS were specified in terms of tasks and procedures, and a relatively informal user 
community emerged in the hospital.  
 
The phase following NPfIT was characterised by conflicts between how rules on aspects of 
PACS were created and managed and the existing PACS routines in the hospital. Important 
changes were the externally defined power granted to the newly formed PACS department, 
which was in conflict with the already established role of medical physicists in the hospital 
who used a more emergent, incremental, inclusive and consultative process for rule-setting. 
This created a condition in which decision-making power on, for example, technical 
specificities on the size of image to be transported and stored in the PACS system, handling 
of patient information, access to the PACS system, search options, saving of past scans, 
rules on who could request a scan, which groups got PACS training, accountability for 
accuracy and changes of patient reports, and degree of confidentiality of patient 
information, were defined without including the main groups who were affected by these 
changes.   
 
 
Section summary 
This case explored aspects of the creation of PACS capabilities in a large urban teaching 
hospital. Intuiting was helped by previous experience with IT systems in the hospital with 
medical physics, and by the medical physicist’s familiarity with other individuals and 
groups in the hospital and communicated via established relationships. Before NPfIT, 
interpretation was aided by localised dialogue and communication in the medical physics 
department, time for trial-and-error experimentation, and social norms of knowledge 
exchange with the wider medical physics community outside the hospital, and the existing 
norm for inter-disciplinarity within this community. After NPfIT, interpretation was held 
back by the new social group of the PACS department, externally determined social norms 
for decision-making, and the difficulty of replacing existing norms in the hospital. 
Integration before NPfIT was supported by the individual commitment of medical 
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physicists for acquiring information, testing, communication with radiologists and nuclear 
medicine staff through informal social processes supported by social norms of interaction 
between the main PACS user groups in the hospital of medical physics, radiology and 
nuclear medicine. Integration was also helped by the long-standing norms of medical 
physics as a central service function for the radiology and nuclear medicine departments in 
the hospital and the region, and supported by social norms and experience of working with 
industry (important for fast-changing products and systems in PACS), wider practice 
communities, regulatory agencies, and the small size of the national medical physics 
community, making communication easier. After NPfIT, integration processes were slowed 
down by the external creation of internal structures and decision-making rules, the 
establishment of the PACS department as a leader, and low levels of communication 
between this department and existing users, and a misunderstanding within the PACS 
department of the incremental nature of the PACS development process in the hospital. 
Overall, stabilisation of PACS was well under way in the hospital before NPfIT, and was 
slowed down by it. Feed-forward learning processes led by medical physics were relatively 
successful because of individual knowledge, communication, and interactions with other 
social groups inside and outside the hospital. The existing processes of capabilities creation 
were delayed by the external programme, which imposed rules in the hospital that were in 
conflict with existing learning structures and processes.  
 
 
7.3 Chapter summary  
In section 7.1 the case study explored the accumulation of knowledge and the creation of 
organisational routines as part of a managed process of hospital learning and change. 
Intuiting at the level of the manager was helped by previous experience in PACS learning 
in another hospital, in particular on technical aspects and on pre-empting personal 
resistance to changes in the behaviour of radiologists. Insights were shared by a relatively 
neutral social group, that of nurses, who were sympathetic to the change requirements and 
knowledgeable about the operational needs of radiologists, and who could act as boundary-
spanners between the social groups. The manager also relied upon his intuition when 
making internal decisions that were likely to be affected by changes in products and 
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systems by private industry and by regulatory authorities. Individual intuition was also 
important for radiologists, who relied upon their PACS experience in other hospitals, and 
on skills acquired from the analogue regime (in particular for image interpretation through 
pattern recognition). Interpreting was aided by constructing a physical space for knowledge 
exchange (a designated room with high-resolution monitor screens) which allowed for 
interaction between individual PACS users, and for communication, trouble-shooting, and 
the creation of an understanding of PACS and its meaning to different user groups in the 
hospital. Choice restrictions (for example, no more X-ray film, just digital visualisation) 
helped in directing efforts for interpretation by creating problems, and at the same time 
opportunities for solving them. Integration was helped by communication of the meaning of 
PACS for different user groups in the hospital, the creation of a physical learning space, 
and the small hospital size and the requirement for individual flexibility in roles. Overall, 
technology stabilisation was made more difficult by the dependence on external aspects of 
decision-making, continuing changes in regulations, and regulatory mediation of changes in 
products and systems, restricting search processes and flexibility in technical choices. 
 
Section 7.2 focused on informal aspects of the creation of PACS capabilities in a hospital, 
and the organisational changes in learning conditions which occurred following the 
implementation of a national programme for PACS implementation (NPfIT). PACS 
routinisation was initiated by a medical physicist and the medical physics department, and 
specifically their commitment to PACS installation, to the solution of technical problems, 
and to the collection of information for the definition and realisation of tasks and 
procedures. These processes were supported by existing social norms for facilitating inter-
disciplinary communication, and knowledge exchange with hospital user groups, and the 
wider PACS user community outside the hospital. Following NPfIT, learning processes 
were obstructed by changes in decision-making structures and their conflict with existing 
norms associated with PACS in the hospital.  
 
The table below summarises the main findings of the chapter.  
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Table 8: Summary of changes in learning conditions in PACS clinical practices examined 
PACS clinical practice Organisational learning 
processes 
Knowledge factors Social factors Other factors 
PACS Town     
Brief description of case: This 
case describes aspects of PACS 
routinisation in a large urban 
teaching hospital. It shows how 
integration processes led by 
rules and institutions external to 
the hospital were mediated via 
internal management through 
choice restrictions and support 
for tacit learning and inter-
disciplinary communication 
structures.  
Intuiting 
 
Manager: Previous skills 
acquired through tacit 
experience for PACS 
systems integration in 
another hospital by the 
manager; intuition for pre-
empting resistance to 
change by social groups; 
previous experience for 
understanding and pre-
empting external changes 
in regulation and industry. 
Individual radiologists: 
experience with analogue 
pattern recognition. 
 
Manager: testing of 
insights with nursing 
group, building familiarity 
with group less threatened 
by change; relationships 
with informal regulatory 
bodies; relationships with 
industry. 
 
 Interpreting Physical proximity and 
designated hospital space 
for tacit knowledge 
exchange and 
communication.  
Horizontal social structures 
in physical problem-
solving space; technical 
choice restrictions; 
externally directed changes 
in rules of operation; 
creation of a community of 
practice supported by 
changes in norms of social 
group interaction; different 
interpretations of PACS by 
each user group. 
 
 
 Integrating Radiologists: accumulation 
of skills through trial-and-
error learning and 
interactions with other 
hospital users; repeated 
practice, changing 
Creation of a structure (a 
physical space) for 
communication supporting 
integration; nurses 
emerging as an important 
social group, acting as 
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behaviour and keeping up 
to date with changing 
technical requirements 
through interaction with 
other users; divergence of 
decision structures and 
internal demands for 
learning of processes 
underpinning changes in 
routines; small size of 
hospital and norms give 
rise to advantages such as 
flexibility of staff in 
performing diverse tasks.  
boundary spanners between 
previously disconnected 
groups in the hospital; 
nurses’ familiarity with 
different groups, patients 
and organisational 
processes; integration 
supported by emergence of 
hospital PACS community 
of practice; changes 
delayed by legacy of X-ray 
regime such as rigid 
professional boundaries 
obstructing development of 
systemic features of 
technology.  
 
 Institutionalising Externally defined goals 
and rules, and differences 
between them and internal 
capabilities; changes in 
conditions for knowledge 
exchange. 
 
Supports for the creation of 
a hospital PACS 
community of practice; 
inclusion in internal rule-
making; changes in internal 
decision-making structures. 
 
 Feed-forward and feedback 
between the learning 
processes 
Feed-forward: radiologists 
and nurses learning through 
practice; group learning 
supported by long-standing 
familiarity between staff, 
especially with nurses.  
 
Feedback: management-
level supports for 
knowledge exchange and 
problem-solving; 
management mediation of 
external regulatory changes 
affecting clinical practices 
and rule-setting.  
 
 Feedback: National 
programme for PACS 
implementation; changes in 
regulation of clinical 
practices; changes in 
technical requirements 
mediated by firms, 
regulatory authorities, and 
other hospitals.  
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PACS City Organisational learning 
processes 
Knowledge factors Social factors Other factors 
Brief description of case: This 
case explores PACS learning 
phases before and after NPfIT in 
a large teaching hospital in a 
city.  
Intuiting 
 
IT systems and operational 
service skills; commitment 
to problem-solving.  
Individual agency and 
motivation; structure 
(position of medical 
physics within hospital and 
regional healthcare 
system); understanding of 
social norms of radiology 
and nuclear medicine users. 
 
 Interpreting Phase before NPfIT: 
Individual commitment to 
collaboration and inter-
disciplinarity in defining 
rules and procedures; 
technical support of 
medical physics 
department; reliance upon 
existing communication 
and decision-making 
structures within and 
outside the hospital.  
 
Phase after NPfIT: change 
in and external imposition 
of a new decision-making 
structure; conflict with 
existing social norms and 
procedures. PACS 
department supported by 
externally instituted 
decision-making power; 
knowledge of regional IT 
network structures and 
NPfIT program 
requirements.  
 
Phase before NPfIT: 
existing norms and 
structures for dialogue and 
communication between 
user groups. 
 
Phase after NPfIT: change 
in organisational decision-
making hierarchy in 
conflict with existing 
structure and obstruction of 
inter-group interpretation 
processes by exclusion of 
existing user groups from 
decision-making process; 
and new external meaning 
of hospital PACS 
performance and distance 
between programme goals 
and actual hospital 
achievements.  
 
 
 Integrating Phase before NPfIT: 
Medical physics: 
commitment to leading the 
Phase before NPfIT: 
Supported by existing 
social norms of medical 
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interaction process between 
definition of system 
technical requirements, 
task learning requirements, 
and task specification; 
testing; supporting 
radiologists in problem-
solving; leading and 
enabling knowledge 
exchange with other 
hospital user groups.  
 
Phase after NPfIT: change 
in decision-making 
structure with externally 
defined actors, rules and 
goals; disruption of 
existing learning processes 
and structures.  
 
physics for inter-
departmental mediation 
and inter-disciplinarity, 
hospital-wide search 
processes, and external 
interactions with firms and 
regulatory authorities. 
 
Phase after NPfIT: 
disruption of learning 
processes through changes 
in structure and lack of 
internal relational structure 
and support.  
 Institutionalising and Feed-
forward learning processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction between 
individual, group learning 
and institutionalising: 
Individual intuition, 
motivation and 
commitment to problem-
solving, dialogue, and 
testing. Interaction with 
and support from medical 
physics and gradual 
emergence of their role as 
main actors enabling 
technical change elements 
to PACS regime; supported 
by existing IT capabilities, 
existing inter-departmental 
relationships. Gradual 
stabilisation and definition 
of individual and group 
tasks and procedures 
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Institutionalising and 
feedback learning 
processes 
through a joint 
communication process.  
 
 
Conflicts with existing 
internal learning structures 
and externally defined 
decision-making structure 
and norms; separation of 
control (goals and rules) 
from social groups 
involved in carrying out 
PACS routines; disruption 
of learning because of 
lacking relational structure 
of PACS department in 
hospital; gradual 
acceptance  of users of 
changes in rule-making 
procedures, with continued 
reliance on medical physics 
department for problem-
solving.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explore innovation in hospitals. Using a framework for 
technological learning in organisational practices, this thesis set out to uncover processes of 
innovation in CT, MRI and PACS. Based on six empirical case studies in UK hospitals, this 
research found that learning in clinical practice is diverse, incremental, and shaped by 
complex processes of multi-level mediation and technological problem-solving in 
operational routines.  
 
Section 8.1 summarises the main findings and presents the key features of medical 
innovation discovered in the individual case studies on clinical practice in CT, MRI and 
PACS. In section 8.2 the theoretical implications of the research are presented, making 
explicit the reinforcement and contradiction to existing theory on organisational learning 
and technological change based on the research results. It also provides a critical analysis of 
the study’s limitations, and makes some suggestions for future research. Section 8.3 makes 
policy inferences based on the research evidence gathered in this study and, where 
appropriate, suggests some changes to existing health technology policy. Section 8.4 
presents the final conclusions.  
 
 
8.1 Summary  
This thesis explored innovation in clinical practice in UK hospitals. Innovation in hospitals 
is considered an important topic for policy. Current policy approaches to healthcare 
innovation were reviewed in Chapter 1, which revealed reliance upon scientific evidence of 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness to inform policy, and formulation and implementation 
practices built on a rather linear, narrow and atomistic view of medical innovation.  
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This was confirmed by a review of some of the main scholarly literature on change in 
healthcare practices in Chapter 2, which found conceptualisations of hospitals as adopters 
of external ideas, products and services. The main approaches to organisational learning 
were then reviewed, and a framework for studying learning processes, learning levels, and 
learning outcomes in hospitals was presented. While organisational learning approaches 
offer extremely valuable insights into learning in clinical practices, their relationships with 
aspects of technological evolution were understudied. This chapter then argued that deeper 
understanding of technological processes underpinning learning in hospitals may help us 
understand how hospitals innovate and why some innovate more readily than others. 
Following on from the deduction of the rationale for studying learning in hospitals and its 
relationships with technological change, this chapter presented the theoretical framework 
and research questions guiding the study.  
 
Research design choices were discussed in chapter 3, which argued for the choice of an 
exploratory case study design for the collection and analysis of novel empirical data. The 
justification for the selection of clinical practice as the unit of analysis, and CT, MRI and 
PACS technology areas was presented. The chapter discussed the use of interviews, 
observations and archival searches for data collection, the reasons for choosing the specific 
hospital sites, as well as the analytic techniques used for interpreting the data. The 
shortcomings of the methods, and the ways in which I tried to ameliorate their effects on 
the study, were also described.  
 
Chapter 4 argued that an investigation of hospital innovation requires an understanding of 
details of the scientific discovery and historical development of the specific technology 
areas. The chapter reviewed literature demonstrating that diagnostic imaging evolved 
through complex interactions between the science system, technology and the healthcare 
sector of which they were part. This chapter described important sectoral aspects such as 
the distribution, procurement and regulation of these technologies in the UK NHS, where 
the empirical study was carried out.  
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The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, which defined the organisational 
learning concepts at the individual, group and organisational levels (intuiting, interpreting, 
integrating and institutionalising) and their interactions with evolutionary aspects of 
technology (such as regimes, technological systems, cumulativeness, and complexity) used 
to explore the findings presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The analyses have shown that 
clinical practice innovation is characterised by incremental, inter-disciplinary, emergent 
and contextualised features of technological learning in operational routines. These points 
are expanded upon in the sections that follow.  
 
 
8.1.1 Learning in CT clinical practices  
Chapter 5 explored innovation in CT practices in two cases of hospital learning. In the first 
case it was found that learning conditions were altered by changes in the complexity of 
pelvic cancer, extra-hospital changes in values and expectations (mediated by changes in 
patient preferences and changes in medical guidance). It was also found that transformation 
in CT artefact complexity, an increase in ambiguity in the interpretation of diagnostic data, 
and alteration in artefact ‘systemness’ properties all influenced interpretive requirements in 
different and previously disconnected parts of the hospital.  
 
Integration of CT diagnosis activities and their operational routinisation in the hospital were 
transformed by change in certain technical aspects and the functional role of CT 
information over time, and changes in medical guidance and their reinforcement of existing 
individual values in the hospital. The increase in CT-based diagnostic information affected 
hospital skills requirements and their accumulation by influencing individual searches for 
more information (with limited changes in learning conditions) and by increasing the 
pressure on clinicians for diagnostic accuracy.  
 
An important feature of the CT regime was an increase in the variety of decisions and 
decision-points (for example, technical aspects, diagnostic decisions, decisions on 
information access, and of inclusion). Emergent and systemic aspects of CT were reflected 
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in the far reach of individual decisions on individual tasks, procedures, and communities in 
other parts of the hospital.  
 
Incremental steps towards transformation in the CT regime such as ‘multi-disciplinary team 
meetings’ occurred in parallel with a retention of the division of labour under the X-ray 
regime (for example, divisions between radiologists and oncologists in accessing of 
diagnostic information), producing a ‘layering’ of technological systems (Hughes, 1989).    
 
CT diagnostic information had no obvious cognitive or social boundaries, so it was difficult 
to locate relevant know-how. Certain communication structures in the hospital became 
more collaborative, flexible and inclusive of clinicians and technicians with diverse skills. 
Despite these changes, some structural rigidity remained (such as decision-making rules, 
and rules on access to the amount of diagnostic information available to non-radiologists).  
 
The second part of this routine involved the development of CT capabilities in the oncology 
department of the hospital. It was found that the learning environment of the oncology 
department was transformed by the acquisition of the CT device, supported by learning 
processes and the gradual formation of a community of practice. Integration of CT 
technology aspects were supported by addition of individual with diverse skills and 
resources to the department (for example, IT skills, radiation therapists, and medical 
physicists). Interpretation was slowed down by hospital social norms of departmental 
divisions (hindering communication and tacit knowledge exchange) between the oncology 
and the radiology department, and divisions between the oncology department and the CT 
devices firm.  
 
Integration of CT into oncology practices was hindered by the continuing separation of 
decision-making from the locus of learning, and insufficient time being made available for 
clinicians to learn new tasks. Integration was helped by the replacement of patients by 
‘phantom’ planning software and hardware, which removed the need for patients to lie for 
long periods of time while their cancer treatment was being planned.   
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Within the same context of capability-building in the oncology department, CT 
institutionalisation was helped by skills accumulation and collective learning over time at 
the departmental level, and hindered by elements of structure, such as norms reinforcing 
departmental divisions which supported the ‘old’ X-ray regime. Routinisation benefited 
from physical flexibility provided by the systems technology, such as making the same type 
of diagnostic information available at different hospital sites. Routinisation was supported 
by the gradual creation of a community of practice in the oncology department, a common 
goal in the department, and a low level of existing relational norms within the department, 
which made it easier to achieve feed-forward learning processes underpinning the creation 
of the new routine.  
 
The second case revealed that capabilities creation in a CT department in a small town 
hospital depended upon tacit knowledge accumulation supported by social norms of 
mentoring and imitation. Interpretation was supported by staff in ‘higher grades’ mentoring 
staff in ‘lower grades’ to perform task elements of the CT regime. This social norm had the 
effect of empowering staff, and creating more incentives to practice, acquire skills, and 
learn. 
 
An important aspect of CT capabilities was found to be the ability to integrate various tasks 
and procedures in a short span of time. Integration was supported by continuous repetition 
of tacit elements of tasks and procedures, observation of other members in the department, 
continuous, predictable patterns of communication, and the uninterrupted availability of 
core radiography, nursing and technical staff in the department, which helped to build trust, 
familiarity and behavioural certainty.  
 
Institutionalisation processes were helped by the above-mentioned factors, as well as by 
other stable elements of the routine such as interactions with the contracted CT 
manufacturing firm, the long-standing experiences of the CT manager with the exact same 
CT device, the uncertain availability of radiology staff (which created the need to routinise 
without them), recognition of learning through staff promotions, and the small hospital size 
requiring flexibility in roles to meet departmental performance goals.  
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Part of the departmental capability in CT scanning was reflected in the codification of its 
practices in the form of a CT scanning protocol. In addition to the above-mentioned factors 
supporting learning, codification was influenced by factors such as the merger of the 
hospital with another hospital, creating conditions for the transfer of CT practices, and the 
overall increase in demand for CT scans which affected both hospitals (both from patients 
and from changes in radiologists’ preferences for CT scans).  
 
Institutionalisation via feed-back learning processes was attempted with the transfer of the 
protocol to the second hospital site. It was argued that institutionalisation processes were 
hindered by contextual differences between the two hospital sites such as how they had 
scans booked, which staff were available, and the differences in social norms for mentoring 
staff in lower staff grades, differences in level of experience with CT devices, differences in 
CT devices, differences in individual radiologists’ preferences for CT, and limited choices 
and decision-making powers in the receiving department to ameliorate the effects of these 
differences on changes in the CT regime.  
 
 
8.1.2 Hospital innovation in MRI  
Chapter 6 analysed two cases of change in learning conditions underpinning MRI 
routinisation. In the first case it was found that the hospital learning environment was 
transformed by knowledge resources, commitment, and strategic reorientation. Specialised 
individual experience and skills in MRI research and operations were a basis for individual 
intuition. Characteristics of the hospital context, such as its recent change to a teaching 
hospital, changed learning conditions by expanding the search and problem space in the 
hospital.    
 
Individual and group interpretation of MRI in the hospital was supported by individual 
commitment to dialogue and incremental step-wise problem-solving, and the open and 
flexible cognitive map of the neurologist scientist leading inter-departmental 
communication in the protocol formulation process. Interpreting was helped by a clear and 
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specialised goal, awareness of its translational complexity, and the subsequent inclusion of 
diversely skilled individuals to meet the knowledge, process, and organisational 
requirements of routinisation in the phases of individual and group learning.  
 
Conditions for technology interpretation and integration were changed by the creation of 
hospital norms in support of teaching, research, the expansion of neurological diagnostic 
imaging services, and the distribution of power and resources in favour of scientific 
experimentation and discovery in parallel with the provision of more diversified patient 
services. Integrating was supported by the strategic change intensifying the role of the 
hospitals neurological services at the regional level, both increasing demand and changing 
the patient population (from chronic to acute cases), and by the accumulation of knowledge 
through repeated practice.  
 
Familiarity between individuals and detailed knowledge of how they performed their 
individual tasks helped in the execution of the new operational routine in MRI in the 
hospital, because of the high importance of individual clinicians’ capabilities within 
organisational procedures. Routinisation was helped by the historically important central 
function of diagnostic imaging within neurology, and the networked way of carrying out 
neurological services, structures that overlapped to a certain degree with the 
institutionalised MRI research practices.  
 
The second case explored aspects of MRI innovation involving the formulation of a set of 
guidelines at the regional level for its implementation in the local hospitals. Essential for 
the learning process was a definition of the diversity of MRI devices, skills and procedures 
in the local hospital population. This informed the codification process by supplying 
information on the behavioural modifications that were possible in the hospitals.  
 
Intuiting was, as in the previous case, supported by experience in the specialised diagnostic 
area. Scientific evidence and insights into MRI capacities for breast imaging helped 
influence experienced clinicians’ ideas for codification. Interpretation processes were based 
on past knowledge accumulation in MRI for breast diagnosis, as well as on skills acquired 
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through experimentation with different MRI devices in the distant past when connections 
between the advantages of MRI over other imaging techniques were less explicit. 
Interpretation was also helped by individual experiences in the translation of scientific 
evidence to clinical practice.  
 
Interpretation and integration processes were central requirements for institutionalisation, 
and these relied upon individual capabilities, and an understanding of the rapid technical 
change in MRI devices, which increased heterogeneity between local hospitals. Fast-paced 
external changes to the devices put pressure on language and learning capacities within 
local hospitals to keep up with changing knowledge demands created by external changes 
in MRI devices.   
 
Learning depended upon knowledge exchange and task coordination between different 
social groups with divergent goals, resources, and power. A crucial social group were 
patients, who increased pressure on clinicians’ performance in diagnosis and changed their 
preferences towards non-invasive diagnostic techniques such as MRI.  
 
Overall, regional-level institutionalisation was supported by knowledge of how and why 
individual devices in hospitals were different, and knowledge of the MRI capabilities of 
local hospitals, the increase in resources that were brought into the region with the creation 
of a local medical school and teaching hospital, the increase in scientific evidence on the 
medical value of MRI for breast cancer diagnosis over existing diagnostic techniques, a 
supportive attitude at the individual clinician level of medical guidance, the creation of a 
regional governing body for the improvement of regional cancer services, and an 
orientation of national-level priorities towards cancer diagnosis and treatment channelling 
resources for this area to the region.  
 
 
8.1.3 PACS innovation  
Chapter 7 described aspects of PACS institutionalisation in a city and in a town hospital. 
The first case found that PACS learning was supported by incremental step-by-step 
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behavioural restrictions and changes in the conditions for knowledge exchange. 
Modifications underlying the transition to a digital from an analogue diagnostic regime 
were helped by unlearning features such as interactions between diverse specialists, and 
rule changes informed by external regulatory requirements and technical support of the 
local PACS firm.   
 
Managerial skills acquired through tacit experience in PACS systems integration in a 
previous hospital helped learning through intuiting. Specifically, awareness of possible 
resistance to externally led change by internal social groups, and insights into pre-empting 
external changes in regulation and industry, reduced uncertainty in the innovation process. 
 
Experience with analogue pattern recognition aided individual radiologists in intuiting what 
was required for learning tasks that formed part of the PACS regime. Testing of insights 
into solutions to problems benefited from the manager’s and radiologists’ familiarity with 
boundary-spanning individuals, such as nurses, a comparably stationary and neutral social 
group in the hospital who historically had an important role in inter-departmental functions 
and communications.  
 
Changes in conditions for tacit knowledge exchange, such as a designated physical space 
for high-resolution PACS equipment, fostered inter-disciplinary communication between 
PACS users in the hospital, to address problems such as technical choice restrictions (from 
film to digital scans), changes in the ‘ritual’ of visiting patients with a stack of film, and 
operational aspects such as logging scans. Such processes contributed to the collective 
interpretation of PACS, and to an awareness of different perceptions of the technology by 
the various social groups, as well as creating a foundation for the formation of a community 
of practice. 
 
Integration of rules and tasks in the radiology group was supported by the accumulation of 
skills through trial-and-error learning, interactions with other users in and outside the 
hospital, and by repetition. Interaction with users outside the hospital helped in keeping 
practices up to date with rapidly changing software and hardware elements (which, for 
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example, changed the types of devices in other hospitals the clinicians visited) influenced 
by private industry. Integration was supported by an understanding of diversity in hospital 
goals, and by changes in decision-making structures influencing operational routines. Staff 
flexibility in performing diverse tasks, partly because of the shortage of resources such as 
specialists due to the small hospital size, helped in the integration of systems components 
of PACS because it was impossible to know where in the hospital such skills might be 
needed and when.  
 
The creation of operational routines (for obtaining scans, logging scans, delivering 
diagnoses, and monitoring and interacting with patients) characterised the change towards a 
PACS regime in the hospital. These aspects of the regime change were supported by 
‘feedback’ learning processes such as codified knowledge provided by the national NPfIT 
programme, and managerial mediation of it to the wider user community in the hospital 
through the creation of a hospital-wide PACS community of practice, and their inclusion in 
internal rule-making, focusing efforts towards both internal learning processes and their 
connectedness to external organisations and systems.  
 
The second case, that of PACS implementation in a city hospital, showed that individual 
and group-led changes to an internal regime can be jeopardised by social power structures, 
technical specifications, rules and procedures defined by external organisations addressing 
the same or similar conditions and objectives. In the first phase of hospital learning (before 
the national programme), PACS innovation was led by the medical physics group in the 
hospital. Intuiting was helped by knowledge of hospital IT systems, hospital service skills 
derived from the centralised service function of medical physics within the hospital, which 
involved both an understanding of procedures and social norms and perceptions of the main 
hospital PACS users (radiology and nuclear medicine). Essential to regime change were 
aspects of social agency, specifically individual commitment to problem-solving and 
motivation, and actions that were enacted from there on.  
 
The creation of a PACS regime in the hospital context required periods of individual and 
collective interpretation. Before NPfIT, interpreting was supported by individual 
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commitment to collaboration and inter-disciplinarity in defining elements of the routine 
(rules, tasks and procedures), the norms and structures of the medical physics department 
such as their knowledge of existing communication and decision-making structures within 
and outside the hospital that overlapped with knowledge and social requirements of PACS 
technology.  
 
Individual commitment to inter-departmental communication, hospital-wide search 
processes, collaborative and incremental definition of rules (for example for access and 
image transportation) benefitted the building of socio-technical aspects of the PACS system 
in the hospital. Learning was supported by task execution, testing, supporting radiologists 
in solving network and access problems, and mediating between previously disconnected 
groups. External imposition of rules (for example through the NPfIT programme) resulted 
in some disruption of these emergent and painstakingly accumulated learning structures 
(for example, the directed uni-lateral nature of some of the programme’s decisions were in 
conflict the comparably open structures for dialogue and communication between PACS 
user groups in the hospital).  
 
In parallel, the staff in the new PACS department helped in the hospital’s integration within 
the regional PACS systems through their knowledge of regional IT network structures and 
NPfIT programme requirements, and external interactions with the contracted firm and with 
the primary regulatory authority, which over time emerged as important rule-making 
aspects of the hospital PACS regime. 
 
In summary, routinisation of PACS was supported by emergent feed-forward processes and 
obstructed by decisions made separate from the practice locus of learning, systems usage 
and development. Feed-forward processes were reliant upon individual intuition, 
motivation, and commitment to problem-solving, inter-disciplinary dialogue and testing, 
and incremental stabilisation of technology through a joint communication framed by 
existing relational structures for the definition of tasks, rules and procedures, which were 
difficult to maintain under the externally-led PACS regime.  
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8.2 Theoretical implications  
Hospital innovation in diagnostic imaging technologies is very important for the 
improvement and delivery of healthcare services, and many investments have been made to 
support it. However, hospitals differ in their innovation processes, and important 
explanations have been provided by scholars of diffusion, communication, and evidence-
based medicine, as well as scholars on organisational behaviour and management.  
 
This thesis has focused on organisational learning processes shaped by evolutionary 
accumulation of technological knowledge. This thesis found that important aspects of 
learning and innovation processes in hospitals are underpinned by technical change and 
group-level technological regimes, such as communities of practice.  
 
The results in this thesis support the view that technological accumulation is an important 
underlying feature of innovation in hospitals. Organisational learning processes were found 
to be interdependent with aspects of technical change such as cumulativeness, emergence, 
systemness, and unpredictability, such as has been suggested by evolutionary approaches to 
technological change (Rosenberg 1982; Hughes 1989).  
 
This thesis used an organisational learning framework to explore technical change in 
hospital organisations. The findings suggest that technological learning processes occur 
simultaneously at the individual, group and organisational levels, and that the barriers, 
supports and outcomes are variegated and difficult to predict. 
 
Innovation in hospitals is a dynamic process involving changes in regimes such as building 
novel interpretations of individual and departmental roles and functions. This finding 
confirms Barley’s (1986) work on the interdependent relationship between technology and 
organisational structure. This thesis has also revealed that an important aspect of regime 
change is the proximity between decision-making and the locus of learning, and that larger 
distances between them (whether cognitive or physical) make learning more difficult.   
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The empirical chapters showed that hospitals cannot innovate on the basis of evidence of 
efficacy or on the basis of medical guidance alone. Important for operational routinisation 
are regime aspects such as behavioural restrictions for decision-making and rules for inter-
disciplinarity in problem-solving.  
 
This thesis suggests that regulation (based on codified knowledge) is insufficient in 
harmonising operations across hospitals because of the partial tacitness of operational 
routines (Zollo and Winter 1999). Contextual features such as departmental management of 
scanning requests, skills availability, group learning norms, and access to knowledge 
sources are difficult to shape and control, as are their interactions with externally defined 
changes in organisational goals.  
 
Problems in changing technological regimes (for example, from X-rays to IT-based 
diagnostic imaging such as CT, MRI and PACS) demanded out-of-routine knowledge and 
relational patterns which were localized and context specific, confirming Gibbons et al.’s 
(1994) conceptual advances regarding ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production. Hospitals with 
resources (individuals, time) and social norms supporting communication and learning 
processes across departmental, and other cognitive and social boundaries were better at 
solving problems posed by new technologies than those hospitals that had few such 
resources or norms.  
 
Learning requirements (such as understanding, defining and making choices with 
unpredictable outcomes, transforming work practices and ways of relating to other clinical 
groups and patients, and building novel and unexpected individual specialisations within 
the same learning infrastructures) associated with complex systems devices are group, 
organisation, and time-specific, and they take a long time to accumulate and to be applied. 
It was found that medical devices such as CT or MRI scanners are not static stand-alone 
products, but rather systems technologies which have idiosyncratic, emergent and systemic 
developmental patterns within hospital contexts that may create conflicts with structural 
legacies of older regimes. This finding supports the earlier work of Hobday (1998).  
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Hospital innovation is strongly guided by external and internal social values of technology 
which are also dynamic. The emergence of positive public attitudes to non-invasive 
diagnostic procedures, the motivation of clinicians to provide the best service to patients, 
and the increasing threat of being sued for making a diagnostic mistake, spurred on 
individual and group learning efforts in the technology areas. The evolution of social values 
and their interrelationships with advancements in imaging echo Hughes (2004) work on the 
relationship between technology and culture.   
 
Learning in hospitals is an uncertain and complex process (for example in which social 
groups will be affected in diagnostic procedures, and the extent and degree of ambiguity 
that will be introduced with more diagnostic data). Technological uncertainty in hospital 
contexts is reduced by processes of agent involvement in decision-making and codification, 
and that this involvement needs to continue throughout the entire learning process. These 
findings confirm Oudshoorn and Pinch’s (2005) research on the importance of user 
involvement in innovation.  
 
Innovation in clinical practice is supported by the creation of communities of practice 
(Wenger 2000). Communities of practice form around technological problems (Rosenberg 
1982) for which solutions, and the processes to arrive at them, are partially or wholly 
unknown. The same problems may occur in different parts of the hospital and this may also 
be unknown to all parties.  
 
Hospitals, like firms, have organisational boundaries which are open to external knowledge 
sources. Learning processes do not only arise from and interact with other learning 
processes within the organisation, but that they co-evolve with technological changes that 
occur outside the organisation, confirming Dosi’s (1982) contributions on technological 
paradigms. 
 
For the medical devices studied, interactions with firms are important for medical 
innovation. CT and MRI devices in particular were found to embody diverse technology 
elements such as electromechanical knowledge, engineering knowledge, and IT and 
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software knowledge, and ‘hidden’ knowledge on their bundling within the device. 
Interactions with firms supported understanding of such intrinsic artefactual complexities, 
confirming Pavitt’s (2004) view of innovation. In turn, firms benefited from these 
interactions by obtaining knowledge on aspects of the device as they interacted with the 
hospital innovation environment.  
 
Changes in environmental complexity, such as changes in diseases, patient populations, and 
in societal expectations of healthcare services, influence hospital innovation. Modes of 
mediation of external technology aspects are highly variegated and structured, perhaps for 
hospitals more so than for other organisations (for example, via guidance, regulatory 
authorities, national and local healthcare strategies, research organisations, and patient 
groups). As a result, hospitals seem to have less power and flexibility within large technical 
systems (LTS) than firms do.  
 
Increase in knowledge in hospitals is incremental and it is supported by step-wise 
restrictions of technical choices which are managed and proximate to the locus of learning. 
Knowledge growth is supported by individual commitment to discovery, problem-solving 
and the expansion of search and problem spaces via the inflow of technology ‘elements’  as 
found in Bell and Pavitt’s (1993; 1995) studies of technological capabilities.  
 
An aspect of the evolution of systems technologies in organisations is that they increase the 
complexity of organisational procedures before they simplify them. Complex products such 
as CT and MRI place different knowledge and structural demands on hospitals which take a 
very long time to discover and learn, connect previously disconnected parts of the hospital, 
and change existing connections. This confirms Hobday’s (1998) theory of complex 
products and systems and their contextualised, unpredictable and incremental evolution in 
organisations.   
 
Hospital technological capabilities are sometimes embodied in single individuals. 
Organisational-level learning is in such cases highly dependent upon individual experience, 
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skills, availability, motivation, and individual persistence in technological knowledge 
accumulation.  
 
Hospital routines are highly tacit, and regime changes benefit from mentoring and imitation 
and the accumulation of tacit skills. It was also found that tacit knowledge accumulation 
across the organisational hierarchy ameliorates negative consequences of the sporadic 
availability of resources such as individual capabilities. For example, highly skilled 
clinicians move around hospitals on a daily or weekly basis, and the difficulty in predicting 
their accessibility was lessened by the accumulation of know-how for less mobile staff.  
 
The empirical results in this thesis show that hospital learning is cumulative and that it can 
take a very long time to be translated into services for patients. As noted by Bell and Pavitt 
(1993), knowledge accumulation and production involve different conditions and 
processes. Growth in hospital services can occur with little learning (for example, the 
increase in CT scans), but innovation cannot (for example, improvements in the accuracy of 
diagnosis require comparably more learning).  
 
The findings in this thesis can be generalised to the UK national healthcare sector, as well 
as to other healthcare sectors internationally with similar approaches to the governance of 
technological change (for example, publicly financed healthcare sectors in other European 
countries). The findings may also be generalisable to privately financed healthcare systems, 
which have high degrees of regulation. 
 
Other aspects which are generalisable are the close relationship between organisational 
learning and changes in conditions for the accumulation of technological knowledge, and 
the development of systems technologies, which is also important for private sector firms. 
In such cases innovation in systems technologies, such as changes in specialisation, may 
pose similar structural challenges in meeting changing knowledge requirements. 
 
The findings would appear to be less generalisable to sectors where the creation of new 
organisational forms and modes of interaction are less institutionalised and more easily 
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possible, such as many private sectors including the manufacturing sector. In such sectors, 
processes may be more freely outsourced, and learning and production strategies more 
quickly transformed. Moreover, in such a sector the creation of systems and changing of 
processes may not be as constrained by regulation and a multitude of decision-points or risk 
to individual patients. In such cases, generalising the results of this thesis to these sectors 
may be more risky. 
 
The aim of the thesis was to provide a sufficiently comprehensive exploration of learning in 
clinical practice in CT, MRI and PACS and make accurate and plausible analytic 
generalisations. Although the research met the overall project aims, it has important 
limitations. Shortcomings of the thesis are due to its scope, the complexity of the 
phenomenon of learning and the data available for analysis. A further set of limitations are 
the potential of biases, such as researcher bias and current events bias. 
 
My preconceptions about the phenomena of learning and technical change in clinical 
practice changed throughout the course of the study. During the exploration of processes 
and sub-processes of learning in hospitals it quickly became clear that these were much 
more complex and detailed than I had initially assumed. The theoretical framework 
provided perspective but in reality the boundaries of individual practices and processes are 
undefined. This was somewhat improved upon by my carefully designed theoretically 
informed interview schedule to keep the focus on the important details and maintain 
consistency in the findings.  
 
Learning is very difficult to detect and measure and the interpretation of what counts as 
learning, how much detail is required to capture and explain it, and what information to 
omit, is influenced by the researcher. In acknowledgement of this I kept the analysis as 
close to the details of the case as possible (idiographic approach).  
 
Clinicians in the NHS organisations I visited were difficult to contact and interview. I took 
steps to collect high quality data using face-to-face interviews with the main people 
involved in the individual practices and tasks, as well hospital and Trust managers, and 
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regional decision-makers to collect data on the ‘big picture’. I also attended some official 
meetings (multi-disciplinary meetings providing first-hand information in another practice 
context) in the search for multiple sources of information for triangulation purposes.  
 
The effect of the researcher on the interview is not easily controlled. I tried to minimise any 
effect by asking neutral questions, by using an interview guide, and by asking interviewees 
to speak from individual experience to minimize researcher effects. During the analysis I 
tried to reduce researcher bias by keeping the analysis as close to the empirical data as 
possible. Overall the use of a case study, qualitative data and producing contextualised 
theory was appropriate for this exploratory research. The results of the study achieved its 
aim of providing a contextualised analysis of learning in clinical practice in specific 
technology areas.  
 
Future research could go more deeply into the examination of conceptual relationships 
which emerged as particularly important during the course of the exploratory study. For 
example, a closer look at the co-evolution of specific social components of technological 
systems such as practice traditions (values, common problem themes, and testing 
procedures) (Constant 1989) and operational routines in clinical settings. A further line of 
inquiry is to pose the same or similar research questions in another empirical context (for 
example, the same sector in a different country) and through comparative analyses explore 
international differences in sectoral ‘technological style’ (Hughes 1983).  
 
 
8.3. Policy implications  
Several policy inferences can be drawn from the findings of this thesis. Current health 
technology policy in the UK NHS does not adequately acknowledge the importance of 
technological learning for innovation as examined in the case studies. Health economists 
advocate the use of cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness indicators of hospital 
performance, and making the healthcare sector more like a market in order to improve 
medical innovation. Science-based healthcare regulation maintains the view that scientific 
evidence of efficacy is an objective and suitable way to transform healthcare practices and 
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ensure certainty in healthcare outcomes. The importance of creating conditions for the 
accumulation of technological knowledge, and the inherent uncertainty of innovation in 
healthcare remain undeclared and unaddressed.  
 
An over-reliance on medical guidance and large-scale government programmes in which 
rules are specified far away from their integration context can mean that the importance of 
individual, group and organisational learning processes and structures for innovation is 
ignored. Similarly, current policies tend to neglect the unpredictability of how technology 
elements evolve in hospitals. For example, part of the NPfIT programme in the South East 
region has been the external specification of diagnostic images that may be transported. 
While this may seem a suitable issue to focus on for the purpose of regional systems 
harmonisation, outsourcing such a decision to external agents can create operational 
problems (such as inadequate allowance for the size of diagnostic images that need to be 
communicated) for hospitals themselves.  
 
Agent involvement in guidance formulation, such as NICE are doing, is important, but it 
must also be acknowledged that technological change has persistent elements that are 
uncertain and highly differentiated across organisational contexts and over time. Hospitals 
may not possess the required resources to meet regulatory aims, and policies need to take 
into account such differences (not just inputs and outputs), as well as the considerably long 
time spans that are required to accumulate technological knowledge and improve 
performance.  
 
In their technological learning requirements hospitals have some important resemblances to 
firms. For example, they differ from one another in their internal processes of 
communication, collaboration, knowledge exchange, and mentoring, as well as in their 
inter-relationships with other organisations (such as with universities and with producers of 
diagnostic devices). Their knowledge bases, social norms, and connectedness with other 
parts of the healthcare system are more likely to reveal whether they will engage in 
qualitative change, than changes in economic incentives, which may bring about 
quantitative changes without qualitative improvements in services. Policies need to support 
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the creation of an integrated healthcare innovation system that includes hospitals and their 
broader scientific and technological environments.  
 
The use of productivity targets for hospitals needs to be reconsidered because they obscure 
and hide the importance of incremental technological accumulation for the development of 
healthcare services. For example, an increase in CT scans and a reduction in waiting times 
do not necessarily mean an increase in diagnostic accuracy. Similarly, time lines for 
externally governed processes such as NPfIT need to be more realistic. Current 
programmes continuously underestimate the complexity of NHS transition to the IT 
technological paradigm (Clegg and Shepherd 2007).  
 
In hospitals it is difficult to predict who the end-user of a particular diagnostic 
technological product or service is likely to be. For example, in the case of CT, the user 
may be the radiologist or radiographer, while the end-user is the patient. The main elements 
that in economic theory define the user (for example, choice) are not really present in the 
hospital context. Similarly, the emergent nature of systems technologies such as the 
evolution of user groups and the creation of user groups must be acknowledged if 
innovation is to remain a goal.  
 
Current policies suggest that innovation drivers and outcomes for hospitals can be 
identified ex ante. This thesis has shown that in the case of diagnostic imaging technologies 
it is very difficult to see which factors are driving the process of innovation and what their 
outcomes are because hospitals are complex and open, not simple and closed systems. It 
needs to be acknowledged that while certain policy instruments may work for some 
hospitals, they will not work in others. To remedy this, health technology policy targets 
should aim at creating and sustaining learning conditions for technological accumulation.  
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8.4. Final conclusions  
This study has explored innovation in clinical practice using a framework for organisational 
learning and technological evolution. In the case studies on learning and change in CT, 
MRI and PACS practices it was shown that that there exist a number of underlying features 
of technology such as complexity, cumulativeness, and unpredictability, which shape 
innovation in hospitals. Policy needs to address the activities required by hospitals to deal 
with this complexity and learn.  
 
Policies directed at health technologies should take into account that hospitals differ in their 
practices, norms and resources, and if this heterogeneity is not acknowledged it can cause 
inefficiencies in the innovation process. In conclusion, medical innovation can be improved 
by policies that are informed by explicit support for technological learning in clinical 
practice. 
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